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Terms of reference 
PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION ACT 1998 
I, PETER COSTELLO, Treasurer, pursuant to Parts 2 and 3 of the Productivity 
Commission Act 1998, request that the Productivity Commission undertake an inquiry to 
evaluate the affordability and availability of housing for first home buyers. 
Recognising that home ownership is very highly valued by families and individuals, and is 
central to social and family stability, for the purposes of this evaluation the Commission 
should: 
•  Identify and analyse all components of the cost and price of housing, including new 
and existing housing for those endeavouring to become first home owners; 
•  Identify mechanisms to improve the efficiency of the supply of housing and associated 
infrastructure; and 
•  Identify any impediments to first home ownership, and assess the feasibility and 
implications of reducing or removing such impediments. 
Particular attention should be given to the following matters as they affect the cost and 
availability of residential land and housing in both metropolitan and rural areas: 
(a) the identification, release and development of land and the provision of basic related 
infrastructure; 
(b) the efficiency and transparency of different planning and approval processes for 
residential land; 
(c) the efficiency and transparency of taxes, levies and charges imposed at all stages of the 
housing supply chain; 
(d) the efficiency, structure and role of the land development industry and its relationship 
with the dwelling construction industry and how this may be affected by government 
regulations; 
(e) the effect of standards, specifications, approval and title requirements on costs and 
choice in new dwelling construction; and 
(f)  the operation of the total housing market, with specific reference to the availability of a 
range of public and private housing types, the demand for housing, and the efficiency 
of use of the existing residential housing stock. 
The inquiry will also identify and examine mechanisms available to improve the ability of 
households, particularly low income households, to benefit from owner-occupied housing. 
This will include an assessment of rent and direct ownership subsidies, loan guarantees and 
shared equity initiatives.   
 




In undertaking the inquiry, the Commission is to invite public submissions, consult with 
key interest groups and affected parties, issue a draft report, and produce a final report of 
its findings by 31 March 2004. 
 
PETER COSTELLO 
[Reference received 4 August 2003]     
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Key findings 
•  Fluctuations in prices and ‘affordability’ are inherent features of housing markets. 
•  The upswing in housing prices since the mid-1990s has been bigger and more 
widespread than in previous cycles. 
– Notwithstanding lower interest rates, housing ‘affordability’ has declined 
considerably in the past two or three years. 
•  Rising house prices indicate that demand has been outstripping supply. 
–  Much of this increase in housing demand has been due to cheaper, more 
accessible finance and buoyant economic growth through the 1990s. 
–  This led to higher prices because of inherent limitations on the responsiveness of 
housing supply to surges in demand, particularly as much of the demand came 
from existing home owners seeking to ‘upgrade’ in established areas. 
•  Only in the last couple of years have house prices surpassed levels that are 
explicable on this basis, with some additional investment seemingly predicated on 
unrealistic expectations (in a ‘supportive’ tax environment) of ongoing capital gains. 
•  To the extent that currently low housing affordability reflects cyclical price pressures, 
this will eventually be reversed. (Evidence of market cooling is already emerging.) 
However, there is a role for policy to address forces that can cause prices to be 
excessive over the entire housing cycle. 
•  Interactions between negative gearing, ‘capital works’ deductions, post-1999 capital 
gains provisions and marginal income tax rates have lent impetus to investment 
demand during the housing boom.  
–  These influences are not confined to housing and selective ‘fixes’ could have 
ramifications across the economy. Potential reforms need to be assessed 
through a broader review, with a focus on capital gains provisions. 
•  Reducing reliance on stamp duties would help first home buyers and improve the 
efficiency of housing markets over time. 
•  There is also scope to moderate price and affordability pressures over time by: 
–  improving land release and planning approval processes; and 
–  ensuring that developer charges for infrastructure relate appropriately to the 
benefits provided to home buyers in new housing developments. 
•  The First Home Owner Scheme, though conceived to compensate for the GST, 
would have more impact on home ownership if better targeted at lower income 
households. 
–  But the funds may generate larger social benefits if used to address the broader 
housing needs of the lowest income Australians, which should be the subject of a 
separate public review. 
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Overview 
Owning a home is of fundamental importance to most Australians and we have 
among the highest rates of home ownership in the world. The ‘family home’ brings 
many people a sense of security and belonging, and home ownership generates 
wider benefits for a nation’s ‘social capital’. A house is also the most valuable asset 
that most people acquire in their lifetimes and accounts for around two-thirds of all 
private sector wealth in Australia. A house is therefore both a home and an 
investment. 
It follows that most Australians have an abiding interest in house prices. When 
prices rise sharply, as they have done since the mid-1990s, existing home owners — 
around 70 per cent of Australian households — benefit from increased wealth. But 
the new generation of aspiring first home buyers can find it more difficult to realise 
their dream. Because housing markets are inherently cyclical, concerns about first 
home affordability arise periodically. Against the backdrop of especially rapid price 
growth in recent years, the possibility that home ownership may be moving out of 
reach for many has prompted the Government to initiate this public inquiry.  
The terms of reference are wide-ranging, but they essentially comprise three 
questions: 
•  What has happened to affordability for first and other home buyers in recent 
years? 
•  What have been the major causes of changes in affordability? 
•  Are government policy initiatives warranted to improve affordability or the 
efficiency of housing markets generally? 
Within the time available to it, the Commission has sought to bring a broad 
perspective to these issues, encompassing the demand and supply sides of the 
housing market, distinguishing structural from cyclical influences, and assessing 
policy according to the implications for the community as a whole.     





Box 1  Some observations about housing markets 
•  Houses are assets that provide an ongoing stream of ‘consumption’ and investment 
services. Prices reflect expectations about the future value of these services, as well 
as current market conditions. 
•  Housing prices — and especially the value of the land on which they are sited — 
fluctuate considerably over time, partly as a result of slow supply responses to 
periodic surges in demand. Also, price rises (or falls) can condition expectations 
about the future. ‘Overshooting’ can result, with booms followed by busts. 
•  In Australia, since 1996, average house prices have more than doubled in nominal 
terms and risen by around 80 per cent in real terms — over half of this in the last 
three years. 
•  Housing markets are diverse and comprise many different segments, based on 
location, housing type and quality. The market can also be divided into rental and 
owner-occupied components.  
•  While price pressures inevitably flow across market segments, differences can 
persist. For example, in both Sydney and Melbourne, real prices over the past 
decade have actually fallen in some suburbs, while increasing by as much as 
15 per cent a year in others. 
 
 
What has happened to ‘affordability’? 
While Australia has experienced periods of more rapid growth in house prices, the 
escalation in prices since the mid-1990s has been more prolonged and cumulatively 
greater than in previous upswings (see figure 1). It has also been more widely 
spread. Price rises largely began in the more expensive suburbs of Sydney and 
Melbourne, but over time spread across these and other capital cities, as well as to 
many regional centres. Unlike the booms in the early-1970s and late-1980s, the 
recent upswing has not extended to commercial property. 
This price growth has meant that the median house price in Australia is now equal 
to 9 times average per capita income, compared to 6 times at the beginning of the 
upswing. This is much higher than at the peak of the last boom and also appears 
high by international standards. 
However, the ‘affordability’ of home ownership at a point in time depends not just 
on house prices and income levels, but also on the cost of finance, which fell 
dramatically in the 1990s. As a consequence, during the recent upswing, the various 
published indexes all show affordability to be stable or improving until the last 
couple of years, when further steep price rises occurred.     
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While ‘measured’ affordability has declined considerably in the most recent years 
— generally and for first home buyers — it is unclear where it stands historically. 
Notwithstanding their popular usage, the available indexes all suffer from 
methodological and data problems that preclude precise conclusions, particularly 
concerning first home buyers. In the Commission’s view, the most that can be said 
is that affordability in parts of Australia is now near, if not below, the low levels of 
the late 1980s, when inflation and interest rates were very high. 
Another possible indicator of what has happened to affordability is home ownership 
rates. These are currently estimated at nearly 70 per cent (as a proportion of all 
households), which is high by international standards. While ownership rates have 
fallen somewhat since the 1980s, they appear to have stabilised during the first part 
of the boom (to 2001). This is consistent with improvements in measured 
affordability in that period, resulting from rising incomes and falling mortgage 
rates. Moreover, the previous decline in home ownership was largely concentrated 
in the younger age brackets, possibly because many Australians have been entering 
the workforce and starting families later. Detailed ownership data are not yet 
available for the last couple of years, when house prices rose sharply. However, the 
surge in investment in rental housing may be indicative of further reductions in 
ownership rates in this latest period.     


























Much has been made of the recent decline in the share of new housing loan 
approvals accounted for by first home buyers. However, at least until very recently, 
this seems to have been the result of strong growth in demand by investors and 
change-over buyers, and some earlier ‘pull-forward’ of first home purchases to 
qualify for the additional temporary subsidy to first home buyers of new dwellings. 
The underlying trend in the number of first home buyer approvals has been flat over 
the past decade (see figure 2), though a continuation of the most recent decline 
would change that. 
Box 2  Who are the ‘first home buyers’? 
•  The majority of first home buyers are aged in their twenties and thirties, with the 
average age remaining at around 33 over the past decade. 
•  Most first home buyers are couples, though the proportion of lone-person 
households buying a first home has increased by 50 per cent since 1990. 
•  The majority of first home buying households have above-average incomes, with 
over 55 per cent reporting gross weekly incomes in the top two income quintiles in 
2000-01. Though this share has changed little from a decade earlier, a growing 
proportion of the households buying their first home have two or more incomes. 
•  More first home buyers are purchasing townhouses and apartments (20 per cent in 
2000-01 compared to 12 per cent a decade earlier). They are also purchasing fewer 
new dwellings (20 per cent in 2000-01 compared to 26 per cent in 1994). 
•  First home buyers rely heavily on debt finance — in the three years to 1999, the 
average deposit paid was 10  per  cent of the purchase price. Of those paying a 
deposit, nearly 80 per cent had saved it themselves. 
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Why have prices risen so fast? 
A story of demand and supply 
Surging house prices clearly signal that demand has been outstripping supply. It is 
important in seeking the causes, therefore, to consider the factors influencing both 
sides of the market. This was a matter on which participants expressed a variety of 
views. Some emphasised the role of demand forces, whereas others argued that 
constraints on the ability of supply to respond were the main problem. The different 
diagnoses led to different suggested remedies.  
In the Commission’s view, both sides of the market have contributed to observed 
outcomes. However, the dominant source of the widespread escalation in prices has 
been a general surge in demand — above the normal increases associated with 
population and income growth — to which supply was inherently incapable of 
responding, at least in a way that could moderate the pressure on prices in the short 
term. There are several elements to the explanation. 
‘Easy money’ a key driver 
Cheaper and more accessible housing finance is a central part of the story. With 
inflation under control, interest rates fell through much of the 1990s and, in recent 
years, have been about half their levels of a decade earlier (see figure 3). At the 
same time, greater competition among housing lenders (including the advent of 
mortgage originators and brokers) has made it much easier to obtain loans, and has 
contributed to lower interest costs by reducing lending margins. 
For owner occupiers, a halving of the interest rate almost doubles the mortgage 
potentially obtainable, as well as nearly doubling the price of a home that can be 
‘afforded’ for a given budget or income. With double the purchasing power, 
existing home owners could choose to ‘trade-up’ to an improved (bigger, nicer, 
better located) house, and aspiring first home owners could buy sooner. This didn’t 
happen overnight, because decisions about moving home take time and depend on a 
family’s circumstances. But the cumulative response to lower finance costs was a 
growing demand for housing, most of it not from first home buyers. To the extent 
that interest rates remain relatively low and finance readily accessible, a large part 
of the recent shift upward in prices will be permanent.     
















































































At the same time, lower (real) interest rates and expectations of rising house prices 
encouraged greater investment in rental properties, much of it by existing owner 
occupiers:  
•  The proportion of taxpayers with an investment property has almost doubled in 
the past decade, reaching nearly 17 per cent in the most recent survey. 
•  In the same period, investment loans as a proportion of new loan commitments 
have grown from around 20 to more than 40  per  cent (see figure  4), with 
investment loans now accounting for one-third of banks’ total loans outstanding. 
The investor-driven component of demand for housing was further stimulated by 
the downturn in the share market from 2000 to early 2003; by a ‘supportive’ tax 
environment (see below); and by aggressive marketing of housing investment 
‘opportunities’. 
Economic growth contributed 
A fundamental determinant of housing affordability in the long term is income. As 
people’s incomes grow, they generally spend proportionately more on housing. 
Since the early 1990s, real average household income has increased by just over 
1 per cent a year; the number of people in full-time jobs has grown by over 900 000 
and, in aggregate, real household disposable income has risen by about 30 per cent.  
The implication is that, in addition to the effects of cheaper and more accessible 
credit, a sizeable proportion of the burgeoning demand for housing has come from 
higher incomes and more jobs — in short, economic growth.     
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Investors First home buyers Change-over buyers
Note. Excludes refinancing of established dwellings. 
Other demand-side influences have been longer term 
The major determinants of the underlying growth in demand for additional 
dwellings are population growth and the propensity of people to form households. 
Both have played a significant longer-term role, but do not explain the surge in 
demand and prices since the mid-1990s. 
•  While immigration has grown rapidly in this period, it has been partly offset by a 
slower rate of natural increase in the resident population, so that the overall rate 
of population growth has been relatively stable. That said, immigration has been 
an important contributor to underlying demand growth, especially in Sydney and 
Melbourne. (In Brisbane, migration from other parts of Australia has been the 
major contributor.) 
•  A trend to smaller households, including a rise in single occupancy, has also 
increased underlying demand for housing. But this is a long-term phenomenon 
predating the recent boom. (The average number of people in a ‘household’ has 
fallen from 4.5 in 1901, to 3.3 in 1971, and 2.6 in 2001.) 
But there were some recent ‘boosters’ 
A feature of the upswing in prices since 1996 is the ‘second wind’ it appeared to 
receive in the last few years. Apart from the stock market downturn, noted 
previously, two other developments are relevant on the demand side.  
•  One was the boost to demand provided by the First Home Owner Scheme, which 
in compensating for the GST has injected an additional $4.3  billion into the     




housing market over the past three and a half years. However, its overall effect 
on prices has been relatively small. 
•  The second was the September 1999 change to capital gains taxation, from a real 
to a ‘discounted’ nominal basis. This heightened the attraction for individuals of 
investing in property in a period of strong house price growth and low inflation, 
reinforcing other demand-side pressures. 
Why couldn’t supply keep up? 
Cheaper, more readily available housing finance in a booming economy, with some 
added policy stimulus, has resulted in a prolonged surge in demand. Borrowing for 
housing has increased over four-fold in real terms since the early-1990s.  
In most markets, such an increase in demand would have had an initial impact on 
prices, but this would soon have induced extra supply, moderating price outcomes 
over time. So why hasn’t this happened in the housing market? The short answer is 
that, apart from any regulatory hindrances, the supply of housing is inherently 
constrained from responding quickly to sudden demand pressures.  
•  Even in a best-practice supply chain, it can take several years to bring new land 
on-stream, to provide the associated infrastructure and to construct new 
dwellings. 
•  But even if this were not so, there would have been major price pressures in the 
recent cycle, because much of the surge in demand came from people seeking to 
upgrade their dwellings (mainly in established areas) in response to increased 
purchasing power. Even if only a small proportion of households attempt to buy 
a higher quality or better located home, the price of all housing is soon bid up. 
Over the past decade, borrowing by owner occupiers for existing dwellings has 
increased at more than double the rate of borrowing for new dwellings (see 
figure  5). Indeed, new housing sales (including at the urban fringe) have rarely 
accounted for more than 2  per  cent of the housing stock, compared to average 
housing turnover of 6 to 8 per cent a year. 
That is not to suggest that governments could not make supply more responsive (see 
below). However, in order to accommodate a general surge in demand, actions 
would need to be focused on the more desirable established suburbs, where higher 
density development is not feasible on a large scale and, even if successful, would 
not necessarily meet the preferences of many of those seeking to upgrade.     
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Established dwellings New dwellings Alterations and additions
 
Have prices ‘overshot’? 
Various fundamental influences on the demand and supply sides of the market 
explain much, but not necessarily all, of the recent growth in house prices — 
especially in the last couple of years. In an asset price boom, rising prices can create 
expectations of further price increases unrelated to any change in market 
fundamentals. Inherent features of the housing market — such as lagged supply 
responses — make it particularly prone to ‘overshooting’. One recent international 
study concluded that property price booms were three times more likely to be 
followed by a ‘bust’ than booms in the stock market. Price falls can be substantial, 
as Australian experience attests. 
It is difficult to determine with precision whether house prices are ‘appropriate’ at 
any point in time, especially given the diversity and segmentation within housing 
markets. However, some basic indicators on the investment side of the market 
suggest that overshooting has occurred, even allowing for the effects of taxation 
provisions (discussed below). For example: 
•  rental yields on residential property — and the implicit rental benefits of owner-
occupied housing — have fallen well below their long-term averages in most of 
the capital cities (see figure 6); 
•  the rate of growth in the price of apartments has been comparable to the rate of 
increase for detached dwellings, despite lesser land requirements; and 
•  vacancy rates, especially for apartments, have risen, suggesting that supply has 
more than caught up with demand in this segment (with more supply on the 
way).      




























































—— Rental yields for houses    — - — Rental yields for units   ------- Vacancy rate 
Note. Rental yield is calculated as the median annual rent as a proportion of the median dwelling price.  
Taken together, such indicators raise doubts about the sustainability of current 
prices — especially in market segments such as inner-city apartments. 
A presumption of continuing and strong appreciation in house prices appears to 
have been driving market outcomes. Yet realistic expectations about income and 
population growth, or other ongoing drivers of housing demand, cannot support a 
continuation of recent price growth. Moreover, recent interest rate rises, the 
likelihood of some catch-up in supply, and improved returns to investment in the 
stock market, all point to a softening of short-term price pressures.  
There is already evidence of market cooling. For example, recent months have seen 
the cancellation of several proposed high-rise projects, reduced auction clearance 
rates across the board, a substantial drop in lending for housing, and a marked 
deceleration in average house price growth in Sydney and Melbourne, with price 
falls in some market segments. 
What should governments do? 
This assessment suggests that there is limited scope for governments to improve 
affordability for first (and other) home buyers in the short term. 
•  Sustained growth in household incomes and cheaper and more accessible 
housing finance have been of considerable benefit to the community generally, 
notwithstanding their effects on house prices and first home buyers.     
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•  The apparent overshooting in the market will be addressed by cyclical price 
adjustment. Though disadvantaging those who have recently purchased homes, 
such a market correction (together with further income growth) will in due 
course improve affordability for prospective first home buyers. 
However, governments do have an important role to play in facilitating efficient 
housing outcomes. In particular, policy initiatives to address any structural factors 
that encourage excessive demand for housing, or that unnecessarily reduce the 
responsiveness of supply to increases in demand, will reduce ‘average’ house prices 
over future cycles and could provide enduring affordability benefits to both home 
buyers and renters. 
Would tax changes help? 
Taxation arrangements can have direct and indirect effects on house prices and thus 
on affordability. However, the economic incidence of any given tax is not easy to 
determine and rarely equates with the statutory obligation to pay it. Thus, the 
burden of taxation on housing — and especially housing-specific taxes — will 
generally be shared between the buyer and the seller, regardless of who initially 
pays.  
While the impacts of taxes such as the GST and stamp duty cannot be determined 
precisely, increased taxation has not been responsible for much of the recent 
escalation in house prices. For example, though stamp duty revenue has increased 
strongly as a result of rising house prices and higher turnover, it remains a relatively 
small proportion of the price of a house. 
Even so, stamp duties are a hurdle for households endeavouring to save a deposit 
for their first home. They also inhibit the efficient reallocation and adaptation of the 
housing stock. Reducing reliance on stamp duties could thus be expected both to 
improve the efficiency of housing markets over time and, depending on how it is 
financed, facilitate home ownership.  
Of course, moving in this direction would not be straightforward: 
•  reliance on stamp duties, and therefore the revenue that would need to be raised 
through more efficient alternative tax instruments, varies across jurisdictions 
(but it is substantial in all); 
•  various administrative and transitional issues would need to be addressed were 
stamp duty revenue to be replaced by, for example, wider application of land tax 
or by reducing payroll tax concessions and exemptions; and 
•  there could also be implications for Commonwealth–State financial 
arrangements.      




The Commission does not see these as negating the potential benefits of reform, but 
rather as highlighting the importance of a carefully managed approach. Reform 
could be undertaken by each jurisdiction individually, although Commonwealth–
State implications would be best addressed in a joint forum. 
The coverage of the review to be held by 2005 under the 1999 Intergovernmental 
Agreement on the reform of Commonwealth–State financial relations, should be 
extended to include consideration of how best to reduce stamp duties on property 
conveyancing. In particular, the review should examine the scope to replace 
stamp duty revenue with more efficient forms of taxation or sources of revenue. 
Stamp duties can apply to sales already subject to GST. Moreover, because stamp 
duty can be collected more than once as a property changes hands, GST can also 
sometimes apply to stamp duty-inclusive sales. There are likely to be efficiency 
gains from reducing such tax-on-tax anomalies, particularly if stamp duties are 
likely to continue for some time. 
If the 2005 intergovernmental review (or another mechanism) does not lead to 
reduced stamp duties on property transactions, a further forum should assess the 
potential gains from addressing property-related ‘tax on tax’ and ‘multiple tax 
collection’ issues.  
Various aspects of the personal taxation regime also have an impact on expenditure 
on housing and therefore on house prices and affordability. For instance, established 
home owners are advantaged by the exemption of the principal residence from 
capital gains tax and the non-taxation of ‘imputed’ rental income from owner-
occupied dwellings — potentially leading to over-investment in housing.  
However, it is unclear that there would be large gains to the community from 
changes to promote tax ‘neutrality’ in relation to owner-occupied housing, given the 
administrative complexities and compliance costs, and the possible loss of social 
benefits from home ownership that would follow. Equally, it would not be desirable 
to extend existing tax preferences through, for example, allowing owner occupiers 
to claim tax deductions for mortgage interest costs. 
Other aspects of the personal taxation regime — including negative gearing rules, 
‘capital works’ deductions for buildings, the 1999 change to capital gains tax for 
assets held by individuals, and high marginal income tax rates — have combined to 
magnify the attractiveness of investing in residential property during the recent 
upswing in house prices, thereby adding to price pressures.  
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It needs to be emphasised that these features of the income tax system do not in 
principle favour private investment in rental housing over other passive 
investments, such as in the stock market or commercial property. Investors in these 
areas can also benefit either directly or indirectly, from the same negative gearing 
and CGT arrangements, and the same allowable deductions. The fact that these 
provisions, like many others in the tax system, may have different effects across 
asset classes is not in itself a matter for policy concern.  
Nonetheless, aspects of those provisions, particularly the CGT arrangements, appear 
to have ‘pro-cyclical’ effects that potentially distort investment flows whether into 
housing or other asset classes. Attempting to address these impacts for housing 
alone would be hazardous. Indeed, ostensibly ‘quick fixes’ suggested by many 
participants — such as limiting negative gearing or removing the CGT discount for 
housing — could detract from rather than promote more efficient investment. 
Hence, the Commission considers that a broader examination is needed.  
The Australian Government should, as soon as practicable, establish a review of 
those aspects of the personal income tax regime that may have recently 
contributed to excessive investment in rental housing. The focus of the review 
should be on the Capital Gains Tax provisions. However, it should also assess 
‘second best’ options for addressing distortions in incentives to invest in housing 
and other asset markets, including: restrictions on negative gearing and changes 
to the capital works deduction provisions for buildings. Pending such review, it 
would not be appropriate to make housing-specific changes to negative gearing 
rules or to capital gains tax arrangements. 
Could supply be made more responsive? 
As noted, there are inherent constraints on the capacity of housing supply to 
respond to surges in demand in a way that could greatly moderate price rises. That 
said, in many parts of Australia, it appears that regulatory processes could work 
better to facilitate a more responsive housing market.  
Most governments have sought to limit the outward expansion of their capital cities, 
in order to reduce infrastructure costs and protect the environment. In doing so, the 
scarcity value of land in those cities will inevitably rise. Unless there are offsetting 
increases in housing density, affordability will be adversely affected. Indeed, there 
is evidence that constraints on the supply of land at the urban fringe have added to 
price pressures, particularly in Sydney.  
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These trade-offs call for strategic planning processes in which the benefits and costs 
of different long-term options for the evolution of cities, and the assumptions and 
estimates that underpin them, can be publicly discussed and tested. It is not evident 
that all jurisdictions have adequately met these requirements in relation to the future 
supply of residential land. 
All state and territory governments should have long-term land release strategies 
that are based on extensive public scrutiny of projections and key assumptions. 
The trade-offs between greenfield development and urban consolidation should 
be a particular focus of such processes. 
While state and territory governments directly influence what land is potentially 
available for the construction of dwellings, decisions about what development is 
permissible and where, are generally made by local governments. The planning 
approvals process is thus critical to the timely and appropriate expansion and 
reshaping of cities. 
 
Box 3  Examples of reforms to planning approval processes 
•  Pre-lodgement certification — in Victoria, procedures have been developed aimed 
at ensuring that applications meet the information requirements of the approval 
process from the outset. 
•  Fast-tracking approvals — in South Australia, the Minister can now identify a ‘major 
development’ (of social, economic or environmental significance) for fast-track 
approval, in which merit appeals, judicial review and civil enforcement are removed. 
•  Integrated approvals process — the NSW Government has introduced a single point 
of contact for developers to obtain the separate applications required by different 
referral or approval bodies. 
•  Outsourcing assessments — a number of councils, including Leichhardt, Woollahra 
and North Sydney, have trialled private sector involvement in planning approval 
assessments on a fee-for-service basis, in order to speed up the process and 
overcome skill shortages. 
•  Alternative dispute resolution — new mechanisms to resolve disputes early in the 
planning approval process include the Independent Hearing and Assessment Panel 
(Liverpool City Council, Fairfield City Council) and facilitation committees (Gosford 
City Council). 
•  Speeding up court hearings — in South Australia’s Environment, Resources and 
Development Court a compulsory conference provides an opportunity for parties to 
an appeal to resolve differences before proceeding to a hearing. 
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The overwhelming view put to this inquiry by those involved in seeking 
development approvals is that the processes are deficient and have become 
increasingly so — and that this has contributed to the recent escalation in house 
prices. The views of local and state governments have varied, but their actions in 
initiating reviews and making some changes to planning approval processes (see 
box 3) indicate recognition that things can be done better. 
The combination of state-based reviews (such as Victoria’s ‘Better Decisions 
Faster’) and the work of the Development Assessment Forum (see box 4) at the 
national level, provides an important opportunity for informed debate and 
assessment of potentially useful reforms. Indeed, these reviews are better placed 
than this broader national inquiry to assess in detail the problems in different 
jurisdictions and to develop specific options for addressing them. Nevertheless, in 
the Commission’s view, the four areas identified below deserve particular attention 
in carrying forward various proposals and directions for reform emerging from 
these reviews.  
State and local governments need to give priority to the scope to: 
•  achieve greater separation of policy making and administration; 
•  streamline permit approval processes to enable minor or uncontentious 
developments to by-pass unnecessary informational or consultative 
requirements;  
•  improve or expand ‘as of right’ development provisions, without detracting 
unduly from the property rights of existing residents; and 
•  reduce delays in appeals while maintaining the protections of due process. 
As participants’ responses to the Discussion Draft illustrate, there are no single or 
uncontentious solutions in any of these areas. In each of them, a core issue is the 
extent to which clear rules, with broad community support, can be established. 
There will inevitably be an element of ‘experiment’ in any initiatives adopted to 
improve regulatory processes. And community standards can change over time. 
This underlines the importance of not only subjecting any new proposals to 
adequate testing and scrutiny, but also of conducting periodic reviews to assess the 
performance of those that are implemented. It also cautions against seeking to 
impose uniform national approaches before outcomes have been assessed. This in 
turn highlights the importance of having mechanisms to enable best practice to be 
communicated across jurisdictions on an ongoing basis. 
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Box 4  The work of the Development Assessment Forum (DAF) 
The DAF was established in 1998 for the purpose of identifying ways to streamline 
development approval processes. It comprises representatives from the Australian, 
state, territory and local governments, the development industry and related 
professional associations. Following a recent review, drawing on a report by the Centre 
for Developing Cities, it has recommended the following ‘leading priorities’ for planning 
policies and processes (elaborated in chapter 6): 
1.  Separation of policy development from planning approval roles. 
2.  Technically excellent assessment criteria. 
3.  A single point of assessment for development applications. 
4.  Independent, expert assessment and review panels. 
5.  Appeals dealt with by a second expert assessment panel, against the same criteria. 
6.  Third party involvement limited to initial policy input. 
7.  Private sector involvement in specified compliance assessment roles. 
8.  Assessments streamed into tracks related to complexity and impacts. 
9.  Built-in feedback mechanisms to improve processes over time. 
 
 
Could industry perform better? 
The land development, detached housing and building materials industries appear 
broadly efficient and competitive. While some land developers may have a degree 
of market power in certain areas, other developments, existing housing and the 
potential entry of new developers, limit the scope for overpricing.  
However, productivity levels in the commercial (high-rise) residential building 
sector are lagging behind its counterparts in several overseas countries, as well as 
being considerably below those in the detached housing sector. There is scope to 
improve work practices in the commercial sector. This could be especially helpful 
in reducing the costs of raising the density of urban areas. An effective regulatory 
framework is important in facilitating improved work practices. 
Notwithstanding past policy initiatives, apparent shortcomings have re-emerged in 
the way building regulations in Australia are developed, raising questions as to 
whether the benefits always outweigh the costs. Better use of regulatory impact 
assessments would help allay such concerns.     
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Are infrastructure charges too high? 
Government strategic planning and controls on development can be justified on the 
basis that some of the social costs and benefits of locational decisions, such as 
environmental impacts, are not reflected in prices faced by home buyers. However, 
a problem with relying on such supply-side controls is that they may not adequately 
account for community preferences. One benefit of a progressive shift to ‘user pays’ 
systems for infrastructure services, is that it should in time reduce the extent to 
which prescription is necessary to determine where new development can occur. 
However, no reduction in prescription has been evident to date. 
The housing and development industries have further argued that charges on 
developers for infrastructure have become excessive or are being inappropriately 
levied. Considerable potential savings for home buyers from better charging 
practices have been claimed.  
There is a strong case for users of infrastructure services paying for costs 
attributable to them. A charge on users, if it represents the true costs of supply, 
ensures that demand is not excessive and resources are not wasted. As noted, it also 
promotes efficient locational choices for housing development. The real issues 
relate to how to apportion the costs among users and over time. In the 
Commission’s view: 
•  Upfront charging for infrastructure should not in principle reduce affordability 
relative to equivalent payments over time, although in practice more marginal 
borrowers will be disadvantaged if lending institutions do not adjust their 
maximum loan-to-income rules.  
•  It is appropriate that the cost of ‘basic’ infrastructure contained within a 
particular development — and of predominant benefit to prospective home 
owners — is borne initially by the developer and included in house prices.  
•  For ‘major’ infrastructure shared among developments, where the incremental 
costs can be well established and vary across locations, there is also a good case 
for apportioning its costs according to use.  
•  However, where benefits are provided in common to users across the 
community, there is a stronger case for funding such investments out of general 
revenue sources. This is especially relevant to most ‘social’ infrastructure, such 
as community recreation facilities and open space, the costs of which in some 
jurisdictions are increasingly being borne upfront by developers.     




Investments in items of social or economic infrastructure that provide benefits in 
common across the wider community should desirably be funded out of 
borrowings and serviced through rates, taxes or usage charges. 
While current charging practices do not always conform to these requirements, 
inappropriate or excessive charging is unlikely to account for a large proportion of 
existing developer charges. Moreover, developer charges have generally increased 
less than house prices. In any case, the burden of any excessive charging for 
infrastructure, being akin to a tax, would tend to fall most heavily on owners of 
undeveloped land. By the same token, any subsidised provision of new 
infrastructure would primarily benefit land owners or developers rather than home 
purchasers. 
Nonetheless, widespread compliance with some general charging principles would 
help to promote more efficient and equitable outcomes.  
Developer charges (and charging for infrastructure generally) should be: 
•  necessary — with the need for the services concerned being clearly 
demonstrated; 
•  efficient — justified on a whole-of-life cost basis and consistent with 
maintaining financial disciplines on service providers by precluding 
over-recovery of costs; and 
•  equitable — with a clear nexus between benefits and costs, and only 
implemented after industry and public input. 
Developer charges are more likely to satisfy the above principles if the processes for 
establishing and applying them are sound and transparent. Further, efficiency would 
be enhanced if charging regimes provide developers with some flexibility in the 
timing of developments and in the design of the infrastructure.  
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Authorities and utilities imposing developer contributions and charges should: 
•  follow guidelines based on the principles set out in the two previous 
recommendations, and be subject to independent regulatory scrutiny; 
•  provide for ‘out of sequence’ development if developers are prepared to meet 
the cost consequences; 
•  be open to proposals for alternative infrastructure arrangements that meet the 
needs of the households concerned; 
•  allow appeals on the amounts charged, or their coverage; and 
•  be accountable for how money raised from charges is spent. 
A case for direct assistance? 
The Commission was asked to assess various direct measures to assist people to 
achieve home ownership, particularly low-income households. A variety of such 
measures currently exist, most notably the First Home Owner Scheme (FHOS). 
Many new measures have been suggested, including proposals for ‘shared-equity’ 
and ‘lifeline’ schemes canvassed for the Home Ownership Taskforce. 
Assistance to promote home ownership needs to be predicated on the social benefits 
outweighing the costs. However, with ownership rates already high in Australia 
(most Australians attain home ownership sometime in their lifetime), and with the 
more recent affordability problems being partly cyclical, the case for support 
beyond what is already available through the tax system is not compelling. In 
particular, while the FHOS was conceived as compensation to first home buyers for 
the introduction of the GST, its ongoing justification in this role is questionable. 
The money involved could yield a higher return to the community if redirected to 
support the broader housing needs of low income households. 
In the course of this inquiry, the Commission has heard that many low income 
households in rental markets, or in public (or community) housing, face significant 
problems in getting access to affordable or adequate housing. While some 
participants have argued that such problems should be addressed in detail in this 
inquiry, the Commission is of the view that an inquiry with a focus on first home 
ownership could not do justice to the broad-ranging issues involved. Rather, they 
deserve separate review. 
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A national public inquiry should be established to examine the housing needs of 
low income households across Australia, including in Indigenous communities, 
and the nature and extent of assistance to help meet those needs. 
If governments wish to continue providing direct assistance to first home buyers, 
the current FHOS provides an administratively simple and flexible basis for 
delivering the bulk of such assistance.  
However, a deficiency in the present arrangements, reflecting the initial 
compensation rationale, is their limited targeting. The bulk of FHOS assistance goes 
to households with above-average incomes, who might otherwise have purchased a 
house before too long, even without assistance. In the Commission’s view, the 
scheme would have a greater impact on first home ownership if it were more 
closely targeted at lower income households, with a commensurate increase in grant 
levels. 
If the First Home Owner Scheme continues: 
•  assistance should be targeted to the housing needs of lower income households 
by restricting eligibility to homes below (regionally differentiated) price 
ceilings; and 
•  there should be a commensurate increase in the average size of the grant.  
As in the case of the FHOS, it is unclear whether various other assistance measures 
that have been proposed to assist first home buyers would yield significant benefits. 
Nor is it clear that such proposals would be preferable to a targeted FHOS. 
A shared equity arrangement of the sort considered by the recent Home Ownership 
Taskforce would effectively allow for the purchase of part of a home and may 
therefore make ‘ownership’ more accessible for lower income households. The test 
of the viability of this approach is whether the home lending market can develop 
products which are attractive to both borrowers and lenders. Given the likely 
complexity of shared-equity arrangements, the case for government ‘seed’ money or 
ongoing support is not compelling.  
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‘Lifeline’ assistance designed to help households cope with short-term financial 
stress, as also suggested by the Home Ownership Taskforce, involves administrative 
complexities and its impact on home ownership is uncertain. In any case, there are 
already mechanisms in place for this purpose and the case for government funding 
for a new scheme is weak. 
Concluding comments 
Housing markets are large, diverse and interactive. There are many players on both 
sides of the market, and pervasive government influence at all levels. And there are 
strong cyclical as well as structural influences on market outcomes. Prices 
periodically rise and fall, and such price movements can vary across market 
segments.  
In the Commission’s view, there is no ‘quick fix’ to address affordability concerns. 
Indeed, governments cannot prevent most of what happens to house prices and 
should not try. Nevertheless, there is scope for governments to increase the 
efficiency of housing markets and thereby to improve price and affordability 
outcomes over time. This report points to several areas where action appears 
warranted.  
A number of these areas are complex and some have ramifications beyond the 
housing market. In this short inquiry, it has not been feasible or appropriate to 
undertake the detailed assessments (and public testing) of specific policy responses 
to such wider problems. This report explains why change is needed and indicates 
directions for reform in these areas, as well as recommending changes in some 
housing-specific policies. It thus provides a foundation for reforms that should be of 
lasting benefit to the community.     
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1 About  the  inquiry 
1.1  What has the Commission been asked to do? 
For most Australians, home ownership is a major goal. Nearly 70  per  cent of 
dwellings in Australia are owner occupied, and it has previously been estimated that 
as many as 90 per cent of people attain home ownership at some stage of their lives. 
The ‘family home’ is also the most significant asset that most people acquire in 
their lifetimes and accounts for two-thirds of private sector wealth in Australia. 
Over the past few years, housing prices around Australia have risen sharply. This 
has made it more difficult for some prospective first home buyers to enter the 
market.  
The possibility that home ownership may be moving out of reach for an increasing 
number of young people and low income households prompted the Australian 
Government to set up this inquiry. While the terms of reference — which are set out 
at the front of this report — are broad ranging, they can be synthesised into three 
questions: 
•  What has been happening to affordability for first and other home buyers? 
•  What have been the major causes of changes in affordability? 
•  Are government policy initiatives warranted to improve affordability, or to 
improve the efficiency of the housing market more generally? 
In examining possible policy initiatives, the terms of reference ask the Commission 
to identify any impediments to first home ownership, and to assess the feasibility 
and implications of reducing or removing such impediments. The Commission is 
also asked to examine mechanisms to improve the ability of households, 
particularly low income households, to benefit from owner-occupied housing. 
Hence, the inquiry has provided an opportunity to review the effectiveness of 
existing measures to assist first home buyers, as well as to examine the sorts of 
proposals raised in reports prepared for the recent Prime Ministerial taskforce on 
home ownership (see Bor and Moloney 2003; Caplin and Joye et al. 2003; Gans and 
King 2003).     




1.2  How has the Commission approached its task? 
A community-wide perspective 
The Commission has framed its assessments of housing affordability and related 
policy settings in terms of what will deliver the best outcomes for the Australian 
community over time. This is in keeping with the general approach to policy 
analysis embedded in the Commission’s legislation. 
Within this community-wide framework, and consistent with the terms of reference, 
the Commission has had regard for the wider social benefits of home ownership 
(see box 1.1). Acknowledged benefits, such as greater social stability and improved 
health and educational outcomes, help to explain why the Australian and state and 
territory governments provide considerable support for home ownership. The basic 
requirement that all members of the community have access to affordable housing 
means that distributional issues also loom large in policy formulation. 
However, it is important to recognise that affordable rental housing also provides 
social and distributional benefits. Indeed, because of the additional flexibility that 
rental accommodation can offer, most people will prefer to rent during at least part 
of their lives. Also, for many aspiring first home owners, a period of renting will be 
necessary to accumulate a housing deposit.  
Hence, policies to assist home buyers must have regard to any costs imposed on 
those in private rental accommodation (or in public or other forms of community 
housing). Moreover, policies to promote and support home ownership can also have 
wider economic and social costs which must similarly be included in the policy 
calculus. For example: 
•  Such policies will inevitably see more of the community’s resources invested in 
housing, and less in other, possibly more productive, activities. 
•  Where support involves subsidies or tax concessions, there are costs for 
taxpayers and/or potential beneficiaries of alternative government programs. 
•  Increased investment in housing can have negative social or environmental 
effects: concerns about the adverse consequences of urban sprawl on the one 
hand, and higher density living on the other, are two examples. 
Beyond some point, these costs will outweigh the additional benefits for the 
community, meaning that the pursuit of ever increasing levels of home ownership 
would not be a sound policy objective. As a number of inquiry participants from the 
social welfare sector observed, home ownership will always be beyond the reach of 
some low income individuals and families, with other forms of government     
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assistance, such as public housing and rent assistance, being more effective ways to 
support their housing needs. 
 
Box 1.1  The social benefits of home ownership 
Access to affordable and quality housing is central to community wellbeing. Apart from 
meeting the basic need for shelter, it provides a foundation for family and social 
stability, and contributes to improved health and educational outcomes and a 
productive workforce. Thus it enhances both economic performance and ‘social 
capital’. 
While many of these social benefits will be provided by affordable, high quality rental 
housing, some studies (eg Rohe et al. 2000; Glaeser and Shapiro 2002) indicate that 
they tend to be larger for home ownership. For example: 
•  Because the value of their homes are directly affected by what happens in the 
surrounding community, owner occupiers are likely to have stronger incentives than 
renters for civic involvement. 
•  Home ownership provides greater security of tenure, reinforcing incentives for 
community participation. Less frequent relocation also minimises disruption to 
established social networks and children’s education. 
•  By giving occupiers more control over their living space, home ownership can 
enhance self esteem, in turn reducing the incidence of socially disruptive behaviour 
and promoting physical wellbeing. In this latter regard, recent Australian research by 
Waters (2002) suggests that home owners have better health than equivalent 
renters. And, the Australian Association of Social Workers (trans., p. 352) said that 
home ownership can promote better access to disability and aged services.  
Further, the Housing Industry Association (sub. DR260,  p.  7), amongst others, 
contended that home ownership can reduce the extent of welfare dependency later in 
life. In effect, the underlying argument is that home ownership is a form of ‘forced’ 
saving which, like superannuation, can subsequently be drawn on as an alternative to 
welfare payments. 
Such social benefits provide a rationale for governments to facilitate home ownership. 
In Australia, governments provide various tax concessions to owner occupiers and first 
home buyers (chapter 5). Also, they directly subsidise purchases by some home 
buyers (chapter 10). This support is in addition to the provision of public housing and 
rent assistance for low income households, and the exclusion of the family home from 
the pension assets test. 
However, the magnitude of the social benefits is very difficult to establish. Moreover, 
government support for home ownership is not without costs for others in the 
community (see text). Hence, the efficacy of specific measures to encourage home 
ownership will ultimately depend on whether the induced social benefits are greater 
than the accompanying costs (chapter 10). 
 
     




The implication is that the community’s interests will be served by policy settings 
that deliver a level of ownership where the social benefits and costs are 
approximately equal for the ‘marginal’ home owner. Consistent with this objective, 
the Commission has sought to identify initiatives that would both improve 
affordability for first home buyers — thereby facilitating home ownership — and 
enhance, or at least not detract from, overall community welfare. 
Understanding what underlies changing affordability 
At face value, the ‘affordability’ of home ownership is the product of house prices, 
the cost of housing finance and income levels.  
But underlying this ostensibly simple concept is a complex set of forces (see 
figure 1.1): 
•  House prices are the net outcome of various determinants of the demand for 
housing and the cost of supply. 
•  Some demand and supply factors are cyclical in nature, with their effects felt 
primarily in the short term. Others are ‘structural’ and influence prices over the 
medium to longer term. 
•  While the determinants of house prices can be categorised according to whether 
their initial impact is on demand or supply, the ultimate price effects will depend 
on how the two sides of the market interact. For example, the less responsive is 
supply, the greater will be the price rises ensuing from an increase in demand for 
housing. 
•  Income levels and the cost and availability of finance will have feedback impacts 
on the demand for housing over time, as well as affecting affordability at a point 
in time. In addition, the expectations generated by price rises may themselves 
fuel further rises — the so called ‘bubble’ phenomenon. 
Some other features of the housing market which make the analysis of prices and 
affordability more complex are discussed in box 1.2. 
What is clear, however, is that in virtually all countries house prices fluctuate 
considerably around long-term trends. In combination with (often related) changes 
in the cost of housing finance, this means that housing affordability also fluctuates. 
Not surprisingly, calls for additional support to assist first and low income 
households to purchase homes are most evident during periodic low points in the 
affordability cycle.  
 









Employment levels and composition (chapter 4)
Availability of finance (chapter 3)
Population growth (including immigration), household size and age 
structure (chapter 4)
Government assistance to home buyers (chapters 4 and 10)
Taxes and tax concessions for particular home buyers and owners 
(chapter 5)
Land release and development processes (chapter 6)
Costs of housing-related infrastructure (chapter 7)
Availability of housing  land (chapter 6)
Construction costs (chapter 8)
Affordability
Returns on other investments (chapter 3)
(chapter 4)
(chapter 3)
(chapter 9)    





Box 1.2  Some distinctive features of the housing market 
The housing market has some distinctive features which are relevant to the analysis of 
price trends and affordability. 
The nature of the asset 
•  The price of a ‘house’ represents the combined value of the dwelling and the land 
on which it is sited. Most of the change in house prices reflects changes in the value 
of land. (In this report, except where price data refer specifically to detached 
houses, the term ‘house prices’ is used generically to encompass all types of 
residential dwellings, including the land.) 
•  Houses are assets that provide an ongoing stream of consumption and investment 
services. Hence, the price of a house will implicitly reflect the discounted ‘present 
value’ of that stream of services and depend on expectations about future demand 
and supply, as well as current market conditions. 
Price volatility 
•  While house prices in most countries tend to rise over time, prices also fluctuate 
considerably, with ‘overshooting’ sometimes leading to booms and busts.  
•  The cyclical nature of housing demand is responsible for much of this price 
fluctuation. Most house purchases are financed by debt, making demand sensitive 
to movements in interest rates and access to finance, as well as to income and 
employment trends. And investment in rental housing is influenced by the returns 
available on alternative investments such as equities, which similarly fluctuate over 
time. 
•  Other factors also contribute to price volatility and overshooting: 
– Short-term constraints on the responsiveness of supply make it difficult to 
accommodate cyclical surges in demand. It can take several years to transform 
raw housing land to a construction-ready state (including the supporting 
infrastructure). There are also constraints on infill development and on the 
upgrading of the existing housing stock. 
–  ‘Indivisibility’ and the high search and other transactions costs associated with 
buying and selling houses make them much less liquid assets than, say, equities. 
This can delay and thereby accentuate adjustments to changing market 
conditions. Similarly, depending on their family circumstances, households may 
take years to vary their housing requirements in response to changes in prices, 
incomes and borrowing costs. 
(continued next page) 
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Box 1.2  (continued) 
Most transactions involve turnover of the existing housing stock  
•  The availability of housing land in cities and towns is typically limited. In combination 
with other previously noted constraints on supply, the result is that new dwellings 
augment the housing stock by at most 2 per cent a year. In contrast, each year, 6 to 
8  per  cent of the existing stock is bought and sold. This has two important 
implications for this inquiry:  
–  Rapid growth in demand for an asset stock that can only be expanded slowly will 
almost inevitably lead to increases in the value of housing land, and therefore to 
higher house prices — particularly in premium locations.  
–  In analysing price and affordability issues, it is necessary to look at impediments 
which discourage turnover of existing dwellings — for example, stamp duties — 
or upgrading of dwellings, as well as at constraints on augmentation of the stock. 
Segmentation of the market 
•  Within the overall housing market, there are many different segments. The market is 
split geographically, by dwelling type and by price/quality bands. It can also be 
divided into owner-occupied and rental housing. However, such submarkets are not 
unconnected, with substitution occurring across them in response to changes in 
relative prices and rental yields. The linkages between market segments in turn 
mean that: 
–  Even though the majority of first home buyers may be purchasing in particular 
submarkets, prices in those markets and hence affordability are influenced by 
broader market trends.  
–  Initiatives to help first home buyers will have implications for other home buyers, 
as well as for those in rental accommodation. 
•  Diversity within the overall market also raises the question of what prices should be 
used to assess affordability. Moreover, analyses of affordability trends should ideally 
account for changes in the nature and composition of the housing stock over time 
as preferences change. 
 
 
It is also evident that some of the drivers of recent house price increases and/or 
declining affordability, are not of policy concern or even amenable to policy 
intervention. For example, cheaper and more accessible finance, income growth and 
low returns on non-housing investments have been important contributors to the 
recent housing boom (chapters 3 and 4). And, depending on how it is measured 
(chapter  2), the apparent decline in affordability over the long term may partly 
result from the collective decisions of households to spend a greater share of their 
incomes on housing.      




Hence, in looking at how to improve housing affordability, the Commission has 
sought to identify factors or policy settings that unnecessarily or inappropriately 
inflate house prices. These could include, for example: 
•  unrealistic expectations on the part of purchasers about future price increases; 
•  tax or subsidy arrangements that encourage excessive demand for housing; or 
•  artificial or unnecessary regulatory constraints on additions or improvements to 
the housing stock in response to increased demand. 
The scope to address such impediments to greater affordability has in turn been a 
consideration in the Commission’s assessment of the case for direct government 
assistance to promote home ownership. 
A focus on priority issues 
In the limited time available for this inquiry, it would not have been possible for the 
Commission to address comprehensively each of the many influences on house 
prices and affordability. Indeed, some such as urban planning, land release 
arrangements and the taxation of housing, could reasonably be (and have been) the 
subject of major inquiries in their own right. 
Accordingly, the Commission has focused its attention on: 
•  what seem to have been the key drivers of recent increases in house prices, with 
emphasis on demand and supply factors (and any associated policy settings) that 
have recently changed; and 
•  policy initiatives likely to deliver significantly better outcomes for aspiring first 
home buyers and the wider community over time.  
In looking at these matters, the Commission has been cognisant of the role that 
public housing and Commonwealth rental assistance can play in assisting some low 
income households to eventually achieve home ownership. For example, several 
inquiry participants contended that public housing has provided an important 
stepping stone to ownership in parts of Australia and in some other countries. Also, 
to the extent that public housing augments the total housing stock, it can serve to 
contain price pressures in the broader market — and especially for the sort of 
properties likely to be most accessible for aspiring low income first home buyers. 
However, time constraints and the focus of the inquiry on affordability for those 
purchasing houses, precluded examination of the many more general (and 
important) issues attaching to public housing and Commonwealth rental assistance 
raised by participants.      
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Similarly, the Commission has not explored the possible role of regional policies in 
making home ownership more affordable. Such policies may well help to alleviate 
housing pressures in the major cities and thus improve affordability for those living 
there. On this basis, in its response to the Discussion Draft, the Victorian 
Government (sub. DR301, p. 8) contended that the Commission had ‘… omitted 
consideration of an important option to help first home buyers enter the housing 
market’.  
However, as discussed in box 1.3, benefits for home buyers in the major cities if 
more people could be induced to live in regional areas, would most likely come at 
the cost of reduced affordability for those already residing in these regional areas. 
Moreover, as several inquiry participants pointed out, housing affordability will be 
just one of many considerations in formulating effective regional policies. Indeed, 
the Victorian Government’s suggestions for complementary policy initiatives in 
areas such as higher education and immigration to encourage people to move to 
regional locations where housing costs are lower, illustrates why proper assessment 
of the whole area is beyond the purview of this inquiry. (No other government 
submissions took issue with this aspect of the Commission’s approach.) 
Finally, to avoid duplication of effort, the Commission has drawn heavily on the 
large body of previous Australian and overseas work concerned with housing issues 
germane to the terms of reference. Such studies are referred to throughout this 
report. 
Opportunities for extensive public input  
Because of the short reporting period for the inquiry, the Commission sought to 
streamline and expedite its inquiry processes. Nonetheless, these processes provided 
the opportunity for a wide range of interested parties to contribute to the 
Commission’s deliberations: 
•  Shortly after receiving the terms of reference, it released an Issues Paper 
(PC 2003a) inviting written submissions on the matters under review. Prior to 
releasing a Discussion Draft (see below) it received more than 220 submissions 
from a broad cross section of industry, government, financial sector and 
community interests, including from many individuals. 
•  During the course of the inquiry, the Commission met with a wide range of 
organisations and individuals, including: key industry associations; providers of 
housing finance; the Reserve Bank of Australia; various Commonwealth, state 
and local government entities; land and property developers; and several 
academics and research institutions engaged in housing-related research and 
policy development. Some of these meetings were conducted on an individual     




basis, while others took the form of mini-roundtables with particular interest 
groups. 
 
Box 1.3  Regional policy and housing affordability 
Over time, the regions may act as a safety valve if affordability problems in the cities 
become particularly acute. That is, if a large affordability gap opens up, some people 
will move to the regions where housing tends to be cheaper. The Victorian Government 
noted that such movement is already evident: 
Increasing numbers of consumers are … choosing to purchase homes in certain regional 
centres, and commute to work in the city, find employment locally, or re-settle after 
self-funded retirement. (sub. DR301, p. 8). 
Housing affordability will also influence where those moving from the cities choose to 
locate. For example, as a result of sharp increases in house prices in many coastal 
centres, migration from the cities to inland regional areas is becoming more common. 
However, whether regional policy should be explicitly targeted at reducing demand 
pressure on capital city housing markets — as suggested by the Victorian Government 
and some other participants — is a complex issue that cannot be satisfactorily resolved 
in an inquiry of this sort. 
The likely effects of regional policies on overall housing affordability are difficult to 
gauge: 
•  Population pressures have not contributed greatly to the demand surge that has 
caused affordability in the capital cities to decline sharply over the last year or two 
(chapter 4). 
•  While those encouraged to move to the regions may be able to purchase more 
affordable homes, as is already evident, the additional demand pressure is likely to 
reduce affordability for aspiring first home buyers already living in those areas. 
•  Improving transport links from regional centres to the cities may have a role to play 
in easing housing demand pressures in those cities, but the benefits from improving 
outer-suburban or city transport may be just as high.  
In any event, in some regions, house prices have been rising as fast, or faster, than in 
the major cities (chapter 2). There would be obvious problems trying to fine-tune 
regional policies on the basis of housing affordability, especially as those centres with 
the most affordable housing tend to be less attractive for economic and other reasons.  
This in turn illustrates that housing affordability is only one of many considerations in 
formulating effective regional policies. As past Australian experience illustrates, 
attempts to encourage people to move to regional areas without proper regard to the 
full range of economic and social effects can be costly. 
 
 
•  In September 2003, the Commission organised a larger roundtable, attended by 
some 30  housing experts and major interest groups, to elicit views and 
discussion on the key issues for the inquiry.     
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•  In December, the Commission released a Discussion Draft (PC 2003b) outlining 
its initial views and findings. To elicit views on that draft, the Commission held 
public hearings in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne during January and 
February 2004. Some 37 organisations and individuals participated in 
discussions at those hearings. The Commission also received m o r e  t h a n  1 0 0  
additional written submissions responding to the preliminary analysis and 
findings in the Discussion Draft, including from several state governments. And 
meetings were held with other state and territory governments that did not 
provide formal written responses. 
A full list of those with whom the Commission met, those who made submissions 
and those who participated in the public hearings, is provided in appendix A. While 
this report contains only limited explicit references to input from inquiry 
participants, that input has provided the Commission with an invaluable source of 
information, data and analysis. Accordingly, it wishes to thank all of those 
organisations and individuals who contributed to the inquiry. 
1.3  Guide to the report 
The remainder of this report essentially comprises three parts: 
•  The first (chapter 2) describes trends in house prices and housing affordability 
for first home buyers and others. In doing so, it outlines some distinguishing 
characteristics of the recent housing boom, including the prominent role played 
by investors. 
•  The second looks at factors underlying price and affordability trends and at the 
related policy implications. Specifically, it: 
–  describes the important role played by cheaper and more readily available 
housing finance (chapter 3); 
–  examines the main factors influencing demand for housing over the long 
term, including natural population increase and immigration, and growth in 
incomes and employment (chapter 4); 
–  discusses how aspects of the taxation regime have reinforced demand and 
price pressures and canvasses the pros and cons of suggested changes to 
current tax arrangements (chapter 5); 
–  assesses whether the supply of serviced land for housing has tightened, and 
whether augmenting or upgrading the housing stock is becoming a more 
time-consuming and costly process (chapter 6). Particular attention is given 
to urban planning, land release and development approval procedures;     




–  looks at the extent to which higher infrastructure charges have contributed to 
recent house price increases and whether the basis for setting those charges is 
appropriate (chapter 7); 
–  briefly canvasses the performance of the land development and housing 
construction sectors and examines some particular workforce and regulatory 
issues that appear to be contributing to price pressures (chapter 8); and 
–  discusses whether there is an element in recent house price outcomes that 
cannot be explained by reference to market ‘fundamentals’ and might thus be 
indicative that prices have ‘overshot’ (chapter 9). 
•  The final part (chapter 10) outlines some considerations germane to the issue of 
whether direct support for first home buyers is likely to provide a worthwhile 
return to the community. It also compares different policy approaches for 
directly assisting first home buyers.      





2  Are recent price and affordability 
trends unusual? 
Findings 
•  Historically, Australian house prices have fluctuated around a rising long-term trend. 
The ‘affordability’ of home ownership has also fluctuated — not only because of 
variations in prices, but also in response to income growth and changes in the cost 
and accessibility of finance. 
•  Over the long term, house prices in Australia have been increasing faster than 
incomes. But the magnitude of the implied ‘structural’ decline in affordability is 
unclear. Today’s dwellings are much larger and of higher quality than those of 
yesteryear. Related infrastructure and community facilities are also much improved. 
•  The recent housing boom has been more prolonged, with cumulatively greater price 
increases than past upswings, and geographically more widespread. Also, unlike 
previous booms, it has not extended to commercial property. 
•  Sharply increased investment in rental housing has been a major contributor to the 
growth in demand and the ensuing increases in house prices. 
•  Since the trough in early 1996, the Australia-wide average price for a (detached) 
house has more than doubled in nominal terms and risen by nearly 80 per cent in 
real terms. Over half of this increase has occurred in the last three years. 
•  The commonly reported indexes, while not without deficiencies, collectively suggest 
that affordability for first home buyers has declined considerably in the past year or 
two. By some measures, in parts of Australia affordability is now comparable with, if 
not worse than, in the late 1980s, when inflation and interest rates were very high. 
Among the capital cities, the decline in measured affordability is greatest for 
Sydney. 
•  The situation for those living in rented accommodation is more mixed. Over the past 
decade, median rents in most parts of Australia have risen broadly in line with 
average household incomes. But there are also claims that the stock of low-cost 
rental housing has diminished and that affordability for some low income renters has 
declined. 
•  In the 1980s and 1990s, there was some decline in Australia’s (relatively high) level 
of home ownership, particularly among younger age groups. However, 
demographic, economic and social developments have been shifting the tenure 
balance towards rental housing. Moreover, (census-based) ownership data are not 
yet available for the period since 2001. Hence, it is too early to say whether recent 
declines in affordability have affected home ownership rates. 
     




As noted in chapter  1, house prices and affordability are strongly cyclical. This 
chapter looks at how the recent housing boom compares with previous market 
upturns and at its effects on affordability, particularly for first home buyers. To 
provide a broader context for this discussion, the chapter also provides some 
long-term price data and a brief overview of the importance of housing to 
Australia’s economic and social fabric.  
2.1  A snapshot of housing in Australia 
Australians have a strong preference for home ownership. While ownership levels 
have dropped somewhat since the 1980s (section 2.3),  nearly  40 per cent  of 
residential dwellings are fully owned by one or more of the occupants, with a 
further 30 per cent occupied by households paying off a housing loan. 
Traditionally, Australians have also shown a strong preference for detached houses. 
However, a growing number are now residing in medium and high density 
dwellings. Indeed, if current trends continued, within 20 years, only around half of 
all dwellings in Sydney would be detached. 
Homes do more than provide shelter; they are also the major store of household 
wealth (and the major source of household debt). Moreover, the delivery of housing 
services is an important part of the Australian economy:  
•  Australia has roughly 8  million dwellings, valued at over $2200  billion 
(including the land).  
•  As noted in chapter 1, dwellings account for almost two-thirds of private sector 
wealth — well above the levels in countries such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom. 
•  Housing-related debt similarly accounts for the bulk of total household debt and 
has been growing in relative importance. For example, lending for housing by 
banks and other deposit taking institutions ($440 billion at the end of 2003) 
accounts for some 82 per cent of the total value of their loans to households, up 
from 65 per cent at the beginning of the 1990s. Much of this increase is due to a 
sharp rise in the number of owner occupiers who have also acquired investment 
properties. 
•  Over the past few years, an average of around 500 000 dwellings have been 
bought and sold each year. However, turnover fluctuates markedly — tending to 
rise with upswings in demand. For example, in Melbourne, some 100  000 
dwellings changed hands in 2001 compared to just over 50 000 in 1990 and 1991 
after the boom of the late 1980s.      





•  In recent years, an average of just under 150  000 new dwellings have been 
commenced across Australia each year (though again annual levels fluctuate 
considerably). Part of the existing housing stock is also renovated or augmented 
each year. Australia-wide, the residential construction industry generates 
turnover of nearly $50 billion a year — of which close to $20 billion is spent on 
maintenance, alterations and additions — and provides jobs for around 310 000 
people. 
All tiers of government are heavily involved with the housing sector:  
•  State and territory governments have extensive responsibilities related to: land 
release and zoning; establishment of charges for (and in some cases provision of) 
various housing-related infrastructure; and implementation and enforcement of 
building and related environmental regulations.  
•  All state and territory governments also provide public housing and, through 
corporatised state land development agencies, most compete with private firms 
in the supply of serviced dwelling lots.  
•  While the housing-related functions of local government vary, they typically 
include supervision of land development; the administration of associated 
planning requirements; and the supply of some infrastructure.  
•  Through the First Home Owner Scheme, the Australian and state and territory 
governments provided $4.3 billion to more than half a million first home buyers 
in the three and a half years to January 2004. State and territory governments 
also administer a range of additional support measures for low income home 
buyers.  
•  Various taxes apply to housing, including stamp duty, land tax, the Goods and 
Services Tax and Capital Gains Tax (chapter 5). However, comprehensive data 
on total taxation revenue collected from property in Australia are not available. 
Also, reliance on specific property taxes such as stamp duty, varies substantially 
at the state level. For example, the Real Estate Institute of Australia (sub. 124, 
p.  11) estimated that, in 2002-03, property taxes as a share of total revenue 
available to each state and territory ranged from 1.5 per cent in the Northern 
Territory and 3.3  per  cent in Tasmania, to 9.5  per  cent in Victoria and 
11.1 per cent in NSW.  
2.2  How much have house prices risen? 
The impacts of recent sharp increases in house prices in many parts of Australia on 
aspiring first home buyers, have been the trigger for this inquiry. However, periods 
of stronger or weaker price growth — and even price falls — are an inherent feature     




of the housing market in Australia and in many other countries. Hence, a threshold 
issue for this inquiry is whether the recent upturn in house prices is unusual in a 
historical context. (As noted in chapter 1, except where price data refer specifically 
to detached houses, the term ‘house prices’ is used generically to encompass all 
types of residential dwellings, including the land.) 
Substantial price growth over the long term 
Since 1970, real prices for (detached) houses in Australia have more than trebled, 
representing a trend increase of around 2.3  per  cent a year (see figure  2.1 and 
table 2.1). By international standards, this is a high rate of price increase, above that 
in nine of the eleven European Union countries covered in a UK Treasury (2003) 
study of house price trends over a similar period. 
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Note. These price series are for detached dwellings only, indexed with 1959 as the base period. They are 
derived by extrapolating the ABS House Price Index between 1987 and 2003 to the period 1978 to 1986 using 
REIA data on dwelling price growth, and to the period 1959 to 1979 using BIS Shrapnel price data. The real 
price series is deflated using the household consumption deflator in the national accounts. 
Data source: Australian Government Treasury (unpublished).     





However, there has been marked variation in the rates of price increase both 
between the capital cities (see table 2.1) and within them. For example, over the 
past decade, annual real rates of increase in individual Melbourne suburbs have 
ranged from minus 3 per cent to plus 16 per cent (see figure 2.2). A similar spread, 
from minus 2 per cent to plus 14 per cent, has been evident in Sydney. And, were 
data available to allow comparable estimates, similar variation between and within 
regional centres would also be expected. 
Table 2.1  Trend growth and volatility of Australian house
a prices 
  Period  Real annual growth rateb Volatilityc
    per cent  per cent 
Sydney  1970 to 2003  2.7  9.2 
Melbourne  1970 to 2003  2.1  10.7 
Brisbane  1980 to 2003  3.2  8.5 
Adelaide  1974 to 2003  1.2  8.1 
Perth  1980 to 2003  2.8  6.4 
Canberra  1980 to 2003  2.0  7.9 
Hobart  1991 to 2003  1.5  6.4 
Darwin  1987 to 2003  3.4  6.7 
Australia  1970 to 2003  2.3  6.3 
a Detached dwellings only. b Based on a regression of (log) real prices on a constant and a time trend, with 
prices deflated by the consumer price indexes for the respective capital cities. c Average annual percentage 
deviation of median detached dwelling prices from price trends.  
Sources: Productivity Commission estimates using data from the Australian Government Treasury 
(unpublished), Valuer-General Departments (or equivalent), and REIA (unpublished). 
Figure 2.2  Real price growth for detached dwellings in Melbourne suburbs 









































City-wide price growth: 
5.4 per cent per annum
Suburbs with below-average 
price growth
Suburbs with above-average 
price growth
 
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on data from DSE (2003a).     




Over the past few decades, there also have been several significant price upswings, 
as well as periods where real house prices have fallen substantially (see figure 2.1) 
Again, however, the degree of price volatility has varied between the major cities 
(see table 2.1 and figure 2.3).  



































































































































































































—— Median house price    ------Price trend 
Note. Prices for 2003 are based on sales in the first three quarters of the year.  
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on data from the Valuer General Departments (or 
equivalent) for Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide, and data from the REIA for Brisbane, Perth, Canberra, 
Darwin and Hobart.     





As several inquiry participants observed, reductions in real prices have most often 
been due to a flattening of nominal price growth combined with the effects of 
inflation (see figure 2.1). But there have been instances where nominal prices have 
fallen appreciably — Sydney in the late 1980s being a case in point. Moreover, with 
inflation now being sustained at much lower levels than in the past, declines in 
nominal house prices might be expected to become more common.  
Is the recent upswing unusual? 
From the trough in early 1996, the Australia-wide average price for a (detached) 
house has more than doubled in nominal terms and risen by nearly 80 per cent in 
real terms. Over half of this price increase has occurred in the past three years. 
Though well above long-term trends, the rate of price increase has been lower than 
in some previous cycles. For example, during the peak of the boom in the late 
1980s, average house prices rose by 40 per cent in one year. 
In an international context, the recent boom in Australia is also not unique. Since 
the mid-1990s, several other countries have recorded larger house price increases 
than Australia (see table 2.2). 
Table 2.2  International house price growth, 1995 to 2002 
Country  Nominal increase  Real increase
  per cent  per cent
Ireland 219  152
United Kingdom  125  89
Netherlands 121  83
Spain 95  58
Australia 72  48
Sweden 68  56
Belgium 57  39
United States  51  27
France 45  31
Italy 29  8
Canada 18  2
Germany -5  -13
Japan -20  -19
Sources: The Economist (2003), except the figure for Australia which is calculated from ABS (House Price 
Indexes, Cat. no. 6416.0). 
However, compared with previous booms in Australia, the recent upswing in prices 
is different in key respects.     




First and foremost, it has been more prolonged and has occurred at a time when 
inflation has been low. As a result, the cumulative real increase in house prices has 
been larger than in previous upswings — for example, roughly double that in the 
boom of the late 1980s (RBA sub. 199, p. 10). 
Strong price growth has also been geographically more widespread than in some 
previous upswings:  
•  While price increases in the early part of the boom were mainly evident in the 
more expensive suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne, prices have subsequently 
risen across these cities and in the other capitals (see figure  2.3). More 
specifically, Commission analysis of house price changes within Sydney and 
Melbourne indicates that: 
–  In the first two years of the boom, annual price growth was typically higher 
in suburbs close to the Central Business District (CBD). 
–  Since then, price growth has often been faster in suburbs further from the city 
centre — especially between 1998 and 2000 in Sydney and in 2001-02 in 
Melbourne. 
•  There have also been significant price rises in many regional centres. For 
example:  
–  The Newcastle City Council (sub. 176, p. 8) said that, in the past four years, 
average price increases in Newcastle have been higher than in the Sydney 
Statistical Division.  
–  The NT Treasury (sub. 197, p. 1) noted that, since the late 1990s, prices have 
grown faster in Alice Springs than in Darwin. 
–  The SA Government (sub. 98, p. 8) commented that while prices have risen 
most strongly in Adelaide, average prices outside the metropolitan area have 
still increased by 50 per cent over the past four years. 
–  The WA  Government (sub.  190, p.  7) pointed to solid price growth in 
regional centres, noting that prices in Broome have recently been increasing 
faster than in Perth. 
Further, unlike the booms in the early 1970s and late 1980s, the recent upswing has 
been limited to the residential property market. As the Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA) (sub. 199, p. 12) observed, prices for commercial properties across Australia 
have been increasing at an annual rate of just over 4 per cent since the mid-1990s, 
with current price levels in all of the capital cities still below the peaks of the late 
1980s.     





It also appears that the upgrading of owner-occupied housing through the purchase 
of higher quality and/or better located dwellings (so-called ‘change-over’ buying) 
has played a greater role than in previous booms. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, 
such upgrading has been encouraged by cheaper and more available housing finance 
and strong income growth. According to the market analyst BIS Shrapnel (2004), 
demographic factors, such as the ‘empty nest’ phenomenon and increased migration 
to coastal centres outside the major cities, have also played a role. And some 
inquiry participants, for example Pollard (sub. DR253, p. 3), contended that more 
limited purchasing options for first home buyers (see below) make it more likely 
they will trade up subsequently into better housing.  
The surge in investment in rental housing 
A final feature of the recent upswing is that sharply rising investment by households 
in rental housing has played a very important role, especially in the last few years. 
Since the mid-1990s, loan commitments for investment properties have risen from a 
little over 20 per cent to more than 40 per cent of the value of total new housing 
loan commitments. More than half of this increase has occurred since 2000 (see 
figure  2.4). According to the RBA (sub.  199, p.  18), investors now account for 
one-third of banks’ outstanding housing loans, up from 15  per  cent in the early 
1990s. 




































Investors First home buyers Change-over buyers
Note. Excludes refinancing of established dwellings. 
Data source: ABS (Lending Finance, Cat no. 5671.0; Housing Finance for Owner Occupation, 
Cat. no. 5609.0).     




Notably, there has been a large increase in the number of households purchasing 
rental properties (as distinct from existing landlords expanding their rental 
portfolios): 
•  According to the Australian Tax Office, 13  per  cent of taxpayers reported 
earning rental income in 2000-01, compared with 9 per cent in the early 1990s. 
•  Recent household survey data suggest that this share may have since increased to 
nearly 17 per cent (Uren 2004). 
These proportions are much higher than in some other ‘comparable’ countries. In 
the United States and Canada, for example, around 6.5 per cent of households own a 
rental property, while in the United Kingdom, the share is just 2 per cent — though 
it has been rising of late (RBA sub. 199, p. 19). 
There has also been an increase in foreign investment in Australian residential 
property. According to the Foreign Investment Review Board (2004), which is 
responsible for scrutinising foreign investment, the value of approved proposals for 
overseas investment in residential real estate increased from $5.9 billion in 1995-96 
to $9.3 billion in 2002-03. More than 80 per cent of approvals in 2002-03 were for 
the purchase of land or new housing developments. This is consistent with current 
policy, which aims to channel foreign investment into the supply of new housing. 
According to the  NSW Government (sub.  187, p.  18), overseas investors have 
shown particular interest in the provision of moderately priced, high rise apartments 
in the Sydney CBD. 
Of course, some approved proposals will not ultimately proceed. Moreover, in other 
cases, the spending will be spread over a number of years. Nonetheless, the figures 
just cited suggest that increased foreign investment has contributed to demand and 
price pressures during the recent upswing.  
Very strong investment demand has been evident despite falling rental yields and, 
more recently, growing vacancy rates in some cities (see figure  2.5). Across 
Australia, gross rental yields for detached dwellings now average around 3  to 
3.5 per cent, with the yield on apartments and units being only a little higher. By 
comparison, the RBA (sub.  199) reported that average yields in the United 
Kingdom and the United States are around 7.5 per cent. And in Canada, yields on 
residential property typically appear to range from 6  per  cent to as much as 
12 per cent (Royal LePage Real Estate Services 2003). Clearly, such comparisons 
must be treated with caution. Apart from sampling issues, whether the yield on 
residential property in a particular country is high or low must be considered in the 
context of returns on other classes of investment, and of any country-specific factors 
bearing upon yields on residential property (see further discussion in chapter 9).     





Nonetheless, there is widespread agreement that returns in Australia are currently at 
the low end of the international spectrum. 


















































































































































—— Rental yields for houses  – - – Rental yields for units     ------ Vacancy rate for all rental dwellings 
Note. Rental yield is equal to the ratio of the median annual rent to the median dwelling price. Rental yields for 
2003 are averages for the first three quarters of the year.  
Sources: Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished data from the REIA and RBA.     




The reasons underlying the surge in investment demand despite declining rental 
yields are considered in subsequent chapters, as part of the Commission’s general 
assessment of the factors that have underpinned the recent boom in house prices. 
Finally, the Commission notes that most of the decline in rental yields has resulted 
from rising house prices rather than falling dollar rents. In most of the capital cities, 
the ratio of median rents to average household disposable income has been 
reasonably stable over the past decade.  
However, such market-wide statistics conceal considerable variation between 
individual segments within regional markets. For example, while there is recent 
evidence of falling dollar rents at the top end of the apartment market in some cities, 
several inquiry participants claimed that, at the bottom end of the market, a decline 
in the stock of affordable properties has seen rents rise sharply in recent years in a 
number of centres (see box 2.1). Housing affordability for low income households 
is discussed further below and in chapter 10. 
 
Box 2.1 Concerns  about  the  affordability of rental housing 
While median rents as a proportion of household income have been quite stable in 
most parts of Australia in recent years, several inquiry participants raised concerns 
about a growing shortage of rental housing that is affordable for lower income 
households. They said that this is making it more difficult for some of these households 
to save a housing deposit, as well as causing stress for many of the larger group of low 
income households for whom home ownership is always likely to be beyond reach. 
These participants attributed the perceived shortage of affordable rental housing partly 
to reductions in (real) levels of government spending on public and community (social) 
housing. For example, the Tasmanian Government argued that as a result of changes 
to funding arrangements under the Commonwealth–State Housing Agreement:  
The public rental-housing portfolio is currently unviable and reduction in funds to support it is 
having significant impact on Housing Tasmania’s operations. In the medium to long-term, 
capacity to maintain levels of public sector housing stock, let alone increase levels to meet 
existing demand, will pose a significant challenge. (sub. DR320, p. 15) 
And the Community Housing Federation of Victoria said: 
 … although it was originally designed to accommodate working families, public housing has 
become increasingly targeted to the most disadvantaged. Just being on a low income no 
longer ensures access to [social] housing. Most current tenants are in receipt of Centrelink 
payments, and are described as having ‘high’ or ‘complex’ needs. (sub. 142, p. 2) 
However, it also contended that the decline in the stock of public housing has not been 
matched by an increase in the supply of low cost private rental accommodation, 
leading to sharply increased rental costs at the cheaper end of the market in some 
cities and regions. Thus, the Housing Justice Roundtable commented:  
(continued next page) 
 
     






Box 2.1  (Continued) 
Unfortunately, increased demand for low cost rental housing has forced prices up, making it 
less low cost and new investment has not increased [the] supply of affordable, well-located 
housing. (sub. 181, p. 2) 
Further, while acknowledging that indexation of Commonwealth Rent Assistance 
(CRA) payments has helped to offset the impacts of rising private rentals for those on 
social security benefits, some inquiry participants contended that CRA payments have 
failed to keep up with ‘needs’. According to the Australian Association of Social 
Workers (sub. 158, p. 7) this has rendered ‘… the private rental market unaffordable for 
many of those on low incomes’. 
Amongst the evidence cited to support these contentions was a suite of studies by 
Wulff and Yates (2000), Wulff, Yates and Burke (2001) and Yates, Wulff and Reynolds 
(2004) comparing the stock of low-rent dwellings with the number of low income 
households. All three of these studies reported the existence of a substantial shortfall 
in low-rent dwellings in the latter half of the 1990s, though the most recent study 
pointed to some reduction in the shortfall between 1996 and 2001. 
Given the time available for the inquiry, and its focus on home ownership rather than 
housing affordability in the broad, the Commission did not subject these findings (and 
those in other similar studies) to detailed assessment. Moreover, data is not yet 
available to establish whether the large increase in investment in rental housing since 
2001, has helped to alleviate previous shortages at the bottom end of the rental 
market. Nonetheless, it seems clear that many low income earners face serious 
affordability problems — whether paying off a home or renting their accommodation.  




2.3  What has happened to housing ‘affordability’? 
The recent sharp increase in house prices in most parts of Australia has seen 
affordability for first and other home buyers decline.  
A commonly cited indicator of this decline is the increase in the ratio of the median 
house price to average per capita income. For Australia as a whole, this ratio has 
risen from 6 at the beginning of the recent upswing to around 9 (see figure 2.6) and 
now appears to be high by international standards (RBA sub. 199, p. 13). 
However, the price-to-income ratio is only a partial indicator of affordability trends. 
In particular, it does not take account of the cost of housing finance. As discussed in 
chapter 3, reductions in interest rates which have enabled households to finance 
much larger housing loans from a given income, appear to have been one of the key 
drivers of increases in Australian house prices since the mid-1990s. Hence,     




discussions of trends in affordability — especially over the short to medium term —
typically rely on indexes that incorporate the effects of changes in borrowing costs.  
Figure 2.6  Ratio of median house prices to average per capita income in 
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Note. Data for Canada based on average rather than median house prices. 
Sources: Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished data from Halifax, US Commerce 
Department, OECD, Canadian Real Estate Association, Real Estate Institute of New Zealand and HIA. 
The published indexes of housing ‘affordability’ in Australia (see box 2.2) fall into 
two groups: 
•  those that relate mortgage repayments to household income; and 
•  those that measure the extent of the ‘deposit gap’ that must be funded by home 
buyers. These are sometimes referred to as ‘accessibility’ indexes. 
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 provide examples of both of these index types. 
These indexes are sensitive to underlying house price and income assumptions, and 
to whether their focus is on the size of the ‘deposit gap’ or the capacity of 
households to service a ‘typical’ home loan. Nevertheless, all indicate that, 
following an improvement in the early years of the recent upswing, affordability has 
declined appreciably in the last couple of years. Indeed, the two indexes produced 
by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia–Housing Industry Association 
(CBA–HIA) (see box 2.2), suggest that, in parts of Australia, affordability for first 
and other home buyers is now worse than in the late 1980s when interest rates were 
very high. And though the AMP–REIA and BIS Shrapnel indexes suggest that 
affordability is still generally better than at that time, the gap is narrowing. All of 
the indexes show that, among the capital cities, affordability problems are most 
acute in Sydney.     






Box 2.2  Housing affordability indexes 
The most widely reported indexes of housing affordability in Australia are:  
•  The AMP Banking–Real Estate Institute of Australia Housing Affordability Index — 
the ratio of median household income to average loan repayments, with the latter 
based on the average size of new loans in each quarter. 
•  The  BIS Shrapnel Home Loan Affordability Index — the ratio of mortgage 
repayments on a ‘typical’ housing loan to average full-time male earnings. The 
former assumes a 25 year loan for 75 per cent of the median house price. 
•  The  Commonwealth Bank of Australia–Housing Industry Association (CBA–HIA) 
Housing Affordability Index — the ratio of average household disposable income to 
the ‘qualifying’ income required for a ‘typical’ first home loan. Qualifying income is 
calculated on the assumption that repayments on a 25 year loan, for 80 per cent of 
the price of a ‘typical’ property purchased by a first home buyer, are equal to 
30  per  cent of household income. Up until 1988, the price of a typical dwelling 
purchased by first home buyers was directly estimated from loans approval data. 
Since that time, it has been based on the 1988 price, indexed by subsequent 
movements in the market-wide median price. 
•  The CBA–HIA Deposit Gap Index — the difference between the price of a ‘typical’ 
dwelling and the maximum loan that could be repaid from average household 
income, expressed as a proportion of that income. The dwelling prices in this index 
are the same as in the other CBA–HIA index. 
All of these indexes have limitations. For example, all are based on median prices in 
each period and thus do not account for changes in the composition of sales (dwelling 
type and location) between periods. One consequence is that collective decisions by 
households to spend more on higher quality or better located houses will be manifest 
as a decline in measured affordability — a particular limitation in the context of the 
recent upswing, where much of the demand pressure has come from households 
seeking to upgrade their housing. Also, the indexes do not account for changes in 
lending practices which have reduced deposit constraints (chapter 3). 
 
 
As discussed in box 2.2, only the CBA–HIA indexes relate specifically to prices 
paid by first home buyers. And even these indexes are based on prices paid in the 
late 1980s, adjusted for subsequent changes to market-wide median prices. 
However, indexes calculated by the Commission based on the average size of 
mortgages taken out by first home buyers — for which data have been continuously 
available since the early 1990s — showed similar trends to these CBA–HIA 
indexes. Figure 2.9 provides an illustration of this. 
The Commission notes that because of the lower dwelling prices used in its indexes, 
absolute levels of affordability appear better than in the corresponding CBA–HIA 
indexes.      
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Note.  At June of each year. Mortgage repayments on a 25 year loan equal to 75 per cent of the median 
house price at the standard bank variable housing interest rate, expressed as a percentage of average 
full-time male earnings. 
Source: BIS Shrapnel (2003). 
But this is partly because the gap between median market prices — used to adjust 
the CBA–HIA indexes since the late 1980s — and average prices actually paid by 
first home buyers has widened during the recent boom. This movement of first 
home buyers ‘down-market’ is in itself symptomatic of declining affordability for 
those seeking to achieve home ownership. It highlights the need, when looking at 
these sorts of indexes, to focus on trends as well as levels. 
More broadly, indexes that simply link average house prices to interest rates and 
some measure of average income cannot provide a complete picture of what is 
happening to affordability:     
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Note. The difference between the price of a ‘typical’ dwelling (see box 2.2) and the maximum loan that could 
be repaid from average household income, expressed as a proportion of that income. A decrease in the index 
represents an improvement in affordability. Data are from the March quarter 1985 to the December quarter 
2002. 
Source: HIA (unpublished). 
•  Importantly, they do not account for improvements in the quality of housing 
over time. As a number of submissions pointed out, the average size of new 
houses has been increasing, and the quality of fittings improving. The standard 
of infrastructure — such as roads and drainage — and the range of community 
facilities available to residents in new developments, is now much greater than 
in the past. And upgrading of the existing housing stock has been ongoing. 
Indeed, as noted above, around 40 per cent of total residential construction 
expenditure is for alterations, additions and maintenance. But against these 
trends, block sizes for new homes have generally been declining. Also, the trend 
towards medium and high density dwellings would similarly be reducing the 
land to dwelling ratio, albeit slowly. The net impact of these competing 
influences is discussed further below in relation to changes in the affordability of 
housing in Australia over the long term.  
•  Ultimately, affordability depends on the ongoing costs of home ownership as 
well as the purchase price. Of particular relevance in this regard is the common 
contention that market-wide price rises have forced first home buyers to 
purchase in locations further away from their places of employment, leading to 
increased commuting costs. This contention, which is supported by some 
Commission analysis of price changes by suburb (see below), also serves to 
illustrate the element of circularity in affordability indexes — the prices in those 
indexes reflect what people can afford to pay.      




Figure 2.9  First home buyer deposit gap as a proportion of average 
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Note. Calculated on a similar basis to the CBA–HIA index in figure 2.8, but using prices derived from the 
average size of mortgages taken out by first home buyers, for which data have been continuously available 
since 1991. For the period prior to 1991, prices were estimated from market-wide prices. 
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on ABS (Housing Finance for Owner Occupation Cat. no. 
5609.0; Australian System of National Accounts, Cat. no. 5204.0). 
•  Because the indexes are based on average income measures, they will not 
necessarily indicate what is happening to affordability for the many households 
with below-average incomes. Though the majority of first home buyers have  
above-average incomes, they are nonetheless a diverse group (see box 2.3 and 
appendix B).  
     





Box 2.3  Who are the ‘first home buyers’? 
•  The majority of first home buyers are aged in their twenties and thirties. 
•  Most are couples, though the proportion of lone person households buying a first 
home has increased by 50 per cent since 1990. 
Selected household characteristics  
 1990  2000-01
 per  cent  per  cent
Lone person  12  18
Sole parent  5  4
Couple only  33  32
Couple with children  36  33
Proportion aged 
 
15 to 24  15  10
25 to 34  54  61
35 to 44  20  19
45 to 54  8  8
55 and over  3  3
Data sources: ABS (Housing Occupancy and Costs, Australia, Cat. no. 4130.0); unpublished data from ABS
2000-01 Survey of Income an Housing Costs. 
 
•  The majority of households buying a first home have above-average incomes, with 
55 per cent reporting gross weekly incomes in the top two income quintiles in 2001. 
Though this share was little different from a decade earlier, a growing proportion of 
households buying a first home have two or more income earners. 
•  Lower income first home buyers — those in the second income quintile — tend to 
be slightly more evenly distributed over the age spectrum than first home buyers as 
a whole. Not surprisingly, there are also more lone person/single income 
households in this group. Compared to renters in the same income quintile, these 
lower income home buyers are younger on average and less dependent on social 
welfare. Also, while 30 per cent of second income quintile renters are sole parents, 
this household type accounts for only 5 per cent of lower income first home buyers. 
•  More first home buyers are purchasing townhouses and apartments (20 per cent in 
2000-01 compared with 12 per cent a decade earlier). They are also purchasing 
fewer new dwellings (20 per cent in 2000-01 compared with 26 per cent in 1994).  
•  First home buyers rely heavily on debt finance — in the three years to 1999, the 
average deposit paid was 10 per cent of the purchase price. 
Sources: ABS (Housing Occupancy and Costs, Australia, Cat. no. 4130.0); unpublished data from ABS 
2000-01 Survey of Income and Housing Costs. 
 
 
     




•  Similarly, the use of Australia-wide income measures means that the indexes do 
not pick up the impact of regional differences in incomes on housing 
affordability. For example, to the extent that average incomes are higher in 
Sydney than in some of the smaller capital cities, the indexes in figures 2.7 to 2.9 
will overstate the magnitude of the difference in affordability between Sydney 
and these other centres. 
In the light of these shortcomings, the Commission looked at several other 
indicators of what has recently been happening to affordability for first home 
buyers, as well as examining how affordability has been changing over the much 
longer term. As a number of inquiry participants pointed out, in many respects, it is 
the underlying ‘structural’ trend in affordability rather than shorter-term cyclical 
movements that should be the focus of policy attention.  
Home ownership levels 
By international standards, the rate of home ownership in Australia is quite high 
(see table  2.3). But even abstracting from the methodological difficulties in 
estimating ownership rates (Mudd et al. 2001), such international comparisons shed 
little light on the affordability of housing in individual countries. In particular, 
ownership rates will vary across countries for a range of reasons unrelated to 
affordability — for example, the typical length of time that children stay at home 
and the availability of public and community housing. Spain and Ireland, which 
have amongst the highest recorded levels of home ownership in the world, both 
experienced faster house price growth than Australia between 1995 and 2002 (see 
table 2.2). 
Of more relevance, therefore, is what has been happening to the home ownership 
level in Australia over time and, more particularly, whether it has declined during 
the recent upswing in house prices. Again, methodological issues mean that caution 
is required in drawing conclusions from small changes in estimated ownership rates. 
Nonetheless, the weight of evidence suggests that, in the period prior to the 
commencement of the recent boom, there was a material decline in home ownership 
in Australia. For example, using unpublished census data, Mudd et al. (2001) 
estimated that the ownership rate declined by two percentage points between 1981 
and 1996, with Yates (2002) calculating a similar decline for the period 1986 to 
1996. 
Significantly, during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, ownership rates 
appear to have dropped more sharply in younger age groups. Commission estimates 
based on the census data indicate, for instance, that between 1981 and 1996, the rate 
for 15 to 24 year olds fell from 27 per cent to 22 per cent, for 25 to 34 year olds     





from 63 per cent to 52 per cent and for 35 to 44 year olds from 78 to 70 per cent. 
These declines are broadly comparable in magnitude to those recently calculated by 
Yates (pers. comm., 2 February, 2004).1  
Table 2.3  Home ownership rates in selected countries 
Country Year  Ownership  ratea
    per cent 
Spain 1998  83 
Ireland 2000  78 
Greece 1999  74 
Belgium 2000  74 
New Zealand  1996  71 
Australia 2001  70 
Italy 1998  70 
United Kingdom  1999  69 
United States  1999  67 
Canada 1999  64 
France 1999  55 
Denmark 2000  53 
Netherlands 2000  51 
Germany 1998  43 
a Proportion of households who own or are purchasing the house they live in. 
Sources: ABS (Australian Social Trends 2001, Cat. no. 4102.0); Barker 2003, Annex A; Bernardi and Poggio 
(2002). 
However, for the subsequent period 1996 to 2001 — the first five years of the 
recent upswing — the Commission’s estimates suggest that: 
•  the overall home ownership rate in Australia increased marginally;  
•  declines in ownership rates in the 25 to 34 and 35 to 44 age cohorts were much 
smaller than in the preceding five year period; and 
•  the rate for the 15 to 24 age cohort actually increased by more than 2 percentage 
points. 
Estimates provided to the Commission by Yates (pers. comm., 2 February 2004) 
show similar outcomes, though they suggest that ownership rates in the 25 to 44 age 
group actually rose slightly over this five-year period. 
As noted above, all of these estimates are sensitive to the detailed methodologies 
employed. Moreover, the overall increase in the ownership rate between 1996 and 
                                              
1 A study by Harding et al. (2003), using Household Expenditure Survey data, and covering the 
period from 1989 to 1999, similarly estimated that the ownership rate in the 25 to 39 age group 
fell from 64 to 54 per cent.      




2001 could simply be due to the ageing of Australia’s population. That is, with 
home ownership being higher among older Australians, ageing of the population 
will, other things equal, lead to higher overall ownership levels. The Commission 
estimates, for example, that if the age composition of the population had remained 
unchanged since 1971, the measured ownership rate would currently be about 
1 percentage point lower.  
Nonetheless, the apparent slowing in the decline in home ownership among younger 
Australians between 1996 and 2001 is notable given some broader influences on 
tenure patterns pushing in the opposite direction. For example, as the HIA 
(sub.  177, p.  3) noted, younger Australians are waiting longer to buy their first 
homes, as they spend more time in education and defer entry to the workforce. They 
are also having children later, with some deferring home purchases while repaying 
Higher Education Contribution Scheme debts. Growth in the number of overseas 
students and other non-permanent immigrants (chapter 4), and greater casualisation 
in the labour market, are also likely to have shifted the tenure balance towards rental 
housing.  
This in turn suggests that between 1996 and 2001, income growth, cheaper housing 
finance and various innovations in the home lending sector, such as low deposit and 
non-conforming loans (chapters 3 and 4), provided an offsetting boost to home 
ownership.  
The recent sharp increases in house prices, and continuing high levels of investment 
in rental housing (partly in response to the sorts of demographic, economic and 
social developments outlined above), indicate that there may well have been more 
marked declines in ownership levels among younger Australians since 2001. 
However, (census-based) ownership data are not yet available for this period. 
Hence, it is still too early to say how movements in affordability over the duration 
of the recent upswing in prices have impacted on home ownership in Australia. 
Numbers of first home buyers 
Much has been made of the decline in the share of new housing loan approvals 
accounted for by first home buyers. 
But, at least until the last couple of years, this was due to the strong growth in the 
number of loans taken out by ‘change-over’ buyers and investors in rental 
properties, rather than to a reduction in the number of approvals for first home 
buyers. Since the mid-1990s, the ‘statistical’ trend in the number of first home 
buyer approvals has in fact been marginally upward (see figure 2.10). Moreover, at 
least some of the recent fall in numbers will have been due to the preceding ‘pull     





forward’ demand effect from the introduction of the Commonwealth Additional 
Grant component of the First Home Owner Scheme (chapter 4).  
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Note. Only includes loan approvals for owner-occupied housing. 
Data source: ABS (Housing Finance for Owner Occupation, Cat. no. 5609.0). 
That said, a continuation of the lower levels of first home buyer activity evident in 
the last couple of years would lend support to the view that entry to the housing 
market has recently become more difficult. 
Location choices 
A number of participants claimed that, as prices have risen, not only has the number 
of dwellings that first home buyers can afford fallen, but so too has the number of 
affordable locations within individual cities, towns and regions. For example, the 
NSW Government (sub. 187, p. 44) said that a household earning around $40 000 a 
year could afford to purchase less than 10  per  cent of properties in the Sydney 
region. (For the purposes of these calculations, a property was deemed to be 
unaffordable if it entailed mortgage repayments in excess of 30  per  cent of 
household income — the usual marker of ‘housing stress’ for lower income 
households.) The NSW Government further claimed that for households earning the 
median household income for NSW outside Sydney, less than 20  per  cent of 
dwellings in coastal regional areas could affordably be purchased. This compared 
with a figure of more than 40 per cent for non-coastal regional areas. 
The purchasing options for first home buyers in Sydney have of course been limited 
for a number of years now. The data provided by the NSW Government indicate     




that, since 1994, the maximum share of the stock that could have been ‘affordably’ 
purchased by first home buyers has been about 25 per cent, with the share during 
much of 1995 and 1996 being only slightly higher than at present. These data 
further suggest that, outside Sydney, the share of the stock affordable for first home 
buyers has actually been higher in the past two years than for much of the past 
decade (sub. 187, p. 42).  
Nonetheless, research undertaken by the Commission on rates of house price 
increase in suburbs adjacent to the major transport corridors of Sydney and 
Melbourne, supports the view that locational choices for first home buyers have 
diminished somewhat in these two cities over the past decade or so: 
•  In 1992, a representative Victorian home buyer able to afford to pay the 
Melbourne-wide median price, would have been able to purchase the 
median-priced house in a suburb adjacent to the South Eastern freeway some 
22  kilometres from the CBD. In 2002, taking account of the increase in the 
representative buyer’s income — assumed to be equal to the average for all 
households — and the reduction in interest rates, the ‘affordable (median-priced) 
home’ would have been located in a suburb 24 kilometres from the CBD. 
•  Adjacent to the Nepean Highway in Melbourne, the equivalent suburb was 
28 kilometres from the CBD in 2002 compared to 21 kilometres in 1992. 
•  Adjacent to the Campbelltown line in Sydney, the corresponding suburb 
distances were 24 kilometres in 2002 and 21 kilometres in 1995. 
Whether similar outcomes would be evident for the other capital cities is unclear. 
For example, First Home Owner Scheme data show that, in some of the smaller 
capitals, first home buyers are purchasing in a wider range of suburbs. The lesser 
gap in some of these smaller cities between median prices paid by first home buyers 
and market-wide medians (appendix B), may similarly indicate wider locational 
choices than in Melbourne and Sydney. 
Low income households 
While the trends emerging from affordability indexes based on average incomes are 
relevant to all households, the values of those indexes will overstate the scope for 
low income households to achieve home ownership. For example, unpublished data 
from the Survey of Income and Housing Costs, indicate that, in 2000-01 prior to the 
most recent surge in prices, first home buyers in the second income quintile were 
spending an average of 30 per cent of disposable household income on housing. As 
noted, for low income earners, a level of more than 30 per cent is often regarded as 
indicative of ‘housing stress’.     





The difficulty that many low income households face in entering the market at this 
time is not, of course, a problem unique to the recent housing boom.  
However, several social welfare organisations and unions argued that the problem 
has become more acute in recent years. For example, according to Yates (trans., 
p. 116), since the mid-1980s, home ownership rates in the lower income quintiles 
have fallen by more than in the higher income quintiles. 
Inquiry participants focusing on the situation of low income earners contended that 
a worsening market-entry problem cannot be attributed solely to recent sharp 
increases in house prices. Other factors put forward as contributing to the 
difficulties of low income home buyers included greater casualisation of 
employment, as well as the previously noted concerns about a perceived decline in 
the stock of affordable rental housing and an increase in its cost (see box 2.1). 
According to these participants, declines in the stock of affordable rental housing 
have made it more difficult for low income households to save a housing deposit. 
The ACTU (sub. DR291) also contended that cut-backs in the public housing stock 
have reduced the constraining effect on house prices at the cheaper end of the 
market.  
On the other hand, like other first home buyers, the scope for low income 
households to achieve home ownership has been improved by income growth 
(albeit slower than the average for all households), lower interest rates and 
innovations in the home lending market such as ‘low documentation’ and ‘non-
conforming’ loans (chapter 3).  
More broadly, the affordability issues confronting low income households are not 
limited just to those seeking to purchase a home. Access to affordable rental 
housing is a basic requirement for the wellbeing of the large number of low income 
households for whom home ownership may always be beyond reach. Thus, as 
discussed in chapter 10, the Commission sees merit in a broader and more holistic 
assessment of housing affordability than was envisaged or possible in this inquiry 
focussing on the costs of home ownership. 
Long-term trends 
As emphasised throughout this chapter, the affordability of home ownership, like 
house prices, has a strong cyclical element. 
However, a number of respondents to the Discussion Draft suggested that the 
Commission had overplayed this cyclical element and underplayed what they saw 
as a longer-term structural decline in the affordability of home ownership. Some     




characterised the Australian experience over the longer term as a ‘ratchetting-up’ of 
house prices, leading to a trend decline in affordability. 
Taken at face value, the price data reported at the beginning of this chapter lend 
support to this view. The trend increase in real average house prices across 
Australia since 1970 has been 2.3 per cent. This compares with an average increase 
of about 1 per cent a year in real household disposable income over the same period 
(chapter 4). And, while interest rate movements can have a pervasive impact on 
affordability over the short to medium term, they may be less of an influence over 
the long term. Indeed, interest rates in Australia are currently at similar levels to 
those obtaining at the end of the 1960s. 
Nonetheless, some caution is required in concluding that there has been a 
substantial decline in the affordability of home ownership over the last thirty or 
forty years: 
•  Such calculations are sensitive to the time period chosen. Thus, were there to be 
a prolonged period of price stagnation, or simply lower house price increases in 
coming years, the calculated difference between the long-term growth in prices 
and incomes would most likely diminish. 
•  There is variation in outcomes across regional markets. For example, while the 
trend increases in house prices in Sydney and Melbourne have been well above 
the average growth in household disposable income, prices in Adelaide have 
risen at much the same rate as income. 
•  Changes in the quality of housing become a much more significant consideration 
over the longer term than during a particular price cycle. 
In this latter regard, it is obvious that the housing stock today is very different from 
that of the 1950s and 1960s. Houses are much larger and many features that were 
considered luxuries, or not even available at that time — for example, indoor toilets, 
four bedrooms, family (or ‘rumpus’ rooms) and en-suite bathrooms — are now 
regarded as essential by many home buyers. 
As noted earlier, reductions in the average amount of land per dwelling would 
notionally have offset the additional costs of larger and better quality houses. 
Pollard (sub. DR253, p. 4) also contended that new urban land at the fringes tends 
to be intrinsically less attractive and thereby less valuable than land close to the 
CBD, concluding that ‘the average value of land per dwelling in a non-monetary 
sense is clearly falling’. 
But offsetting this are the considerable enhancements in housing-related 
infrastructure such as roads, drainage and sewerage, as well as in community     





facilities and open space. For example, a member of the Planning Institute of 
Australia commented: 
Finished lots now come with not only fully constructed drainage and road 
infrastructure, but with highly embellished parklands, local maternal and child health 
centres and other community facilities, shopping centres (which are often developed 
ahead of threshold viable demand levels), sporting facilities and so on … In the past, 
affordability was assisted by the fact that initial buyers gained a very rudimentary 
product (often without made streets) and the infrastructures were brought on at a later 
time and paid for through recurrent charging mechanisms (like rates). (sub. 163, p. 7) 
In any event, some long-term decline in ‘quality constant’ affordability would 
hardly be surprising. As discussed in chapter 4, housing is widely regarded as being 
‘income elastic’. This means that people will seek to spend more of their incomes 
on housing as those incomes grow. With some factors required to produce housing 
in scarce supply — particularly inner city land — an almost inevitable outcome will 
be higher prices for a given level of housing quality. Population growth and the 
trend towards smaller numbers of residents per household (chapter 4) will have 
similar price impacts. 
2.4 Concluding  remarks 
The recent sharp increase in house prices in most parts of Australia has seen 
affordability for first and other home buyers decline. Indeed, the duration, 
geographical spread and cumulative extent of the price increases sets the recent 
boom apart from previous booms in the past 30 years. 
However, as emphasised, house prices and the affordability of home ownership 
fluctuate widely around long-term trends. In the short term at least, prices can fall as 
well as rise. Similarly, affordability improves as well as declines — not only when 
prices fall, but also when interest rates go down or household incomes go up. 
This of course is of little comfort to those households that are currently finding it 
very difficult to realise the goal of home ownership. 
But the preceding observations are highly relevant to considerations of whether 
additional measures are needed to assist first home buyers cope with the impacts of 
the recent boom (chapter 10). While further price increases and interest rate rises 
may contribute to some additional deterioration in affordability in the short term, 
future ‘softening’ of house prices (chapter 9), in combination with continuing 
growth in incomes, is likely to see affordability for many aspiring first home buyers 
improve over time.     




That in turn suggests that in seeking to improve the affordability of home 
ownership, it will be equally if not more important to focus on policy measures that 
take pressure off house prices over the long term, and that therefore provide 
enduring affordability benefits across housing cycles. The discussion in the next 
suite of chapters on factors underlying recent house price trends, points to a number 
of areas where policy initiatives would potentially yield such benefits.     








•  Cheaper and more accessible finance has been an important driver of increased 
housing demand and rising house prices over the past eight years.  
•  Since interest rates peaked in 1990, reductions in nominal interest rates have 
roughly doubled the amount that households can borrow for housing from a given 
income. Innovations in home lending have simultaneously made it easier for many 
households to access finance. And lower real interest rates have made both 
owner-occupied and rental housing more attractive as an investment and thereby 
increased the incentive to borrow.  
•  However, there is no mechanistic relationship between the cost and availability of 
finance, levels of housing-related borrowing and house prices. A range of other 
demand-side factors have also increased the capacity and/or incentive for 
households to borrow for housing.  
•  The recent housing boom has highlighted the importance of appropriate regulation 
of lending practices and property investment advice. Initiatives to address 
shortcomings in regulatory requirements are being progressed in several forums. 
 
 
In the recent housing boom, substantial price increases have been evident in most 
cities and regions. This suggests that factors common across Australia have been at 
work. With most house purchases at least partly financed by debt, cheaper and more 
readily available housing finance is widely viewed as having been an important 
contributor to the growth in demand and thereby to house price increases. 
The Commission’s analysis supports this assessment. Lower nominal interest rates 
have increased the amount households can borrow for housing from a given income. 
Innovations in home lending have simultaneously made it easier for many 
households to access finance for housing. And lower real interest rates have made 
both owner-occupied and rental housing more attractive as an investment and 
thereby increased the incentive for households to borrow. Collectively, these 
financial market developments have increased demand for housing by both owner 
occupiers and investors, and contributed to the recent large rise in borrowing for 
housing.      




However, there is no mechanistic relationship between the cost and availability of 
finance, levels of housing-related borrowing and house prices. Hence, although 
financial market developments have clearly been influential, putting precise orders 
of magnitude on their contribution to price increases during the recent boom is not 
possible. 
3.1  How much cheaper is housing finance? 
Since their peak in 1990, nominal and real mortgage interest rates have more than 
halved (see figure 3.1 and table 3.1). 

















Standard mortgage rate Real interest rate
 
Note. The real interest rate is equal to the standard variable mortgage rate deflated by the weighted median 
inflation rate (with the effect of the GST removed). Figure based on quarterly data. 
Data source: RBA (2004a, 2004b). 
Table 3.1 Five-year  average  variable  mortgage interest rates 







Sep 1983 to Jun 1988  13.4  5.6  2.2 
Sep 1988 to Jun 1993  13.8  9.5  2.1 
Sep 1993 to Jun 1998  8.9  6.7  3.0 
Sep 1998 to Dec 2003  6.8  4.0  3.6 
a Assumes that repayments for a 25 year loan do not exceed 30 per cent of annual disposable income, and 
that both interest and principal are repaid. 
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on RBA (2004a, 2004b).     




Some of the decline in nominal rates has been due to lower inflation. Over the past 
decade, the annual inflation rate in Australia has averaged less than 3 per cent, 
compared to 6 per cent in the previous ten-year period. 
However, until the late 1990s, real mortgage interest rates also fell considerably and 
have been broadly stable since. According to the Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA 2003e), lower margins resulting from the entry to the housing finance market 
of new lenders (see below) accounted for two percentage points of the reduction in 
real interest rates during the 1990s. 
Moreover, the reductions in mortgage interest rates shown in figure  3.1 and 
table 3.1 understate the true fall: 
•  During the 1980s, regulatory caps on bank lending rates meant that households 
borrowing from non-bank lenders incurred an interest premium of up to 
two percentage points. 
•  A rate premium of around one percentage point that previously applied to loans 
for investment housing has been competed away. (Such premiums still apply in 
some other countries.)  
•  Today’s mortgages have additional features which add to their value 
(section 3.2). Also ‘honeymoon’ rates, and other arrangements that reduce the 
initial cost of acquiring or servicing a loan, are now much more common. 
Finally, in examining the role of changes in financing costs on the demand for 
housing, it is also relevant to look at expected as well as current interest rates. A 
mortgage is a long-term contract. Hence, as evidenced by the shift into fixed rate 
mortgages that typically occurs when interest rates are expected to rise, borrowing 
decisions are influenced by perceptions about future financing costs.  
Like actual mortgage rates, expected real interest rates — as proxied by the return 
on indexed long-term government bonds (see figure 3.2) — have trended down 
since the beginning of the 1990s. However, while real mortgage rates have been 
roughly stable since the late 1990s, for much of this period, the expectations of 
participants in the bond market were that real interest rates would continue to 
decline further. Thus, for example, in mid-2003, the real yield on indexed long-term 
government bonds was about a quarter of one per cent below that in mid-1998 and 
nearly three-quarters of one per cent below that for much of 1999. 
Clearly, caution is required in drawing a link between the behaviour of home buyers 
and yields on indexed bonds. Nonetheless, the expectations about future inflation 
and monetary policy settings underlying those yields would presumably influence 
the behaviour of some participants in the housing market.     























Note. Yields calculated on a quarterly basis. 
Data Source: RBA (2004d). 
What effect has cheaper housing finance had on the capacity and 
incentive to borrow?  
Owner occupiers 
The fall in nominal interest rates has significantly increased the borrowing capacity 
of households seeking to purchase a home. Traditionally, borrowing for owner-
occupied housing has been capped by a requirement that interest payments, plus the 
repayment of the loan principal, not exceed 30 per cent of annual disposable 
income.1 On this basis, even without any growth in household incomes (chapter 4) 
or changes in lending practices, average borrowing capacity over the past five years 
would have been around 70 per cent higher than for the period from 1983 to 1993 
(see table 3.1). Indeed, the current maximum loan to disposable income ratio is 
more than double its level at the time of the interest rate peak in 1990. Taking 
account of increases in income (chapter 4), and relative to the average variable 
mortgage rate over the period 1988 to 1993, overall household borrowing capacity 
is now around 120 per cent higher in real terms than at the beginning of the 1990s. 
                                              
1 The Commission understands that some lending institutions have replaced this traditional ‘debt 
service ratio’ with a ‘net service ratio’ that takes account of differences in the outgoings of 
households with the same disposable income. While this development potentially has 
implications for issues such as the effects of upfront charging for infrastructure on the 
affordability of home ownership (chapter 7), it does not fundamentally alter the analysis of the 
impacts of lower nominal interest rates on borrowing capacity.     




Of course, an increase in borrowing capacity resulting from cheaper finance (or 
income growth) will not automatically lead to higher levels of borrowing such that 
total loan repayments are unchanged. Some households might prefer to have lower 
loan repayments and increase their consumption of other goods and services, or use 
the savings to invest in other assets. 
Nonetheless, cheaper finance will have provided strong incentives for many 
households to upgrade to better housing, or to enter the market sooner. 
•  A fall in real interest rates (and/or reduced variability in rates) reduces the 
opportunity cost of borrowing to buy a house, as well as making the family 
home a more attractive store for household wealth. An investment in the family 
home generates a future stream of ‘earnings’ in the sense that home owners do 
not have to pay rent. When real interest rates fall (or are expected to do so), the 
cost of acquiring these future earnings also falls. Hence, there is an incentive to 
borrow more for housing.  
•  As people’s incomes grow, they generally seek to spend an increasing 
proportion of that income on housing services (chapter 4). To the extent that the 
traditional ‘30 per cent of income’ borrowing limit has constrained this response 
to previous income growth, it is likely that many households will have opted to 
increase borrowing for owner-occupied housing by close to the full amount 
permitted by the reduction in financing costs. 
Investors 
Investors in residential property are not constrained by the same maximum 
repayment-to-income ratio that limits borrowing for owner-occupied housing. This 
is because investors receive explicit rental income to offset against loan repayments, 
and a tax deduction if that rental income is less than their borrowing and other costs 
(chapter 5). Moreover, most private investors in rental properties also have a family 
residence which serves as an additional (or alternative) form of collateral to secure 
the loan. Hence, the reductions in nominal interest rates over the past decade or so 
may not, of themselves, have greatly increased investors’ capacity or incentive to 
borrow. 
However, the initial effect of a fall in real interest rates will be to raise the total 
return (rental income plus capital appreciation) on housing investments and thereby 
stimulate demand. Ensuing increases in prices will push rental yields back down. 
But these price increases may then encourage a further wave of borrowing, as some 
investors (and owner occupiers) seek to increase their holding of an appreciating 
asset. It is this latter motivation for borrowing which can give rise to a housing 
‘bubble’ (chapter 9).     




Moreover, while investors in all types of assets have benefited from lower real 
borrowing costs over the past decade or so, the reduction appears to have been 
generally larger for investment in housing. As noted above, increased competition 
in the home lending sector has meant that the one percentage point premium that 
had previously applied to those investing in residential property was competed away 
by the mid-1990s.  
In sum, cheaper finance has clearly provided strong incentives for both owner 
occupiers and investors to borrow more heavily for housing. Along with much more 
readily available housing finance, it has been an important contributor to the surge 
in borrowing for housing (section 3.3) and the ensuing increases in house prices 
during the market upswing. 
3.2  How has the availability of housing finance 
improved? 
Reductions in interest rates have been accompanied by extensive innovation in the 
home lending sector, particularly since the commencement of the recent market 
upswing. According to the Australian Bankers’ Association (sub.  164, p.  5), the 
number of home loan products has more than doubled since 1996.  
Many of these innovations have made finance more accessible for households 
wishing to purchase a home. Notable examples include: 
•  Mortgage insurance to secure low-deposit loans. While a longstanding feature of 
the home loan market, its use has increased significantly in recent years. 
•  High loan-to-valuation ratio (LVR) loans. These allow the borrower to take out a 
loan to cover all, or nearly all, of the value of a property. The RBA (2003f) 
reports that around 2 per cent of currently outstanding loans from deposit taking 
lenders had an LVR between 95 and 100 per cent at inception. Moreover, despite 
the extra risk, some financiers have been offering 100 per cent LVR loans for 
owner-occupied housing at standard variable interest rates.  
•  Home equity loans that allow households to borrow against the family home to 
purchase a rental property (or for other purposes). Such loans currently comprise 
around 17  per  cent of outstanding loans secured against residential property 
(RBA 2004d). 
Other innovations have reduced the risks and transaction costs of borrowing. For 
example: 
•  Most of today’s loan products do not penalise borrowers for early or accelerated 
repayments. Also, there are fewer barriers to loan switching, giving existing     




borrowers more scope to take advantage of any interest rate differentials 
between lending institutions. 
•  Fixed interest loans, which became more common in the early 1990s, offer 
protection against fluctuations in interest rates (though the terms for these loans 
in Australia are short compared with some other countries). 
•  Products offering more flexible repayment arrangements (such as redraw 
accounts) have allowed households to more easily accommodate short-term 
changes in their capacity to service loans. 
Much of this recent innovation (see box 3.1) has been driven by increased 
competition among home lenders, made possible by earlier deregulation of the 
finance sector. In the early 1990s, the banks and other deposit taking financial 
institutions moved to expand their home loan portfolios. The subsequent entry of 
mortgage originators and brokers (see box 3.2) in the mid-1990s provided an even 
greater boost to competition. For example: 
•  since 1996, the number of entities offering housing loans has risen from around 
90 to more than 130 (ABA, sub. 164, p. 4); 
•  mortgage brokers are responsible for arranging some 25 to 30  per  cent of 
housing mortgages in Australia (RBA, pers. comm., 9 March 2004); and 
•  the loan portfolios of mortgage originators have increased tenfold since 1996, 
and now represent 17 per cent of outstanding home loans (RBA 2003d). 
Increased competition (aided by new technologies and more sophisticated credit 
risk assessment procedures) has also encouraged lenders to rely more heavily on 
case-by-case assessment of borrowing applications. This has facilitated less 
conservative lending practices better tailored to the circumstances of individual 
borrowers, without necessarily increasing the risk for the lender. For example, as 
previously noted, some lenders now take into account the outgoings as well as the 
income of the borrower when setting loan limits. According to a number of inquiry 
participants, greater reliance on case-by-case assessment of borrowing applications 
has been of particular benefit to part-time and casual workers. (That said, concerns 
have also been raised about an increase in imprudent lending behaviour — 
section 3.4.) 
In summary, product innovation and changes to lending practices have increased the 
number of households who can borrow and the amount they can borrow, expanded 
their choice of lending products, and reduced the costs of borrowing. As many 
participants pointed out, this has reinforced the incentives for households to take 
advantage of lower interest rates and to borrow more for housing to meet previously 
unsatisfied demand.      





Box 3.1  Some other recent home loan innovations 
Split-purpose loans 
These allow a borrower to split a loan into a personal home loan and a loan for 
investment in a rental property. Their main attraction is that they enable the borrower to 
focus on repaying the home loan, with the accruing interest cost on the investment 
component of the loan being tax deductible.  
Deposit bonds 
Deposit bonds remove the need for a purchaser to provide a deposit at the time of 
purchase. The issuer of the bond (often an insurance company) guarantees the 
payment of the deposit at settlement in return for a fee. Deposit bonds are more 
commonly used for off-the-plan purchases where settlement may be as long as three 
years from contract exchange. 
Non-conforming loans 
These loans are provided by specialist mortgage originators (see box 3.2) to borrowers 
who cannot meet standard lending criteria, or who have poor credit histories. Low 
documentation mortgages provided without the need for the borrower to detail their 
income are one example. While such loans generally attract higher charges, they may 
be particularly useful for people in casual employment. Previously, most borrowers 
catered for by non-conforming loans had to rely on Cooperative Housing Societies or 
government sponsored loan programs to obtain finance. 
Redraw facilities and offset accounts 
These arrangements allow borrowers to redraw money previously deposited in a loan 
account. This helps households to pay off their loan more quickly, but with the security 
of access to the redraw facility to deal with unanticipated expenditures. 
 
 
In a general sense, the impetus to borrowing provided by product innovation applies 
with similar force to owner occupiers and to investors in rental property.  
However, the changes wrought by increased competition among home lenders 
appear to have been particularly beneficial for investors. According to the RBA 
(2002, p. 1), lending products for investment in residential property were previously 
considered ‘expensive, inconvenient or hard to acquire’. But finance for such 
investment is now widely available, with product innovations such as home equity 
loans, split-purpose loans and deposit bonds explicitly targeted at investors. Indeed, 
more readily available finance may help to explain part of the increase in negatively 
geared housing investment during the recent upswing. Moreover, as noted earlier, 
competition between lenders has eliminated the interest rate premium on housing 
investment loans, providing an additional benefit to investors over and above the 
general reduction in lending margins.      





Box 3.2  New entrants to the home lending sector 
Over the past decade, two new institutional groups have made significant inroads in 
the Australian home lending market. 
•  Mortgage originators (such as Aussie Home Loans and Wizard Home Loans). 
These institutions are retail or wholesale lenders that raise funds by issuing 
securities in the money markets (securitisation), rather than primarily lending 
against deposited monies.  
•  Mortgage brokers. These entities help borrowers find and arrange home loans. 
They have made it easier for consumers to undertake price comparisons, and their 
advertising campaigns have raised consumer awareness about financing costs and 
the different sorts of home loan products available in the market. They have also 
assisted new lenders (such as mortgage originators) to enter the market by 
providing marketing and support services. Mortgage brokers are primarily 




3.3  Effects on housing demand and prices 
Because house prices are the result of the interaction of many influences on the 
demand and supply sides of the market, it is not possible to be precise about the 
contribution of specific developments such as cheaper and more available housing 
finance.  
However, a distinguishing characteristic of the housing market is that most 
purchases are largely debt financed. Hence, an increase in borrowing capacity as 
large as that experienced since the early 1990s must be expected to have been an 
important contributor to the surge in housing-related borrowing over this period, 
and thereby to the increases in house prices during the recent boom.  
What has happened to household borrowing levels? 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, household debt has increased more than three and 
a half times in real terms. Over the same period, real household disposable income 
has risen by around 30 per cent. Consequently, household debt as a proportion of 
household disposable income has increased from 49 per cent in 1990-91 to 143 per 
cent currently (see figure 3.3). 
According to the RBA (sub. 199, p. 14), this increase in household debt has been 
very rapid by international standards, with the result that Australia has moved from     




the lower end of the debt-to-income spectrum to be close to the top. In its latest 
Monetary Policy Statement, the RBA (2004e, p. 23) also commented that in the 
December quarter of 2003, Australia’s ratio of debt-servicing cost to household 
income ‘is likely to have surpassed’ the previous peak at the end of the 1980s when 
interest rates were at record levels. 
















Owner-occupied housing Investor housing Personal debt
 
Note. The separation of housing debt is based on bank lending data. 
Data source: RBA (2003c). 
Most of this large increase in household debt has been due to an even more rapid 
increase in borrowing for housing. Such borrowing has increased more than   
four-fold in real terms since 1990, meaning that housing-related debt now accounts 
for 84 per cent of total household debt, up from 69 per cent in 1990. Importantly, 
however, not all of this housing-related debt is actually spent on housing services. 
Aided by innovations in the home lending market (see above), an increasing number 
of households have been using borrowed funds secured against property for other 
purposes. Indeed, since mid-2001, borrowings secured against property have 
exceeded total new investment in housing assets (RBA, sub. 199, p. 16). 
In dollar terms, most of the increase in borrowing for housing since 1990 has been 
for owner-occupied dwellings. However, the rate of growth in loans for investment 
properties has been much higher (figure 3.3). Hence, the share of investment loans 
in total housing-related debt held by the banks rose from 14 per cent in 1990 to 
33 per cent in 2003 (RBA 2003c).  
Also, most of the growth in borrowing has been for purchases of existing rather than 
new homes. In a general sense, this is hardly surprising given that purchases of     




existing dwellings account for as much as 80 per cent of total market turnover. Even 
so, over the past decade, borrowing by owner occupiers for existing dwellings (and 
for alterations and additions) has increased at more than double the rate of 
borrowing for new dwellings. Around 81  per  cent of the value of finance 
commitments for owner-occupied housing is now for existing dwellings, with a 
further 4 per cent being for alterations and additions (see figure 3.4). 

















Established dwellings New dwellings Alterations and additions
 
Note. Excludes refinancing of established dwellings. 
Data source: ABS (Housing Finance for Owner Occupation, Cat. no. 5609.0). 
How much of the increase in borrowing is due to cheaper finance? 
As outlined in section 3.1, the fall in interest rates has seen income constant 
borrowing capacity for owner-occupied housing more than double since interest 
rates peaked in 1990. However, this large rise is still much less than the growth in 
borrowing for owner-occupied housing, which has more than tripled in real terms 
over the same period (ABS 2003). Moreover, as noted above, not all households 
would have wished to exercise fully the increase in their borrowing potential. This 
led the RBA (sub.  199, p.  34) to conclude that the ‘ … structural reduction in 
interest rates … would explain, at most, an approximate doubling in household 
borrowing relative to incomes … and probably less’. 
The even more rapid growth in borrowing for investment in rental housing is 
similarly hard to explain in terms of the fall in interest rates alone — particularly as 
borrowing costs also fell for other investments. Also, the surge in investment in 
residential housing has continued despite the stabilisation in real interest rates since     




the late 1990s, and declining rental yields that have ostensibly offset much of the 
benefit of lower borrowing costs. 
More available housing finance helps to explain part of the large borrowing 
residual, as do income and population growth — the key drivers of demand for 
housing services in the long term (chapter 4). Moreover, the stronger labour market 
and more stable interest rates in recent years may have increased the willingness of 
households to take on debt. 
In explaining the surge in borrowing for investment in rental housing, lower returns 
on other investments (see box 3.3) have seemingly been influential. So too, have 
aspects of the taxation regime which have reinforced incentives to invest in housing 
in a period of strong price growth (chapter 5). Not surprisingly, surveys on 
household investment preferences by the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic 
and Social Research showed an increasing preference for real estate between 2000 
and March 2003 — though in the latest 2004 survey there was a marked decline. 
The attractiveness of housing as an investment is also likely to have encouraged 
many owner occupiers to borrow and spend more when purchasing or renovating 
their ‘family homes’. Long standing tax preferences for the family home (chapter 5) 
have added to these incentives. 
Further, there has arguably been a ‘bubble’ dimension to housing demand and the 
associated increase in borrowing, especially in the past two or three years. While it 
is impossible to be certain that house prices exceed their ‘fundamental’ value, the 
basic drivers of housing demand cannot support an extended continuation of recent 
price growth, making a softening of prices almost inevitable (chapter 9).  
Finally, while the purchase of the majority of housing is initially financed by 
borrowing, factors that increase the equity that buyers have at their disposal will 
also put upward pressure on house prices. The First Home Owner Scheme (chapters 
4 and 10) is relevant here.  
To summarise, cheaper and more accessible finance have been important, though 
not the only, contributors to the recent surge in housing demand and the ensuing 
upswing in house prices.     





 Box 3.3  Returns on property versus other investments 
Over the past few years, investment in residential property has offered higher pre-tax 
returns than have been available for other asset classes (see table below). 
•  The Commission’s estimates suggest that, Australia-wide, investment in rental 
housing delivered a notional pre-tax return (including capital gains) of around 20 per 
cent per annum in the two years ended June 2003, with even higher returns in some 
regional housing markets. 
•  In contrast, depressed equities’ markets resulted in negative returns on Australian 
shares over that same two-year period and on international shares for the three 
years to June 2003. 
•  Investment in commercial property (unlisted and listed property), while providing a 
broadly comparable return from mid-1999 to mid-2001, delivered significantly lower 
returns in the subsequent two financial years. 
Of course, it is post-tax rather than pre-tax returns that drive investment decisions. 
However, taking tax liabilities into account would not eliminate the large disparity in 
recent returns on residential property and shares. And, accounting for tax liabilities 
would widen the percentage gap between returns on property and those on bonds and 
cash. The latter are taxed at normal marginal rates. In contrast, only 50 per cent of 
capital gains — which have provided the lions’ share of recent returns on residential 
property — are taxed at an individual’s marginal tax rate if the property concerned has 
been held for more than 12 months (chapter 5).  
Annual (pre-tax) returns on alternative investments (per cent) 
Asset class    June 2000  June 2001  June 2002  June 2003
Australian shares  15.5  9.1  -4.7  -1.7
International shares  12.6  -6.0  -23.5  -18.5
Unlisted property  10.9  10.4  9.5  11.1
Listed property  11.9  13.9  14.9  12.1
Australian bonds  6.2  7.4  6.2  9.8
Cash 5.6  6.1  4.7  5.0
      
Melbourne residential property  12.1  20.9  17.3  25.3
Sydney residential property  13.1  6.3  22.0  20.0
Australia-wide residential 
property 
11.8 14.7 21.3  18.2
Note. These percentage rates of return do not allow for transaction costs associated with investment in 
residential property, such as stamp duty and real estate agents' charges. While the annualised magnitude of 
these costs depends on the length of time the investor holds the property, their exclusion means that the 
estimates in the table overstate the difference between returns on residential property and other assets. 
However, with investment properties typically held for several years, the extent of this overstatement would 
not be large. 
Sources: Intech (2003); Productivity Commission estimates based on Valuer–General median price data for 
Sydney and Melbourne, ABS (House Price Indexes, Cat. no. 6416.0), and RBA-REIA (2003). 
       




3.4  Some policy issues 
Cheaper and more available housing finance have been of considerable benefit to 
many Australian households, even though ensuing increases in house prices have 
diluted the gains for more recent home buyers. More generally, the liberalisation of 
capital markets that has underpinned many of the changes in housing and other 
financial markets, has been an important contributor to Australia’s strong economic 
performance in recent years. 
However, some lending practices may reduce affordability or be otherwise inimical 
to the interests of borrowers or a stable and secure home lending sector. Some 
specific concerns raised in submissions are canvassed below. 
Are deposit requirements an impediment to home ownership? 
For conventional loans attracting standard variable interest rates, borrowers will 
typically pay a deposit of around 10 per cent of the purchase price. The need to 
accumulate a deposit, as well as to meet other upfront costs such as stamp duty, 
make it more difficult for some first home buyers to enter the market. 
Nonetheless, given the imperfect information available to both lenders and 
borrowers, deposit requirements are likely to promote better market outcomes. For 
example, they: 
•  help to screen out high risk borrowers and thereby enhance the stability of the 
home lending sector; and 
•  benefit approved borrowers by providing an equity margin if house prices fall, or 
if repayment difficulties arise.  
Furthermore, innovation in the home lending market has provided several options to 
purchasers unable (or unwilling) to meet deposit gaps (section 3.2). Although these 
options usually require higher loan repayments, they nonetheless allow some 
households with limited savings to bring forward their home purchases. Also, 
various government programs assist first home buyers to meet deposit and other 
upfront costs, including rebates for stamp duties (chapter 5) and grants for first 
home buyers (chapter 10). 
However, although deposit requirements (or other mechanisms that address the 
additional risks for lenders that attach to highly geared loans) are broadly 
appropriate, this does not mean that deposit-gap issues are irrelevant from a policy 
point of view. For example, the effect on the upfront costs of home purchase of 
possible changes to taxation arrangements is an important consideration (chapter 5).     




Further, depending on the perceived social benefits, governments may wish to look 
at options to help those first home buyers facing a particularly acute deposit-gap 
problem (chapter 10). 
Can regulation of lending practices and property advice be improved? 
Especially since the entry of the mortgage originators, all home lenders have 
become more aggressive in seeking out borrowers and marketing their products. 
Potential investors in rental property and higher-risk first home buyers have been a 
particular focus of attention.  
Like innovation in lending products, increased competition for customers has 
generally benefited home buyers. However, there is concern that the incidence of 
imprudent lending, and misleading investment advice to consumers, is increasing. 
Prudential regulation issues  
The provision of housing loans by authorised deposit taking institutions is subject to 
prudential supervision by the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA). 
The Authority (sub.  107, p.  4) said that the current regulatory framework ‘… 
underpins a robust and well managed [deposit taking] sector in Australia, in the 
interests of depositors, while allowing vigorous competition in housing lending’. 
However, though some poor lending decisions are inevitable even in a very efficient 
and well supervised financial system, more aggressive competition for customers 
does appear to have led to some increase in imprudent lending practices. For 
example, in its recent ‘stress-testing’ assessment of the deposit taking institutions, 
APRA said that though most of these institutions have adopted prudent and rigorous 
lending practices, its supervisory visits had identified a growing number of practices 
that were ‘questionable in their prudence’ (2003a, p.  17). Furthermore, APRA’s 
review did not cover non-deposit taking institutions, such as mortgage originators, 
which hold about 17 per cent of the value of outstanding home loans, but do not 
have to comply with the same prudential regulation as deposit taking lenders. More 
generally, it was put to the Commission that imprudent lending is the flip-side of 
concerns evident in some quarters about excessive borrowing for housing. 
Against this backdrop, APRA is currently examining two specific aspects of the 
prudential framework applying to deposit taking lenders: 
•  the criteria that housing loans by deposit taking lenders must satisfy to qualify 
for the concessional 50 per cent risk weighting. (Because of low default rates on 
residential property in Australia, the minimum capital backing on housing loans 
is half of that required for other loans to individuals and businesses); and     




•  whether to implement proposed international reforms to capital adequacy 
requirements, commonly known as Basel II, that would further reduce the capital 
backing required for lending for residential property by these institutions.  
In its Discussion Draft, the Commission sought comment on whether current 
prudential requirements for deposit and non-deposit taking lenders are appropriate 
and, if not, what changes are required. In response, several participants reiterated 
general concerns about a perceived deterioration in prudential standards. More 
specifically, the Credit Union Services Corporation (Australia) Ltd (CUSCAL) 
argued: 
… if mortgage originators or other non-ADIs wish to position their products to compete 
in the housing finance and associated lending markets, they should be subject to 
comparable regulatory regimes or supervisory controls that protect borrowers to at least 
the same standard as ADI lenders. (sub. DR308, p. 3) 
And, Nigel Fitzpatrick (sub. DR228) argued that a reduction in the risk weighting 
for housing loans is unnecessary, and proposed that APRA and the deposit taking 
institutions both be subject to various new prudential obligations and information 
collection requirements.  
Assessment of the merits of these more specific proposals clearly lies well beyond 
the purview of this inquiry. Accordingly, the Commission has forwarded them on to 
APRA for consideration as part of the Authority’s current review of risk weighting 
and related issues. 
That said, the concerns underlying these sorts of proposals illustrate the importance 
of effective prudential and regulatory oversight and the need for careful assessment 
before any liberalisation of current requirements occurs. Such liberalisation could 
have significant impacts on the ability and willingness of the deposit taking 
institutions to lend for housing, with flow-on implications for house prices. 
Ensuring that there is an effective regulatory framework for non-deposit taking 
lenders is similarly important, particularly if this sector’s share of the home loan 
market continues to grow.  
At the same time, it is important that such prudential and regulatory frameworks do 
not unduly stifle the sort of innovation in lending practices and products that, in 
recent years, has brought home ownership within the reach of a new group of 
Australian households. In this regard, CUSCAL (sub. DR308, p.  3) expressed 
concern that attempts to tighten regulatory supervision of non-deposit taking lenders 
might inadvertently lead to additional and unnecessary controls on deposit taking 
institutions.     




Reducing the incidence of misleading practices 
Like lenders, borrowers can also make poor decisions. For some consumers, 
assessing the array of lending products now available, let alone making   
well-informed judgments about the future course of interest rates etc, may be very 
challenging. Hence, instances of excessive exposure to risk, inappropriate loan 
selection and over (and under) borrowing are inevitable. 
Various market-driven initiatives are helping consumers to make more informed 
decisions. For instance, information on home loan products is now much more 
widely available. Also, requirements for lenders to provide consumers with specific 
information central to borrowing decisions is mandated in several pieces of 
legislation. 
Nonetheless, concerns about misleading practices remain, particularly in relation to 
the activities of mortgage brokers and some property investment advisers.  
State and territory governments are currently developing proposals to provide for 
uniform regulation of the mortgage and finance broking industries. Options being 
canvassed by a working group that will report shortly to these governments include 
the introduction of minimum licensing requirements, and probity and disclosure 
standards. In the interim, the Mortgage Industry Association of Australia has 
introduced conduct and disclosure standards for its members. 
Another working party of state and Australian government representatives 
(including from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC)) will report shortly on 
options for introducing a new national or state-level regulatory scheme for property 
investment advice. Amongst other things, the working group’s terms of reference 
asked it to report on the nature and extent of property investment advice in 
Australia, the adequacy of current regulations and the potential impact on 
consumers of existing industry practices. This assessment follows a previous review 
by ASIC (2000), which found that the legislation in this area was inadequate, 
especially in relation to competency requirements and the disclosure of 
commissions.  
In responding to the Discussion Draft, the Real Estate Institute of Australia 
(sub.  DR279, p.  3) emphasised that real estate agents are already subject to 
extensive state and territory regulation and various Australian Government 
legislation covering the provision of investment advice. It went on to note that the 
Joint Communiqué released by the working party in August 2003 (Ministerial 
Council on Consumer Affairs 2003) indicated that the review was prompted by ‘… 
concern at the operation of marketeers and property investment advisers and the 
detrimental impact they have on unwary customers’.     




In the Commission’s view, some recent well publicised episodes have highlighted 
the importance of appropriate regulation of property investment and related 
financial advice. Indeed, given the magnitude of the commitment involved in 
buying a house, the consequences for individuals of poor purchasing or financing 
decisions made on the basis of incompetent or misleading advice, can be very 
serious. Further, overly ‘aggressive’ marketing of real estate has the potential to 
increase house price volatility, thereby affecting participants in the housing market 
more generally. 
However, like prudential and regulatory oversight of lending institutions, there is a 
need for balance in such regulation. For example, regulation that significantly 
reduced the scope for mortgage brokers and property investment advisors to 
respond flexibly and expeditiously to the needs of clients, could disadvantage rather 
than benefit home buyers. Hence, it is important that policy initiatives emerging 
from the current review exercises are the subject of rigorous benefit–cost analysis 
within the agreed regulatory impact statement process.     








•  A sustained period of strong economic growth has underpinned housing demand 
since the early 1990s. This has contributed significantly to the pressure on house 
prices over the life of the recent boom. 
•  Growth in immigration since the mid-1990s has been an important contributor to 
underlying demand, particularly in Sydney and Melbourne. 
–  However, the pick-up in immigration has been partially offset by a slower rate of 
natural increase in the resident population, so that overall population growth has 
not been a key driver of recent rapid increases in house prices. 
•  The trend to smaller households is also increasing the underlying demand for 
housing, but this is a long-term development that is unlikely to have contributed 
significantly to rising prices during the recent upswing. 
•  While the First Home Owner Scheme has brought forward some housing demand 




Increases in housing demand resulting from cheaper and more ‘accessible’ housing 
finance, in a ‘supportive’ tax environment (chapter 5), explain a substantial part of 
the rise in house prices since the mid-1990s. Other demand-side forces have, 
however, also played a role. These include: 
•  income growth; 
•  population (including immigration) and other demographic changes; and  
•  direct government assistance for first home buyers. 
Economic and population growth, along with other demographic changes, have 
increased demand for housing throughout the 1990s, while direct government 
assistance has added to cyclical price pressures.     




4.1 Economic  growth 
Over the last decade or so, Australia has experienced sustained strong economic 
growth (see figure 4.1). Since 1992-93: 
•  the number of people in full-time jobs has risen by around one million (growing 
by an average rate of 1.5 per cent per year); 
•  aggregate household disposable income has increased by 32  per  cent in real 
terms (2.8 per cent per year); and 
•  real disposable income per household has increased by an average rate of 
1.2 per cent per year. 









































































Average full-time employment (LHS)
Annual growth of aggregate real gross household disposable income (RHS)
 
Data source: Productivity Commission estimates based on RBA Bulletin Statistical Tables. 
With rising employment and incomes, more people have the financial capacity and 
security to purchase their first home, while more existing home owners will seek to 
trade up to higher quality housing. 
Studies based on Australian data, which have focused on aggregate demand-side 
pressures alone, have estimated that, in the long term, real house prices might 
increase by 1.5 per cent or more for each one per cent increase in aggregate real 
income (IMF  2003; Sutton  2002; Tu 1999). These estimates imply that income 
growth could explain roughly half of the almost 80 per cent increase in real house 
prices during the recent upswing. 
These estimates, however, seem too high by international standards. For example, in 
most European countries, house prices tend to rise less rapidly than incomes (UK 
Treasury 2003, p. 32).  Moreover,  disentangling the effects of income and     




employment growth from other demand-side forces, such as lower interest rates and 
population growth, is complex. Changes in the distribution of income also affect the 
demand for housing. In addition, the extent to which increased demand for housing 
leads to higher house prices depends on the responsiveness of housing supply 
(chapter 6). 
These methodological problems mean that not too much store can be placed on such 
estimates. In view of the limitations of the relevant econometric techniques and time 
constraints, the Commission did not attempt to derive its own estimates of the 
income elasticity of house prices. 
Nevertheless, it seems incontrovertible that income and employment growth have 
underpinned growth in housing demand in Australia since the early 1990s, which in 
turn has placed upward pressure on prices.  
4.2  Population and other demographic changes 
The strong growth in aggregate incomes over the past decade is partly the result of 
higher income per capita as productivity has improved (Banks 2003). Part of the 
aggregate income growth, however, is attributable to population growth. In this 
sense, the influences of income and demographic changes are entangled. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to examine population and other demographic influences 
in their own right, partly because there is a view that immigration has been an 
important contributor to the housing boom, and partly because some demographic 
influences, such as changes in household size, are only loosely related to income, if 
at all. 
Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, Australia’s ‘resident population’ 
(explained in box  4.1) increased by about 1.2  per  cent per year, down from an 
annual rate of 1.5 per cent in the 1980s. Thus, as David Tollner noted, population 
growth was moderate and stable during a period when growth in house prices varied 
dramatically (sub. 87, p. 2). This suggests that population pressures have not been a 
major cause of the recent acceleration in house prices across the country, although 
rapid growth in overseas visitors such as students may have boosted demand for 
rental housing (see Reserve Bank of Australia, sub. 199, p. 28).     





Box 4.1  Coverage of resident population 
In responding to the Discussion Draft, Rob Keane (sub. DR232) contended that the 
ABS population growth figures omit certain household formation groups — namely, 
overseas students and business migrants who do not continuously stay for 12 months 
in Australia — and that this may have implications for the assessment of housing 
demand. 
The Commission recognises that the ABS resident population estimates have 
limitations when used for assessing housing demand. 
In the census, the usual residence rule is used to estimate the resident population. 
Essentially, all people in Australia on the census date are included in the count of 
resident population, except for short-stay visitors who usually live in another country 
and are visiting Australia for less than a year. 
Some short-stay visitors who are not included in the resident population estimates may 
have housing requirements similar to those counted as part of the resident population. 
For example, an overseas student attending a short course (for less than 12 months) in 
Australia could rent a house or an apartment, rather than stay in a hotel. (This group of 
short-stay visitors is a subset of the visitors referred to by Rob Keane.) 
To calculate intercensal changes in the resident population, the ABS measures the 
number of arrivals and departures of residents, permanent migrants and visitors (see 
box 4.2) to estimate net immigration. Of the visitors, only those who stay or depart for a 
continuous period of 12  months or more are included as a change to the resident 
population. The movements not included as net migration may include: 
•  overseas ‘residents’ who spend a considerable amount of time in Australia but for 
never more than 12 months at a time; and  
•  Australians who live overseas but are never continuously absent for longer than 
12 months. 
Given the significant influx of foreigners coming to work or study in Australia in recent 
years, it seems highly likely that short-stay visitor movements may have added to the 
demand for housing. However, the Commission is unaware of any research that 
quantifies these effects. 
Sources: ABS (How Australia Takes a Census, Cat. no. 2903.0; Australian Demographic Statistics, Cat. 
no. 3101.0, June Quarter 2003 issue); ABS pers. comm., 2 February 2004. 
 
 
However, the impacts of population growth on the demand for housing in particular 
cities and regions are subtle and complex, and understanding them requires analysis 
not only of aggregate figures, but also of: 
•  the sources of population growth, and in particular the extent to which it derives 
from natural increase or immigration; 
•  the composition of arriving immigrants;     




•  movements of people among regions and cities; and 
•  changes in household formation. 
But as discussed below, accounting for these complexities does not invalidate the 
basic conclusion that factors such as cheaper and more accessible finance and 
income growth have been more important contributors to recent house price growth 
than population pressures. 
In this regard, it is important to distinguish between changes in demand for 
additional dwellings and increased demand for better located and higher quality 
housing. As discussed in earlier chapters, most of the added pressure on prices has 
come from households seeking to buy higher quality and better located dwellings. 
Population 
As noted above, some consider that immigration has been a key driver of population 
growth and housing demand in the past few years. For example, the NSW 
Government (sub. 187) regarded immigration as the dominant source of additional 
demand for new dwellings in that state, and in Sydney in particular. Similarly, 
Birrell and Healy (2003, p.  55) suggested that ‘… there is little doubt that a 
reduction in the national immigration intake would improve housing affordability in 
Sydney’. 
Immigrant and visitor arrivals 
Net immigration is calculated by the ABS as the excess of permanent and long-stay 
(more than a year) visitor arrivals over permanent and long-stay departures. It is an 
important component of population growth in Australia and has increased from a 
low point in 1992-93 (see figure 4.2). The ABS estimates that in 2002-03 there was 
a net gain of 125 000 persons through permanent and long-term movements. This 
estimated net intake is more than four times the level in 1992-93, double the 
average net immigration level in the first half of the 1990s, and approaching the 
previous peak reached in 1988-89. 
While the extent of the recent increase may be overstated by ABS net immigration 
estimates (see box  4.2), immigration has clearly added to demand. Moreover, 
housing demand will have been boosted in recent years by short-stay visitors who 
are excluded from the estimates of net immigration, but who have similar housing 
requirements to the resident population (see box 4.1).     





























Data source: ABS (Australian Demographic Statistics, Cat. no. 3101.0). 
The precise effect of immigration on housing demand depends on the composition 
of arrivals and where they settle. 
Composition of immigrant arrivals 
Early in the 1990s, two permanent settlers arrived for every long-stay visitor. By the 
early 2000s, there were twice as many long-stay visitors as permanent settlers. 
Long-stay visitors such as students and working holiday makers are less likely to 
have dependants and so an increase in their number is likely to add more to the 
demand for accommodation than a similar increase from natural population growth 
or permanent immigration. Moreover, while some purchase homes, most seek rental 
housing, especially apartments or flats near schools, universities and workplaces 
(typically in the major cities). 
Hence, the shift in the composition of immigration towards long-stay visitors may 
well have contributed to the surge in investment in rental housing, particularly in 
Sydney, which absorbs most new arrivals. Indeed, a recent small scale survey 
indicated that nearly half of all business visitors holding long-stay visas live in 
rental accommodation in Sydney (see box 4.3).     





Box 4.2  Measuring net immigration 
To measure net immigration, the ABS estimates the number of long-stay arrivals (and 
departures) for residents and visitors who stay (and depart) for more than 12 months 
(see box 4.1). The length of stay is identified from incoming and outgoing passenger 
cards, with indirect estimates made of the number of people who subsequently change 
their duration of stay in Australia or time away from the country. 
McDonald and Kippen (2002), however, suggested that the methodology used by the 
ABS systematically overstates the number of long-stay visitor arrivals after 1998 
because of some multiple entries by the same people. In a subsequent paper, 
McDonald, Khoo and Kippen (2003) estimated that, over the five years from 1998-99, 
the number of net long-stay arrivals was about 40 per cent lower than the preliminary 
official estimates. According to their estimate, net immigration has increased by just 
1.1 per cent per year since 1995-96. 
The ABS do not fully accept McDonald, Khoo and Kippen’s estimates because they do 
not have regard for Australian residents who indicate, when leaving the country, that 
they will have a short term (less than 12 months) absence but in practice stay away for 
longer, and vice versa. However, the ABS has revised downwards its original net 
intake estimates for 2001-02 and 2002-03 by 26  000 on average for each year. 
Estimates for earlier years were not revised. 
According to the latest ABS figures, net immigration has increased by 2.7 per cent per 
year since 1995-96 (see figure below). 






















ABS original ABS revised McDonald et al.
 
Data sources: ABS (Australian Demographic Statistics, Cat. no. 3101.0, March Quarter 2003 and June 
Quarter 2003); McDonald, Khoo and Kippen (2003). 
     





Box 4.3  Location and housing arrangements of long-stay business 
visitors 
The results of some preliminary analysis on a limited sample (377 records) of 
Temporary Business Entry (Long-stay) Visa holders undertaken by Professor Peter 
McDonald at the Australian National University Research School of Social Sciences, 
indicate that approximately: 
•  50 per cent live in Sydney;  
•  20 per cent live in Melbourne; 
•  84 per cent live in rental accommodation; 
•  12 per cent live in their own home; and 
•  4 per cent live in an existing household. 
Source: Professor McDonald (pers. comm., 16 March 2004). 
 
 
The effect on housing demand of permanent settlers depends on whether they are 
coming to join existing households in Australia. For example, immigrants under the 
family reunion program (which includes the spouse or fiancé, children and parents 
of an Australian citizen) account for about 40  per  cent of all permanent settlers 
requiring visas (DIMIA 2003). Earlier studies indicated that these families generally 
resided with the Australian citizen they were joining, at least in the short term 
(Tonkin, Williams and Ackland 1993). However, data are unavailable on the current 
housing demand of these migrants. 
Population movements to states and territories 
The distribution of arriving immigrants between jurisdictions and between capital 
cities and regional areas has changed little over the last decade, with NSW standing 
out as the largest recipient: 
•  NSW and Victoria received most permanent settlers (40 per cent and 24 per cent 
respectively in 2001-02). 
•  Most long-stay visitors stayed in NSW (42 per cent) or Victoria (23 per cent). 
Most immigrants settle in capital cities. According to the 2001 Census data, Sydney, 
Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth received 90 per cent or more of their state’s intake. 
The corresponding figures for Brisbane, Hobart and Darwin were in each case about 
60 per cent. 
This suggests that the initial pressure on housing demand from immigration is likely 
to be experienced mainly in the capital cities, particularly in Sydney. However,     




these effects may be diluted as residents (including previous immigrants) move 
around Australia, partly in response to regional differences in house prices. 
At the state and territory level, as well as natural increase, population growth 
includes net immigration and net interstate migration. The combined effects of these 
two latter components of growth is shown in figure  4.3 for NSW, Victoria and 
Queensland. All experienced net inflows of population over the life of the current 
housing boom, with the strongest growth occurring in Victoria. 














































Data sources: ABS (Australian Demographic Statistics, Cat. no. 3101.0; Migration, Cat. no. 3412.0).  
Total population growth in states and regions 
The rate of natural increase in the resident population has been declining across 
Australia. Hence, despite higher national immigration, annual population growth in 
most cities and states has been either lower or only marginally higher since the start 
of the recent housing boom, than it was in the preceding five year period (see 
table 4.1). The exceptions are Melbourne and country Victoria, and WA (except 
Perth), which have experienced a pick-up in population growth.     




Table 4.1  Average annual population growth rates, 1991 to 2002  
Location  1991 to 1996  1996 to 2002
  per cent  per cent
Sydney 1.1  1.2
Rest of New South Wales  0.9  1.0
Melbourne  0.8  1.2
Rest of Victoria  0.2  0.9
Brisbane 2.3  1.8
Rest of Queensland  2.6  1.7
Perth  1.7  1.5
Rest of Western Australia  1.0  1.5
Adelaide 0.4  0.5
Rest of South Australia  0.3  0.5
Hobart  0.5  0.2
Rest of Tasmania  1.7  -0.2
Australian Capital Territory  1.3  0.8
Northern Territory   1.9  1.4
Australia 1.2  1.2
Sources: ABS (Population Growth and Distribution, Cat. no. 2035.0; Australian Demographic Statistics, Cat. 
no. 3101.0). 
This suggests that population pressures in themselves have not been a major driver 
of the recent strong upswing in house prices across Australia. As the NSW 
Government commented: 
Population growth is the key factor leading to household formation and the underlying 
demand for housing. The rate of population growth has been above average in Sydney 
and NSW. However, the net increase in the number of households (or the underlying 
demand for housing) has not significantly diverged from the long-term trend and does 
not in itself explain the degree to which prices have risen. (sub. 187, p. 9) 
This highlights again that increased demand for better quality and better located 
dwellings, rather than for more dwellings, has been the primary driver of prices in 
the recent upswing. 
Of course, in the absence of higher immigration, population growth would have 
slowed by more and with it, the underlying demand for new housing, especially in 
Sydney. This would have tended to offset the upward pressure on house prices 
coming from, amongst other things, economic growth and cheaper finance. 
In making this point, the Commission is not suggesting that immigration policy 
should be used to influence housing demand or affordability. Immigration policy 
obviously needs to be determined by broader considerations.     





The number of dwellings required nationally will grow more rapidly than the 
aggregate population if the average number of residents per household falls. This 
indeed is what has happened during the 1990s and into the 2000s. In this period, the 
number of households has increased by 1.8 per cent per year, while the population 
has grown by 1.2  per  cent, as average household size has declined from 2.8 to 
2.6  persons. According to BIS Shrapnel (2003), the shift to smaller households 
accounted for approximately 40 per cent of the growth in the number of households 
in the first half of the 1990s and 30 per cent in the second half. 
The link between population growth and household formation is influenced by a 
large number of social and demographic factors. For example, the population is 
ageing (see box 4.4), the incidence of family breakdown is growing, the birth rate is 
declining, more people are remaining single, and young adults are staying at home 
for longer. Some of these factors encourage household formation and some work 
against it. However, as the household formation figures show, on balance, social 
and demographic trends are increasing the underlying demand for housing. 
 
Box 4.4  Our population is ageing 
The rates of growth in Australia’s population vary across age groups, and over the past 
decade or so have been highest among those older than 44, who are more likely to be 
trading up to more expensive houses than entering the market for the first time (see 
table below). Since 1996, there has been virtually no population growth in the 25 to 34 
year old age group, which is likely to include most first home buyers (see appendix B).  





25 to 34 
Aged
35 to 44 
Aged 





1991 to 1996  0.3  1.4  4.2  1.8  
 
1996 to 2003  0.1  0.9  2.3  2.9
 
  Source: ABS (Population by Age and Sex, Australian States and Territories, Cat. no. 3201.0). 
 
 
That said, changes in household formation occur slowly. Hence, while the decline in 
the average household size may increase the demand for housing over the long 
term, it is unlikely to be a significant contributor to the recent sharp increase in 
house prices above the long-term trend.     




Impact of population and household formation on underlying demand 
for new dwellings 
The conclusion that population growth and household formation trends have not 
been major drivers of the recent national increase in house prices is supported by 
estimates of the underlying demand for dwellings. According to BIS Shrapnel 
(2003), at the national level, underlying demand for new dwellings (estimated as a 
function of trend growth in the resident population and household formation) fell 
slightly in the second half of the 1990s (see table 4.2).  
Table 4.2  Estimates of underlying demand for additional dwellings, 1980s 
and 1990s 
 NSW  Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT  NT  Australia
  Annual average (‘000 units) 
Mid-1981 to mid-1986  39.7  31.3 31.5 16.1 10.2 3.2 2.4 2.3  136.8
Mid-1986 to mid-1991  39.2  34.2 32.4 18.2 10.7 3.2 2.8 1.1  141.7
Mid-1991 to mid-1996  43.0  26.9 41.0 17.9 8.7 2.9 3.1  1.4  145.0
Mid-1996 to mid-2001  45.0  34.0 32.0 18.0 7.5 1.8 2.1  1.2  141.5
Mid-2001 to mid-2003a 49.1  43.2 41.6 18.0 7.5 2.0 2.0  0.7  164.7
Note. Estimates of underlying demand are based on changes to the estimated resident population. This will 
underestimate the underlying demand because housing demand by visitors, particularly short-stay visitors, is 
not taken into account (see box 4.1). a Figures for the period mid-2001 to mid-2003 are based on estimates of 
net immigration that differ from the latest revised ABS estimates (see box 4.2). 
Source: BIS Shrapnel (2003). 
The Reserve Bank of Australia pointed out that estimates of demand for new 
dwellings have picked up more recently (sub. 199, p. 29). The Housing Industry 
Association (sub. DR260, p. 6; trans., p. 90) also referred to BIS Shrapnel’s higher 
estimates of underlying demand for the period mid-2001 to mid-2003 (see 
table 4.2). However, in estimating net immigration, BIS Shrapnel used the original 
ABS estimate for 2001-02 and its own estimate for 2002-03, which turned out to be 
on average 20 000 visitors per annum higher than the latest revised ABS estimates. 
This would seem to explain a large part of the estimated increase in underlying 
demand early in the 2000s. 
Even so, as noted above, housing demand appears to have been boosted by growing 
numbers of business visitors and students who are not included in the resident 
population estimates.     




4.3  Grants to first home buyers 
The sources of influence on housing demand and prices described thus far are 
permanent features of the social and market environment. A recent additional 
influence on housing demand is the First Home Owner Scheme (FHOS), which has 
been in place since July 2000. Under this scheme, eligible first home buyers can 
apply for a grant of $7000 when they buy a new or established dwelling.  
At the time the grant was introduced, the stated rationale was to compensate for the 
increase in house prices associated with the implementation of the Goods and 
Services Tax (GST). This support for first home buyers led to an increase in their 
demand. However, this was insufficient to offset the slump that followed when 
many other house buyers brought forward the purchase or construction of new 
dwellings into the first half of 2000 to avoid the GST. 
As a result, and notwithstanding the grant, in 2000-01, dwelling commencements 
fell by about 30 per cent, the largest annual decline since 1975. In response, the 
Australian Government introduced the Commonwealth Additional Grant (CAG), 
which provided an extra $7000 to those FHOS recipients who were purchasing a 
newly constructed dwelling. Initially to apply from March 2001 to December 2001, 
the scheme was subsequently extended until 30 June 2002, with the additional grant 
reduced to $3000. The original $7000 grant under the FHOS remains in place for 
eligible first home buyers. 
Impact on house price trends 
From July 2000 to January 2004, around $4.3 billion was provided to over 550 000 
home buyers through the initial and additional grants (Australian Government 
Treasury, pers. comm., 19 March 2004). Both the first home buyers’ share of total 
approvals and the number of loan approvals to first home buyers rose markedly 
around the times that the original and additional grants were introduced, 
subsequently falling sharply (see figures 4.4 and 4.5). Thus the grants appear to 
have ‘pulled forward’ house purchases that would otherwise have occurred 
somewhat later (chapter 10).     




























Note. Excludes refinancing of established dwellings. 
Data source: ABS (Housing Finance for Owner Occupation, Cat. no. 5609.0). 





















Note. Excludes refinancing of established dwellings. 
Data source: ABS (Housing Finance for Owner Occupation, Cat. no. 5609.0). 
The extent to which these grants assisted recipients depends on how much house 
prices have risen in response to the resultant increase in demand. This, in turn, will 
depend on the responsiveness of supply. 
In an extreme case, if there were no capacity to increase the supply of housing in the 
face of a jump in demand, the entire grant could be capitalised into house prices,     




lifting the price of a property valued at $250 000, for example, by a little under 
3 per cent. However, given that median house prices have increased by 18 per cent 
per year since the grant was introduced, it is clear that the FHOS has been at most a 
minor contributor to the recent surge in prices. 
Over the long term, as supply has time to respond to demand pressures, the grant is 
likely to have even less impact on house prices. That is, the increase in demand will 
encourage additional supply rather than simply boost prices. However, the increase 
in supply is also likely to be small, given the relatively low value of the grant in 
relation to house prices and its limitation to one group of purchasers. The impact of 
the FHOS, and in particular whether it has materially increased home ownership 
rates, is discussed in chapter 10. 
 
     
    
 
 
     




5  The role of taxation 
Findings 
•  The burden of taxes affecting housing is generally shared between buyers and 
sellers, regardless of who initially pays. 
•  Increased taxes such as the GST and stamp duty have played only a minor direct 
role in recent house price growth. 
•  However, stamp duties are an obstacle to first home ownership, as well as inhibiting 
the reallocation and adaptation of the housing stock. 
–  Governments need to consider how best to reduce reliance on stamp duties, in 
favour of more efficient alternative sources of revenue. 
–  If progress is not made in this regard, tax-on-tax anomalies involving stamp 
duties would then need to be addressed. 
•  Income tax ‘preferences’ for owner-occupied housing, including the exemption from 
capital gains tax, may have led to over-investment in housing. 
–  But it is unclear whether any changes to promote neutrality of treatment would 
yield significant gains to the community, given administrative complexities, 
compliance and adjustment costs, and the possible loss of social benefits from 
home ownership. 
•  Other aspects of the personal taxation regime — including negative gearing rules, 
‘capital works’ deductions, the 1999 change to capital gains tax, and high marginal 
income tax rates — have combined to magnify the attractiveness of investing in 
residential property during the recent upswing in house prices, thereby adding to 
price pressures. 
–  These features of the income tax system do not in principle favour private 
investment in rental housing over other passive investments, such as in equities 
or commercial property. 
–  Nonetheless, it seems that they may be contributing to inefficient outcomes in 
housing and other asset markets. Hence they should be the subject of a broader 
review, focusing in particular on the capital gains tax regime. 
 
In commenting on affordability issues, many inquiry participants cited the stamp 
duty ‘windfall’ for state and territory governments from rising house prices. There 
was also widespread concern with Australian Government taxation arrangements. It 
was claimed that the recent introduction of the goods and services tax (GST) had 
increased house prices. Further, changes to the capital gains tax (CGT) regime, 
coupled with long standing negative gearing arrangements, were seen to have     




contributed to higher prices through encouraging greater levels of investment in 
housing.  
The next section briefly describes some of the main features of taxation 
arrangements affecting housing. The chapter then examines the possible price 
effects of the recent tax changes and of the tax arrangements affecting housing more 
generally. Finally, some possible improvements to aspects of housing taxation are 
discussed, with attention drawn to some general components of the tax regime 
impinging on housing demand and prices. In some areas, the Commission is 
recommending that potential reforms be subject to further review, including 
examination of the administrative consequences, the transitional and adjustment 
costs, and broader economic effects. 
5.1  Current taxation arrangements 
Australian Government tax policies affecting housing include the taxation of rental 
income, deductibility rules for expenses (including negative gearing), CGT and the 
GST. (The First Home Owner Scheme, introduced in the first instance to offset the 
effect of the GST on the cost of new dwellings, is discussed in chapters 4 and 10.) 
At the state level, stamp duties and land taxes are the two main housing-related 
taxes. 
Tax exemptions and concessions also influence housing demand and supply. For 
instance, the Australian Government does not tax the imputed rental income of 
owner occupiers (see below), nor does it impose CGT on the principal residence. 
State and territory governments provide various stamp duty concessions for first 
home buyers and land tax exemptions for owner occupiers. 
Australian Government taxation arrangements 
Rental income and deductibility rules 
Like income derived from other sources, rental income from residential investment 
property is included in a taxpayer’s assessable income and taxed at the applicable 
marginal rate. A significant proportion of taxpayers — about 17 per cent by one 
recent estimate (chapter 2) — declare rental income. As with other forms of 
investment, investors can deduct allowable associated costs incurred in earning that 
income under the general deduction provisions. Such costs may include: interest on 
borrowings; depreciation (at various rates) of fixtures and fittings such as blinds, 
carpets, furniture and electrical appliances; as well as ‘capital works deductions’.     




This latter item effectively represents an allowance for depreciation on the building 
itself, as well as on alterations and structural improvements. For construction started 
after 15 September 1987, the rate of deduction per income year is 2.5 per cent, 
based on the original construction cost. A rate of 4 per cent applies to construction 
started between 22 August 1984 to 15 September 1987. 
Housing-related deductions in excess of rental income can be set against other 
sources of income (referred to as ‘negative gearing’). In 2000-01, 7 per cent of 
taxpayers had negatively geared property investments, compared with 6 per cent in 
1995-96 just prior to the commencement of the recent housing boom (ATO 2003). 
Moreover, in 2000-01 (and some previous years), total deductions claimed for rental 
properties exceeded reported rental income. Although data are not yet available, 
recent strong growth in investment in rental housing and historically low rental 
yields, suggest that this would also have been the case since then. Negative gearing 
arrangements also apply to some other forms of investment, such as shares. 
The implicit or ‘imputed’ rental income accruing to owner occupiers (in effect, the 
rent which owners would need to pay to themselves if they rented their own houses 
at market rates) is not subject to tax — unlike actual income from other property 
investments — but nor can owners claim tax deductions for costs such as interest 
payments, maintenance and depreciation. The tax treatment of imputed rental 
income is not of course unique to housing — individuals do not pay tax on imputed 
income from other assets, such as motor vehicles. 
Capital gains tax 
Capital gains tax applies to many classes of assets, including housing, acquired after 
September 1985. It is payable when assets are sold rather than on an accruals basis. 
The taxable amount of capital gain is added to income in the year of sale and taxed 
at the applicable income tax rates. The taxpayer’s main residence is exempt from 
CGT. 
Initially CGT was levied on the full estimated real capital gains (after allowing for 
inflation). But since 21 September 1999, it has been levied on nominal capital gains. 
Under the new arrangements, individuals and trusts receive a discount of 
50  per  cent for assets (including investment housing) held for longer than 
12 months, while superannuation funds receive a 33 per cent discount. However, no 
discount applies for companies. Phasing arrangements apply.  
The current CGT discount arrangement was introduced by the Australian 
Government after consideration of the Ralph report. According to that report, the 
rationale for the discount was to improve Australia’s international competitiveness     




while promoting investment in innovative and high growth companies likely to 
produce significant capital gains (Ralph 1999, p. 14).  
The calculated capital gain allows for relevant capital costs associated with 
acquiring and holding the asset. In addition, the CGT cost base is reduced to the 
extent that capital works deductions have been claimed for income tax purposes. (In 
contrast, depreciation claimed on fixtures and fittings is not deducted as these 
‘depreciating’ assets are not subject to CGT.) However, where the taxpayer is 
eligible for a discount, only part of the capital works deductions previously claimed 
is subject to tax — the implications of this treatment are discussed in section 5.4.  
The Government is considering the implications of including buildings and 
structures in the uniform capital allowance system applying since 1 July 2001. This 
would remove the capital works deductions provisions from CGT arrangements and 
thus end the current discounting effect. However, the Government has indicated 
that: 
This measure raises a number of extremely difficult practical issues, including 
separating land value from that of the buildings and structures, and defining the asset 
unit (a single building or many smaller assets). In light of the need for significant 
amounts of further work and competing tax priorities, the measure, if proceeded with, 
will not commence until at least July 2005. (Coonan 2002) 
Goods and services tax 
From 1 July 2000, GST has applied (at a rate of 10 per cent) on the supply of most 
goods and services in Australia. It is collected by the Australian Government, but its 
proceeds are distributed to the states and territories.  
GST was introduced by agreement between the Australian Government and state 
and territory governments, as part of a package of tax reforms. This included the 
removal and rationalisation of a number of state and territory taxes. As a transitional 
measure, the Australian Government makes up any shortfall in state and territory 
revenue occurring as a result of these changes. These shortfall payments, totalling 
an estimated $370  million in 2003-04 (compared to GST revenue of some 
$32 billion), have reduced over time (Costello 2003). In that year, only NSW and 
Victoria are expected to receive shortfall payments, with NSW alone expected to 
receive payments in the following two financial years.  
In relation to land and housing, GST is imposed on: 
•  Vacant land sold by registered enterprises. However, there are some exemptions; 
for example, sales of farm land and government land grants. As well, the     




operation of the ‘margin scheme’ may act to restrict the GST payable on land 
sales to the increases in value since 1 July 2000. 
•  New residential premises erected on vacant land. ‘New’ is defined to encompass 
premises which have not previously been sold as residential premises, those 
created through substantial renovations, or those built to replace demolished 
premises on the same land. It excludes residential premises which have been 
rented out for five years. 
•  Building materials and services used in the construction of new housing or 
renovations (although wholesale sales tax which had applied to some of these 
items was removed when the GST was introduced). GST also applies to property 
management services, and selling and conveyancing expenses. 
Official estimates for GST revenue raised from housing activity are not available. 
The Housing Industry Association (HIA) estimated that, based on industry activity 
levels, the GST lifted indirect tax receipts from new housing and renovations by 
more than $3.6  billion in the first year and in excess of $5  billion in 2002-03 
(sub. 177, p. 52). The latter figure is made up of about $2.5 billion in respect of new 
housing, $2 billion in respect of renovations and about $0.5 billion each in respect 
of repairs and maintenance, and land development (sub.  DR260, p.  10). GST 
collections of around $5 billion appear broadly consistent with the ABS estimate of 
gross fixed capital formation for private dwellings in 2002-03 of $48 billion. 
State and territory taxation arrangements 
Recent tax changes, particularly the introduction of the GST, have led to a 
realignment of the revenue importance of the remaining state-level taxes and 
charges (see figure 5.1). The large increase in the importance of stamp duty receipts 
is also partly due to strong growth in house prices and higher turnover of the 
housing stock. 
Stamp duty 
State and territory stamp duties on sales of land and housing apply on top of GST, 
with marginal rates ranging up to about 7 per cent, but with significant variation in 
the rates across jurisdictions. Duty can be levied more than once as ownership 
changes from original land owner, to developer, to builder and to the final 
purchaser.     




















Stamp duty Land tax Payroll tax Other taxes
 
Note. Data, which exclude GST, are for all jurisdictions combined. Although stamp duty includes duty on 
commercial conveyances, the vast majority is collected on conveyances of residential properties. 
Data sources: ABS (Taxation Revenue, Cat. no. 5506.0) and State Budget Papers. 
In all capital cities, the amount of stamp duty payable on a median valued home has 
increased significantly in the past five years (see table 5.1), mainly because of the 
increase in prices coupled with the progressive structure of stamp duty rates. (That 
is, the percentage tax paid increases with the house price.) However, increases in 
scheduled rates in WA, SA and the ACT have also contributed. 
As a result, and because of increases in housing turnover (chapter 2), total stamp 
duty revenue has risen strongly (see figure 5.2).  
Every state and territory provides stamp duty concessions for first home buyers, 
though in the ACT these concessions are available to all home buyers, subject to an 
income test. Concessions generally take the form of reduced amounts of duty 
(sometimes to zero), while in Tasmania first home buyers are allowed to stagger 
stamp duty payments over a two-year period. However, as these concessions are 
generally restricted to homes below specified threshold values, many first home 
buyers miss out. For example, for sales transacted in January 2004, in Victoria, 
Queensland, SA and Tasmania a first home buyer purchasing a home of ‘average’ 
price would not have received any concession, relative to other owner occupiers 
(see table 5.2).  
In contrast to other jurisdictions, Queensland and the NT provide separate stamp 
duty concessions for all owner occupiers, though the level of concession is less than 
that for first home buyers.      




Table 5.1  Stamp duty payable on the median valued home by  
non-concessional home buyers 














  $’000  $    $’000  $ per cent  per cent
Sydney  249  7 205    442  15 380 78  113
Melbourne  155  4 960    272  11 980 75  142
Brisbanea  144  1 440    290  3 900 101  171
Perth  143  3 721    211  7 803 48  110
Adelaide  119  3 590    225  7 893 89  120
Hobart  107  2 635    181  5 010 69  90
Darwina  174  4 122    211  5 825 21  41
Canberra  156  3 975    294  9 260 88  133
a The figures for Brisbane and Darwin apply to the principal place of residence only, with higher rates applying 
to rental housing. Also, as discussed in the text, all jurisdictions provide concessions to first home buyers — 
see table 5.2. 
Sources: Productivity Commission estimates based on Australian Government Treasury (unpublished), 
Valuer-General departments, REIA (unpublished) and ABS (unpublished), stamp duty rates from NSW 
Treasury (2003). 
























a Current dollars. All jurisdictions combined. b Stamp duty includes duties on conveyances, leases, rental 
arrangements, loans, marketable securities and life insurance premiums. c Although conveyance duty 
includes duty on commercial conveyances, the vast majority is collected on conveyances of residential 
properties. 
Data source: ABS (Taxation Revenue, Cat. no. 5506.0). 
Most jurisdictions adjust their concessional thresholds periodically as house prices 
increase. For instance, the WA Government recently increased its first home buyer 
concession limit from $202 500 to $277 500. And the Queensland Government has     




announced that the State’s concessions will be broadened from 1 May 2004, subject 
to approval by Parliament. From that date, Queensland’s first home buyers will pay 
lower stamp duty on houses valued at up to $500 000, rather than the $160 000 limit 
that currently applies. 
Table 5.2  Stamp duty payable by first home buyers — January 2004 





 price b 
Stamp duty 
payable by first 
home buyers 
Stamp duty payable 
by owner occupiers 
 $’000  $’000  $  $ 
NSW  300  261  5 484  7 625 
Vic c  200  215  8 560  8 560 
Qld  160  195  1 950  1 950d
WA  278  172  5 450  5 950 
SA  130   158  5 150  5 150 
Tas  120  144  3 745  3 745 
NT  no limit  161  1 425  3 566d
ACT 249  231  5  513e 5 513e
a First home buyers do not receive stamp duty concessions on houses that are valued above these prices.  
b Based on the average home loan taken out by a first home buyer assuming a loan to valuation ratio of 
90 per cent. c To qualify for the first home buyer concession in Victoria, the buyer must be a pensioner or 
have at least one child under the age of 18. d Stamp duty payable on a principal residence. Higher rates apply 
for investment houses. e Higher duty applies to buyers who fail the income test. 
Sources: Productivity Commission estimates based on Australian Government Treasury (unpublished), 
Valuer-General departments, REIA (unpublished), ABS Housing Finance for Owner Occupation (Cat. no. 
5609.0) and ABS (unpublished), stamp duty rates from NSW Treasury (2003). 
Land tax 
All states and territories, other than the NT, impose taxes on the unimproved value 
of commercial land holdings, including land for rental housing, on an annual or 
more frequent basis. Owner-occupied housing is not generally subject to land tax, 
with the exception being principal residences valued at more than $1.97 million in 
NSW. 
Like stamp duties, land tax rates are progressive, with marginal rates varying up to 
about 5  per  cent. Often, separate land holdings under common ownership are 
aggregated for the purposes of calculating land tax liabilities. 
Land tax revenue has grown in recent years — although by much less than stamp 
duties (see figure 5.2) — as the value of land has increased. Growth over the past 
five years has been moderated somewhat by increases in the rate thresholds in most 
jurisdictions and also by reductions in tax rates in NSW, WA and Tasmania. In the 
other jurisdictions, rates have not changed over this period, up or down.     





A number of other taxes imposed by state and territory governments affect land and 
housing. These include: levies on residential property to fund emergency services; 
duty on the amounts secured on mortgages and loans (except in the ACT, the NT 
and, from 1 July 2004, in Victoria); duties on commercial leases (except in Victoria 
and Tasmania); a change-of-use (or betterment) charge in the ACT, aiming to 
appropriate 75 per cent of the estimated ‘value added’ due to re-zoning (though this 
raised only $3.9 million in 2002-03); and metropolitan improvement levies on 
households and land in Victoria and WA. (These levies are separate from developer 
charges, dealt with in chapter 7.) 
Collectively, these taxes account for about 5  per  cent of state taxation revenue 
(excluding the GST). 
5.2  Housing taxation arrangements in other countries 
Although international comparisons of taxation arrangements can be difficult, 
Australia’s reliance on specific property taxation seems high compared with many 
other countries. Such taxation accounted for about 9  per  cent of total taxation 
revenue for Australia in 2001, compared with a range from below 2 per cent to 
12 per cent in a selection of overseas countries (see figure 5.3).  
Australia’s specific property taxation relies almost equally on taxes on immovable 
property (such as rates and land taxes) and on financial and capital transactions 
(such as stamp and mortgage duties), but there is wide variation in this respect 
among countries. Some countries, such as the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Canada and New Zealand, make relatively little use of specific transactions taxes on 
property although many, including the United Kingdom, do levy stamp duties. 
Importantly, however, the data in figure 5.3 exclude revenue collected from 
property by broader taxes such as value added and capital gains taxes. Hence, they 
provide only a partial perspective of the importance of property to each country’s 
tax base. 
The taxation treatment of owner-occupied housing in Australia is similar to that in 
countries such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, France and Germany 
(see table 5.3).  
In the past, taxation of imputed rental income on the ‘family’ home was more 
widespread. But a range of issues, including administrative and compliance 
problems, has led to a decline in the use of this tax instrument. Where such taxation     




does remain, imputed rental income is generally low compared with market rates — 
for example, in the Netherlands it is set at 0.8 per cent of the value of the home 
(IBFD 2003, p. 447) — and collection remains administratively complicated.  

































































































































































































































































Recurrent taxes on immovable property Taxes on financial and capital transactions Other property taxes
 
Note. Other property taxes include recurrent taxes on net wealth, estate, inheritance and gift taxes. 
Data sources: OECD (2002a, 2003). 
Interest deductibility for owner-occupied housing was similarly more widespread in 
the past, but concerns about its potential to inflate housing demand have led to its 
removal in countries such as the United Kingdom and France. 
A simple comparison of tax measures applying to investment in rental housing 
across a range of countries suggests that Australia’s provisions are relatively 
favourable (see table  5.3). Indeed, several participants were of this view (see 
below). 
However, tax regimes are complex and a tabular comparison such as this cannot 
pick up the impacts of inter-country differences in important variables such as tax 
rates and deductibility provisions. Further, tax effects can vary across individual 
investments over time and between countries depending on market conditions. 
‘Generous’ negative gearing provisions, for example, are of more value when 
income tax rates and interest rates are high. Another relevant factor, not 
encompassed in the table, is how taxation arrangements for investment in rental     




housing in each country compare with the taxation regimes for other classes of 
assets, such as equities. Australia’s tax treatment of investment in rental housing, 
and its implications, are discussed in section 5.4 below. 
Table 5.3  Tax treatment of owner-occupied and investment housing 
across countries 
  Owner-occupied housing    Investment housing 
















Australia No  No  No  Yes Yes  Discount  Yes..
Canada No  No  No  Restricted Yes  Discount  Yesb
France No  No  No  Restricted Yes  Discount  Yes..
Germany  No  No  No (after 2 
years) 
Restricted Yes Discount  Yes..
Japan No  No  Yes  Yes Yes  Discount  Yes..
Netherlands Yes  Yes  No  No No  Discount  Yes..
New 
Zealand 





Yes Yes  Restricted Yes  Yes  Yes..
United 
Kingdom 
No No No  No No  Yes  Yes..
United 
States 
No  Yes  No (after 2 
years) 
Restricted Yes Yes No..
a ‘Discount’ means less than 100 per cent of the capital gain is taxed. b In approximately half of all provinces.  
c Except for depreciation claw back. 
Sources: OECD (2001); RBA (sub. 199); French Ministry of Finance and Industry (2003); Japanese Ministry of 
Finance (2003); New Zealand Inland Revenue (2003); Dutch Revenue Office (2001); Swedish National Tax 
Board (2002); United Kingdom Inland Revenue (2003a, 2003b); German Tax Data (2001); Barker  (2003); 
CCH (2002). 
5.3  What are the price effects of these taxes? 
Statutory application versus final incidence 
When examining the effect of taxation arrangements on house prices (and housing 
affordability), the statutory application of a tax may not be a guide to its final 
incidence. (This section discusses how taxes on housing are shared between buyers 
and sellers — as discussed in chapter 7, the incidence of charges on housing for 
infrastructure services is quite different.)     




Some taxes are initially imposed on suppliers of land and housing — examples 
include stamp duties paid when property changes ownership prior to final sale. 
Other taxes, such as the GST on new houses, are effectively incorporated into the 
market price paid by the buyer and then remitted by the seller to government. In the 
case of stamp duties on final sale, tax is not included in the market price paid to the 
seller, but is separately paid to the government by the buyer. 
The ultimate effect on house prices depends, however, on how these taxes are 
‘shared’ between buyers and sellers as a result of the interaction of demand and 
supply in the market. While the views of participants on this differed (see box 5.1), 
in broad terms, the final incidence will depend on: the relative responsiveness of 
supply and demand to price in the housing market generally and its various 
submarkets; the time horizon; whether a new tax, or a change to an existing tax, was 
anticipated; and whether the tax in question is specific to housing or applies more 
generally. These points are dealt with in turn below. 
The basic proposition that the final incidence of a housing-specific tax imposed on 
either buyers or sellers depends on the responsiveness of housing supply and 
demand to price changes, is illustrated by the example in box 5.2. What follows is 
that factors influencing the ‘elasticity’ of demand and supply will be integral in 
determining how such taxes on housing are shared between buyers and sellers. 
The ‘response time’ is critical 
In the short term, the supply of land for housing is essentially fixed. There are also 
other constraints and delays in bringing new dwellings to the market and in 
upgrading the existing housing stock (chapters 6 to 8). This implies that demand 
surges are likely to have a quite limited effect on housing supply in the short term 
even if prices rise significantly (that is, supply is relatively ‘inelastic’). For example, 
the WA Government observed that: 
… the typical lead time for the planning and development of new land and housing in 
the Perth metropolitan region is three to five years. There is little practical scope to 
have sub-divided land supply ‘on call’ and ready for sale (i.e. with infrastructure 
installed) to meet sudden surges in demand … (sub. 190, p. 28) 
In contrast, demand for housing will vary somewhat as prices change, even in the 
short term. In this situation, an increase in specific taxes on housing such as stamp 
duty will tend to reduce the quantity demanded, but sellers will be willing to accept 
some reduction in the price they receive in the short term to maintain sales levels. 
Similarly, if taxes are reduced, demand will tend to increase but, because supply is 
largely fixed in the short term, sellers can ask for higher after-tax prices. In both 
cases, most of the immediate price effects of tax changes will fall on the seller of     




property (as a benefit or cost), with the price (inclusive of tax) paid by a buyer being 
little affected.  
 
Box 5.1  Who bears the burden of housing taxes? 
Participants differed in their views about how the burden of taxes on land and housing, 
and the benefits of any reductions in those taxes, are distributed between buyers and 
sellers of property. 
Most passed back to sellers? 
Professor Peter Abelson  
… in most cases, and for most practical purposes including policy making, taxes [on 
housing] reduce undeveloped land prices rather than increase house prices. 
(sub. 21, p. 1)  
ANZ  
A fall in stamp duties is likely to lead to a corresponding rise in house prices. House 
buyers would be little better off, and house sellers would obtain a windfall gain at the 
expense of state governments. (sub. 193, p. 12)  
SA Government  
… there is no guarantee that the stamp duty relief would be passed on to 
purchasers of ‘house and land’ packages and not reflected in a higher developer’s 
margin. (sub. 98, p. 53)  
Most passed forward to buyers? 
Terry Dwyer  
It is sometimes suggested that transfer taxes such as GST or stamp duty can be 
passed backwards to land developers and therefore are borne by the landholders 
whose land is purchased for development. This is a profound mistake in analysis. 
(sub. 144, p. 3)  
Housing Industry Association  
In relation to property taxes and levies … the developer is usually able to 
incorporate this charge in the final price of their land and home package. In this 
sense, the economic incidence … is ‘passed forward’ to the new home owner. 
(sub. 177, Access Economics report, p. 35)  
 
 
In the medium to long term, however, there is considerable scope to increase the 
supply of dwellings — through, for example, development of new housing land, 
moves to smaller block sizes, infill development and higher density living — as 
well as to upgrade the quality of the existing stock. In addition, people can relocate 
to areas where house prices are lower. Over time a higher proportion of the cost (or 
benefit) of a change to a specific housing tax will therefore be borne by (or accrue 
to) the buyer.     




Box 5.2  Who pays a housing-specific tax: the theory 
‘Real world’ outcomes are complex and dynamic, as the HIA noted in response to the 
Discussion Draft (sub. DR260, p. 15). Hence, the net effects of taxation arrangements 
affecting housing, especially broadly-based taxes, could only be quantified through 
detailed modelling. Nonetheless, the proposition that housing-specific taxes will usually 
be shared between buyers and sellers is a robust one, though the degree of sharing 
depends on several factors (see text).  
The following partial and static analysis does not purport to represent the incidence of 
any actual tax on housing. It merely serves to illustrate the mechanism by which a 
housing-specific tax — such as stamp duty — will be shared between the buyer and 
seller. In the diagram, SS represents the supply curve, and DD the demand curve for 
housing services in the absence of tax, with OP the selling price. Suppose a tax of 
OP1  –  OP2 is initially imposed on the buyer. The quantity of housing services 
demanded will decline — this reduces the price rise faced by buyers and effectively 
passes on some of the tax to sellers. Alternatively, the same tax initially imposed on 
sellers will reduce the selling price (provided that supply is not totally insensitive to 
price), leading to a reduction in the quantity of housing services supplied and, in turn, 












For most of a tax to be passed on to buyers, as implied by the HIA and some other 
participants, supply would need to be highly elastic (ie the supply curve in the diagram 
would be close to horizontal), a notion at odds with the usual view of land and housing 
markets (see text). Conversely, if supply is ‘inelastic’ (that is, the supply curve in the 
diagram is close to vertical), and demand is more elastic (as in the diagram), the 
quantity response to the imposition of a tax will be small, the share of the tax borne by 
buyers will be low and the share borne by sellers will be high.  
However, as the relevant time period lengthens, both demand and supply will tend to 
become more elastic and hence the cost of the tax will be shared more evenly by 
buyers and sellers. Moreover, the incidence of a broadly-based tax such as the GST 
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Moreover, over time, any tax impost on ‘middle men’ — for example, land 
developers — is also likely to diminish. In the short term, it is possible that 
developers will bear some of the cost of an increase in a housing tax. That is, if they 
have purchased land prior to an unanticipated tax increase, then in terms of the 
analysis in box 5.2, they will effectively become the seller and incur a ‘windfall’ 
loss. However, over the longer term, higher taxes will see developers paying less for 
raw land than otherwise, demand conditions being equal, meaning that the tax 
burden will again be shared between house purchasers and the owners of 
undeveloped land. 
Broadly-based versus housing-specific taxes 
Broadly-based taxes will have different incidence effects. As noted above, some of 
the taxes that apply to housing also apply to other assets, and the GST applies to 
most goods and services.  
The effects of a broadly-based tax will generally be more complicated, both in 
terms of their initial incidence and their subsequent flow-through, than those of a 
tax specific to one area of activity, such as housing. Thus, empirical modelling 
would be required to explore those effects in any detail. As discussed below, such 
modelling has been employed to analyse the impacts of the GST on house prices. 
That said, the partial equilibrium analysis of a housing-specific tax in box 5.2 is still 
relevant in considering what would happen were the GST to be removed on housing 
alone. The initial cost reduction from such a housing-specific change would be 
shared between buyers and sellers, as described in the box, meaning that the cost of 
buying a home would fall by less than the amount of tax removed. 
The preceding discussion also indicates the need to distinguish between tax-
inclusive and tax-exclusive prices — including in an affordability context. A tax 
reduction on housing, for example, will eventually lead to an increase in the volume 
of houses bought and sold, with both buyers and sellers benefiting from the ensuing 
price change — buyers will pay a lower tax-inclusive  price, while sellers will 
receive a higher tax-exclusive price than before.  
Price effects of recent tax changes 
The Commission has not attempted any special economic modelling of the effects 
of taxation arrangements affecting housing, or of recent changes to these 
arrangements. In the time available, it has been necessary to focus effort on the 
central issue of housing affordability, rather than divert attention to detailed tax 
modelling which is inherently difficult and resource intensive.     




Goods and services tax 
Several participants commented on the effects on house prices of the imposition of 
the GST. The Victorian Government, for example, considered that the GST has 
increased the price of purchasing a new home ‘by around 6 to 8 per cent, although 
the exact figure is undeterminable’ (sub. 85,  p. 37).  The  Master  Builders 
Association noted that the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, in 
its Price Guide released in May 2000, estimated the price change for a new house 
(excluding land) as being between 7.8 per cent and 9 per cent (sub. 135, p. 16).  
These estimates are compatible with projections made by Econtech (2000) 
immediately prior to the introduction of the GST. It projected an initial price effect 
on new housing of 9 per cent, after taking account of the effects of the removal of 
wholesale sales tax and other impositions. But in the long term, allowing for the 
spur to business investment from replacing those previous taxes with the GST, the 
projected price rise was 7.1 per cent.  
The Commission was advised by Treasury that its estimate of the impact of the 
introduction of the GST, and the removal of wholesale sales tax and other indirect 
taxes, on the price of construction was lower at 5.5 per cent. This figure relates to 
the amount by which prices in the industry would need to rise to recover the GST 
impost, taking account of the reductions in costs flowing from the abolition of other 
taxes, and assuming that profit margins in the industry remained unchanged. 
However, GST does not apply to housing stock which has been previously sold. 
Thus, whatever its price raising effect on new dwellings sold, its impact on overall 
housing price levels is likely to be somewhat smaller, especially in the short term. 
Of course, in time, there will be greater ‘pass through’, especially as the proportion 
of the stock that has been subject to GST on initial sale increases. Hence, its price 
effect across the whole housing stock will be commensurately higher. The HIA 
argued that this pass through effect has in fact been quite rapid, with the GST 
effectively becoming ‘capitalised’ into the price of existing housing through 
2001-02 (sub. DR260, p. 10). But as discussed further in this and other chapters, the 
introduction of the GST has been only one of many demand and supply factors 
influencing house price growth in the last few years.  
Capital gains tax 
Many participants considered that the changes made to CGT arrangements in 1999 
provided significant impetus to subsequent increases in house prices. Indeed, as 
discussed further in the following section, these changes have almost certainly 
contributed to the surge in investment in rental housing in the past few years.     




In general, provided nominal house prices increase by more than twice the rate of 
inflation over the relevant ownership period, the new arrangements advantage the 
investor. This situation has prevailed over much, if not all, of the post-1999 period. 
Of course, this generalisation abstracts from the effect of capital works deductions 
and also the effect on house prices themselves of the changes in CGT provisions. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that, in the context of recent strong house price growth, the 
CGT change has given impetus to investment in rental housing and added to price 
pressures.  
But there is no guarantee that recent rates of price increase will be maintained in 
future. Indeed, there is a general expectation that, at the very least, price growth will 
slow (chapter 9). If this happens, or were inflation rates to increase, less capital 
gains tax might be payable by future home buyers, if the pre-1999 arrangement had 
been continued. 
Stamp duties and land taxes 
As noted, there have been some minor changes (up and down) in the scheduled rates 
of stamp duties and land taxes in recent years. As well, some exemptions and 
concessions have been altered.  
The wide range of scheduled rates that apply both within and between jurisdictions, 
together with extensive exemptions and concessions, make any analytical 
assessment of the aggregate price effects of changes to those arrangements virtually 
impossible. As recent changes have been small, however, any price effects arising 
directly from changes to scheduled rates will almost certainly have been minimal. 
This is not to downplay the point that, in total, stamp duties (in particular) raise 
significant revenue and that revenue collected has increased substantially as housing 
turnover and prices have increased. But as discussed above, the burden of increases 
in stamp duty rates, or less generous concessions, will be shared between buyers 
and sellers. Hence, the impacts on house prices will not have been as great as the 
increase in revenue collected would suggest. 
Effects of income taxation arrangements applying to investment in 
rental housing 
Many of the income tax arrangements affecting investment in rental housing also 
apply to investment in other assets, although their specific application and impact 
can vary across asset classes. These arrangements include CGT, negative gearing, 
capital works deductions and depreciation provisions.      




Like many participants (see box 5.3), the Commission has concluded that these 
general taxation arrangements have lent impetus to the recent surge in investment in 
rental housing and consequent house price increases. In essence, they have 
reinforced the incentives for such investment resulting from falling real interest 
rates, easier availability of finance and lower returns in equities markets. 
 
Box 5.3  Participants’ comments on the tax treatment of rental housing 
Reserve Bank of Australia 
Against the backdrop of expectations of continuing capital gains, two aspects of the 
financing and taxation treatment of investments in rental properties have been 
particularly important … : 
– financial innovation that has allowed investors to purchase an investment 
property with limited, or no, cash outlay; and 
–  the relatively small cash outlay required to cover the ongoing costs of owning an 
investment property even when the rental yield on the property is very low. 
(sub. 199, pp. 37–8)  
Victorian Government 
In the context of a period of relatively low inflation, but strong growth in house 
prices, these [CGT] changes encouraged greater investor activity in the housing 
market, adding further demand pressure to the market. (sub. 85, p. 37)  
NSW Government 
… the relatively favourable taxation of residential property income and capital gains 
may encourage over-investment in residential property. (sub. 187, p. 59) 
Australian Council of Social Service 
Negative gearing arrangements, together with the hasty decision to cut CGT rates 
on personal incomes by half from 2000, have added fuel to the present investment 
property boom. (sub. 147, p. 17) 
Australian Consumers’ Association 
In a period of low inflation … [the revised CGT regime] … has given a large 
incentive to investors seeking (or expecting) opportunities for capital gains. 
(sub. 122, p. 16)  
NSW Council of Social Services 
… we all know that negative gearing is a rort, frankly. We wouldn’t find it so 
objectionable if it were at least used for some useful social benefit … (trans., p. 238) 
CPA Australia 
The favourable tax treatment for investors in Australia relates mainly to the 
treatment of negative gearing, capital gains tax, and depreciation particularly in the 
context of high marginal income tax rates. (sub. DR319, attachment p. 10) 
 
 
Some of these taxation arrangements, such as negative gearing and expense 
deductibility, have been of long standing. But their potential benefits have increased     




as rising incomes have pushed more investors into higher tax brackets. For example, 
the proportion of taxpayers reporting taxable income in the highest tax bracket rose 
from 9 per cent in 1994-95 to 12 per cent in 2000-01 (ATO 2003).  
Given the low rental yields currently available from much housing investment 
(chapter 2), investors must be expecting most of their return to come from future 
capital gains. Here, too, the taxation regime has played a role. Were recent price 
trends to continue, the new CGT arrangements would result in higher after-tax 
capital gains than the previous arrangements. From this viewpoint, that change is 
likely to have acted to spur investor housing demand.  
Collectively, therefore, the general income tax regime has facilitated highly geared 
housing investment aimed at reducing current taxable income and deferring tax until 
capital gains are realised in future years.  
However, just as they have added impetus to the recent boom, so too could these 
arrangements reinforce any future market downturn. For example, as noted above, if 
house price growth slows or reverses, the revised CGT arrangements may turn out 
to be less beneficial for many future investors than the pre-1999 regime. This is just 
one reason why it is inadvisable to examine taxation arrangements affecting housing 
solely in the context of the recent price boom or, indeed, only in the context of 
housing. As discussed below, a broader perspective is needed. 
5.4  Improving taxation arrangements affecting housing 
Many participants requested or suggested changes to one or more of the taxation 
arrangements affecting housing. Some of the requests were intended to assist the 
housing sector generally, or groups such as first home buyers specifically — 
relevant issues are covered in chapter  10. Other requests were directed at 
overcoming perceived general deficiencies in present arrangements.  
The policy challenge 
Full assessment of tax arrangements and possible improvements must take account 
of a number of criteria, relating to efficiency, equity, predictability and 
transparency. Principles of good tax design, as summarised by a recent inquiry into 
business taxation in Victoria, are set out in box 5.4. 
Even with the guidance of such criteria, however, making changes to existing 
taxation arrangements poses major challenges:     




•  All taxation arrangements require compromises in terms of assessment criteria. 
This point is illustrated by the diversity in international approaches to the 
taxation of land and housing (section 5.2).  
•  In Australia, the choice of tax measure and tax mix is constrained by the federal 
system of government. In particular, tax raising options for the states and 
territories are limited — stamp duties, payroll tax and land tax are important in 
this context. 
•  Moreover, many tax arrangements affecting housing markets apply more 
generally, so housing-driven changes to those arrangements would have 
implications for other areas of activity and investment. 
•  Similarly, introducing further housing-specific differentiation into tax 
arrangements might create new inter-sectoral distortions.  
 
Box 5.4  Principles of good tax design 
The Victorian Government’s recent Review of State Business Taxes summarised 
principles of good tax design as follows: 
… a preferred tax would: raise the target amount of revenue with minimal impact on 
behaviour; treat taxpayers equally; be administratively simple to collect; impose low 
compliance costs on taxpayers, and provide no opportunities for tax avoidance; and 
ensure revenue stability. 
It noted, however, that: 
In practice, no single tax is likely to score well on every criterion, and some tax 
design objectives may be mutually exclusive. For example, anti-avoidance 
measures can make administration complex, while progressive rate structures can 
achieve equity objectives but significantly distort decision making. 
Source: Victoria 2001. 
 
 
Consequently, the question becomes whether one imperfect set of tax arrangements 
is preferable to an imperfect alternative. And, even if there is agreement in principle 
that an alternative regime would be superior, there will often be substantial 
transitional issues which diminish the attractiveness of change.  
The GST is a relatively ‘good’ tax 
Compared with some of the other forms of tax affecting housing, such as stamp 
duties, the GST is, in general terms, a relatively efficient tax: being broadly-based 
and relatively uniform in application. Even though the GST applies specifically 
only to new houses and to alterations and additions, over time it is likely to be     




increasingly capitalised into the prices of established housing and thereby passed on 
to all home buyers (see above).  
Indeed, one of the main reasons for introducing the GST was to replace less 
efficient tax measures, including some affecting housing markets. As it transpired, 
several of those taxes were retained, though some are subject to review in 2005 (see 
below).  
Notwithstanding its general advantages, some participants raised questions about 
the way the GST currently applies to housing. For example, the HIA was critical 
that exemptions on early stage transactions — payment of GST-exempt fees and 
charges by land developers to local councils for such things as building certificates, 
development applications and subdivision fees — do not carry through to 
transactions with the final purchasers (that is, home buyers). It estimated that annual 
revenue derived from the application of GST to GST-exempt state and local taxes 
was of the order of $500 million (trans., p. 93). Such an impost would amount to 
around 1 per cent of the annual value of new housing construction (including 
maintenance, renovations and additions). The HIA recommended that a notional or 
imputed input tax credit be allowed on such transactions, even though no GST had 
actually been paid — thus reducing the cost to the final purchaser and giving effect 
to ‘the principle … that GST should not be levied on local and state government 
taxes’ (sub. 177, p. 54).  
In the Discussion Draft, the Commission commented that, although this aspect of 
the current GST regime may have particular effect in the housing area, it is a 
general tax design issue which is relevant to a range of activities. It also pointed out 
that dealing with the issue would raise administrative difficulties and have revenue 
implications. The HIA contended in response that the revenue collected represents a 
windfall to government rather than the result of deliberate tax design, and that the 
necessary administrative arrangements to rectify the situation could not be 
described as ‘cumbersome and expensive’: 
Claims for input tax credits (ITCs) would be made, as now, via the [Business Activity 
Statement] process, and all supporting documentation would, as now, be retained by the 
GST-Registered person. Calculation of the amount of the notional ITC is exactly the 
same as for the calculation of any other ITC on a receipt where GST is not explicitly 
stated — 1/11 of the purchase price. The main issue is whether any particular 
acquisition is a creditable acquisition, and the same tests as currently used would apply. 
(sub. DR260, p. 11) 
Adoption of the HIA’s suggestions could bring a small improvement in housing 
affordability. The Commission nevertheless stands by its assessment that the issue 
is one of general tax design relevant to a range of activities, and that the 
administrative and revenue implications of any revision to current arrangements     




would need to be addressed. Indeed, given the relative efficiency of the GST, it is 
likely that replacing lost revenue of the order of $500 million annually through 
adjustment to other forms of tax would end up reducing community welfare.  
Participants also raised issues about payment of GST on prices which already 
include other taxes, such as stamp duty. This is considered in the following section.  
Stamp duties and land tax: scope for reform? 
General shortcomings of stamp duties 
The focus of much of the input from participants on stamp duties related to the 
impact on the affordability and accessibility of housing.  
In terms of affordability, stamp duties can directly add 5 per cent or more to the 
purchase price. However, because of concessions, the direct impost on many first 
home buyers is much less than this. Further, as mentioned earlier, part of the cost of 
stamp duties is likely to be passed back to the seller, meaning that house prices are 
somewhat lower than they would be in the absence of duties. 
But the effect on accessibility to home ownership can be greater. For example, for a 
home buyer required to provide 10 per cent of the purchase price as a deposit, a 
stamp duty of 5 per cent increases the deposit gap by 50 per cent. Meeting this extra 
upfront cost might require first home buyers to delay their entry to the market while 
saving the additional funds. Alternatively, it could require them to borrow more, 
possibly at a higher interest rate. Here again, of course, stamp duty concessions may 
reduce or eliminate that problem. 
In addition to reducing affordability and accessibility, stamp duties also have 
broader efficiency costs. So-called ‘lock-in’ effects that arise because stamp duties 
apply only when a property is sold, have been a focus of attention. Intending first 
home buyers (unless exempt) have little choice but to pay any stamp duty 
applicable. But those already in their own home can avoid stamp duty by the simple 
expedient of staying put, even if a change of housing type or location might better 
suit their needs. To them, stamp duty looms as a large tax on buying and selling, or 
on moving, rather than as a small tax on the capital value of the home.  
By way of illustration, a ‘change-over’ buyer in Melbourne of a house of median 
value in June 2003 would have paid some $15 000 in stamp duty, in addition to 
legal fees and other expenses associated with selling an existing property and 
moving to another. Faced with such costs, some households contemplating ‘trading-
up’ might instead decide to extend their existing home. Similarly, some older     




people may decide to stay in their existing homes rather than ‘trade down’ to 
something more suitable. In effect, while stamp duty will only be a small fraction of 
the price of the preferred replacement dwelling, it looms much larger relative to the 
perceived benefits to the household from moving. As the Australian Bankers’ 
Association commented: 
For an owner occupier, Stamp Duty represents a significant tax on moving residence, 
and therefore is a barrier to more efficient utilisation of the existing housing stock. 
(sub. 164, p. 15) 
Any such ‘lock-in’ effects, by increasing the cost of relocating, can keep people in 
unsuitable housing, and impede transformation and consolidation of cities.  
The significance of such impacts was questioned by some participants. Some state 
governments, for example, argued that in practice they are small, pointing to 
increased housing turnover in recent years despite higher average stamp duty 
payments. However, this does not rule out the possibility that, if stamp duties had 
been lower, housing turnover may have increased even more. 
There are few data from which to assess lock-in effects. The Commission notes that 
housing turnover in New Zealand did increase slightly in the years following 
removal of stamp duty in 1988 compared with the years before — though the data 
are not comprehensive and could be influenced by cyclical factors (data obtained 
from Quotable Value 2004). Freebairn (2002) estimated efficiency losses from 
lock-in effects of between $200 million and $600 million a year. However, these 
seem modest in the context of the total revenue raised by stamp duties.  
But lock-in effects are not the only potential source of efficiency loss arising from 
stamp duties. In the broadest sense, they are a tax on housing. Hence, for example, 
though such duties may partly serve to offset the tax ‘preference’ for equity 
financed owner occupiers (see below), they may add to the relative tax disadvantage 
experienced by those households forced to borrow heavily to purchase a family 
home. As well, investments in other classes of asset are either not subject to stamp 
duties, or are dutiable at lower rates. And, while stamp duty concessions clearly 
help to improve affordability and accessibility for many first home buyers, variation 
in stamp duty rates according to the type of buyer or the value of the dwelling may 
also have some efficiency costs. The large benefit from removing stamp duties 
projected by Access Economics in a study for the Real Estate Institute of Australia 
(REIA) may partly reflect these broader efficiency considerations (sub. 124, p. 17). 
In terms of equity criteria, notwithstanding progressive rate structures and the 
exemptions and concessions that aim to promote distributional objectives, current 
stamp duty regimes also have shortcomings. While the SA Government noted that 
there could be a ‘correlation between property value and income capacity’ (sub. 98,     




p. 53), stamp duties often treat people in like circumstances differently, and do not 
differentiate well on the basis of ability to pay. In particular, tax scales relate to the 
purchase price rather than income or wealth. Similarly, stamp duty concessions 
(other than in the ACT) take no account of income or assets. Stamp duties also 
impose greater burdens on those families which, for work or other reasons, need to 
move frequently. 
For these sorts of reasons, a number of previous studies, including reports 
commissioned by state governments, have concluded that stamp duties on housing 
do detract from community welfare in a material way. The 2001 Victorian Review 
of State Business Taxes, for example, concluded: 
The Committee believes that stamp duty on residential conveyancing is an impediment 
to economic development and that the abolition of duty would go a long way towards 
providing a more appropriate, simple and consistent taxation system. 
(Victoria 2001, p. 77) 
Reducing reliance on stamp duties 
In their original submissions — and in response to the Discussion Draft — many 
participants argued that, because of problems such as those outlined above, reliance 
on stamp duties by state and territory governments should be reduced (see box 5.5). 
Suggested alternatives included placing greater reliance on land taxes, payroll taxes 
or the GST. Box 5.6 gives some rough estimates of the rates which would need to 
apply to replace stamp duties. 
In the Discussion Draft, the Commission expressed the view that removal of stamp 
duties, and their replacement by more efficient forms of taxation, should be a 
priority at the state and territory level. It recognised, however, that such a change 
would have significant short-term consequences for taxpayers, governments and the 
community generally. The Commission therefore suggested that the foreshadowed 
intergovernmental review, to be held by 2005, of business-related conveyances, be 
extended to consider the removal of stamp duties on residential property. 
In responding to these suggestions, many participants commented on the advantages 
and disadvantages of alternative taxes. While some state governments recognised 
problems with stamp duties, they were generally of the view that the case for 
removal of stamp duties was weak, that such removal could not be considered a 
priority and that there were major problems with the suggested alternatives. The 
WA Government, for instance, stated: 
While the Commission’s proposals may, at least in theory, improve the efficiency and 
equity of the tax system, there is simply no support in the community for increasing     




reliance on these taxes [payroll tax and land tax] — particularly if this were to be 
achieved by removing existing exemptions. (sub. DR339, p. 2) 
Issues relevant to reducing reliance on stamp duties are considered below. 
 
Box 5.5  Participants’ views on reducing reliance on stamp duties 
Prosper Australia 
… transaction taxes in the housing supply chain, ... [should be replaced by] a 
broad-based system of land value taxation (i.e. a system with minimal exemptions 
and no threshold) in order to replace the lost revenue from transaction taxes, force 
speculators to put their land on the market, increase pressure on landlords to seek 
tenants, reduce local opposition to new housing developments, and relieve the 
anxieties of politicians concerning the funding of infrastructure required by new 
developments. (sub. 68, p. 19)  
Terry Dwyer 
Governments need to: get rid of transfer taxes which add to the cost of housing; use 
holding taxes such as rates to encourage land to come onto the market to be put to 
its best and highest [valued] use; and use rating to expand the supply of serviced 
land by earmarking rates for infrastructure expansion and refurbishment. (sub. 144, 
p. 11)  
Australian Council of Social Service 
Governments should review land tax and stamp duty, and consider the introduction 
of betterment taxes to improve the equity of State and Territory property taxes and 
to encourage efficient investment in affordable housing. (sub. 147, p. 33)  
Real Estate Institute of Australia 
… the States ought to abolish the State Stamp Duties on all types of non-residential 
property and other business transactions as soon as GST payments to the States 
reach the level of the Guaranteed Minimum Amount. (sub. 124, p. 18)  
Professor Frank Stilwell 
Stamp duty has become a fundamentally important source of State revenue and 
could not be reduced unless an alternative revenue source were found. That 
alternative could be land tax. Although less in the political spotlight, land taxation 
and its interaction with the housing market could hold an important key to resolving 
the housing affordability crisis. (sub. 212, p. 2) 
Master Builders Australia 
Master Builders strongly supports the rationale for replacing existing stamp duties 
with revenue accruing to states from the GST. (sub. DR256, p. 6)  
Housing Industry Association 
… negotiating a replacement of stamp duty will be an exercise fraught with political 
difficulty. (sub DR260, p. 13) 
     





Box 5.6  Alternatives to stamp duty 
In 2002-03, conveyancing duties raised approximately $8.8 billion for state and territory 
governments, with the major proportion from residential conveyances. The 
Commission estimates that to replace that revenue (and in the case of land taxes to 
also cover the revenue already raised from such taxes) : 
•  land taxes would need to be applied at a rate of approximately 1 per cent on 
‘unimproved land values’ across the board, including on owner occupiers; 
•  revenue from payroll taxes would need to be almost doubled — much of this 
requirement could be met by reducing concessions rather than raising rates; or 
•  the GST would need to be increased by between 2 and 3 percentage points. 
Obviously, a mix of such taxes could be used, with the rates for the replacement taxes 
varying between states and territories depending on the revenue raised through stamp 
duties. Rates of replacement taxes would be lower than those given above if based on 
more ‘normal’ levels of stamp duty revenue, rather than the unprecedented collections 
during the housing boom. Furthermore, these estimates do not allow for any feedback 
effects from such tax changes on economic decision-making.  
 
 
Land taxes are more efficient 
In contrast to stamp duties, comprehensive taxation of the unimproved value of land 
at a relatively low rate, annually or more frequently, is generally regarded as having 
important efficiency advantages (at least in principle). In particular, because the 
supply of unimproved land is inelastic, a broad land tax is unlikely to significantly 
distort land use or building and housing choices. Further, it is a holding tax, rather 
than a tax which applies only on transactions. Hence, a (comprehensive) land tax 
cannot be avoided and, if applied at a broadly uniform rate, should not have the 
lock-in or other efficiency costs of the current stamp duty regime. Depending on its 
provisions, a land tax regime could also deliver more equitable outcomes than 
stamp duties. 
Notwithstanding these in-principle advantages, the REIA was concerned that wider 
application of land tax would ‘provide a disincentive to already diminishing yields 
on residential investment property’ (sub. DR279,  p. 7).  And,  the  Victorian 
Government contended that replacing stamp duties with expanded land tax or 
payroll tax regimes were ‘not feasible options’ as ‘a tripling of land tax or a near 
doubling of payroll taxes would be needed’ (sub. DR301, p. 3).  
However, the substantial increases estimated by the Victorian Government are in 
large part a reflection of the uneven application of land (and payroll) taxes. Land tax 
regimes are characterised by extensive exemptions and concessions, progressive     




rate structures, and provisions for aggregation of land holdings for tax purposes. 
Apart from affecting the revenue raised, these provisions are likely to have adverse 
equity implications — owner occupiers are generally exempt while rental investors, 
and thus renters, pay — as well as implications for how the aggregate stock of 
unimproved land is divided between uses and between users. 
Broadening the land tax base by removing or reducing existing exemptions and 
concessions could therefore provide a means to fund reduced reliance on stamp 
duties, without the need to increase current tax rates. Indeed, even if stamp duties 
were removed entirely, the rate of comprehensive land tax required to deliver 
revenue neutrality (see box 5.6) would be significantly less than the rates that 
currently apply to investment housing.  
As a revenue-neutral change within the housing sector, replacement of some 
element of stamp duties with land taxes should have little overall effect on housing 
prices in the short term. That is, the stimulus to demand from the removal of stamp 
duty would be offset by a reduction in demand resulting from the obligation of 
home owners to pay the ongoing land tax. Hence, at least under this particular 
reform scenario, the concerns expressed by the NSW Government that, by boosting 
demand, abolishing stamp duties would push up house prices would not arise 
(sub. DR315, p. 2). Moreover, there could in fact be some improvement in housing 
accessibility if stamp duties were reduced, as upfront purchase costs would 
correspondingly decline. 
Of course, a range of implementation issues and difficulties would need to be 
assessed before moving to a comprehensive basis of land taxation. For example: 
•  There could be significant cash flow implications for asset rich but income poor 
home owners. This is especially so as a greater share of the revenue impost on 
housing would be borne by owner occupiers — they would be required, in 
effect, to fund not only the revenue shortfall arising from the reduction of stamp 
duties on owner-occupied housing, but also a share of the stamp duties currently 
paid by investors in rental housing. The NSW Government commented that an 
estimated average annual tax bill of $1800 for the average household in that 
state, in addition to existing local government rates, ‘would place a relatively 
high burden on low income families’ (sub.  DR315, p.  5). And, while such 
concerns could potentially be accommodated by allowing low income families to 
defer payment until the house is sold, this would both complicate administration 
and reduce the benefits of change. (As Zhong Jianying (sub. DR263, p. 1) noted, 
such deferred land tax would take on some of the characteristics of a stamp 
duty.) 
•  Provisions would be required to avoid retrospective application of tax to 
previously exempt land holdings.     




•  Rules would also be required for aggregation of multiple land holdings (if 
progressive rate structures were retained) and to cover land holdings spanning 
state borders. 
•  The treatment of land held by developers as short-term trading stock would be a 
further matter requiring resolution. 
Payroll taxes 
There are differing views on the efficiency of payroll tax compared with other 
forms of taxation. However, it is commonly agreed that there would be efficiency 
gains from significantly reducing or eliminating many of the current payroll tax 
exemptions and concessions. Accordingly, funding a reduction in stamp duties by 
reducing these exemptions and concessions offers the prospect of efficiency gains. 
Again, however, various implementation issues would need to be assessed before 
moving in this direction. These include administrative and compliance costs, and 
issues relating to cash flow for those businesses that currently fall below payroll tax 
thresholds. 
GST 
Given that the GST is a relatively efficient tax (as discussed above), there could be 
some advantage in using the existing GST mechanism to replace, or reduce reliance 
on, stamp duties. Indeed, the incremental administrative and compliance costs 
would most likely be small, particularly if a reduced reliance on stamp duties could 
be funded from growth in existing GST revenue. However, the NSW Government 
stated that ‘GST revenue growth will not allow the States to abolish transfer duty’ 
(sub. DR315, p. 4). Similarly, the Tasmanian Government commented that: 
… incremental growth is unlikely, and was never intended, to compensate the States for 
further erosion of their own sources of revenue in the form of the abolition of additional 
State taxes. (sub. DR320, p. 11) 
Moreover, as with greater reliance on land taxes and payroll taxes, an increase in 
the GST rate (or an expansion of GST coverage) would raise numerous 
implementation issues, including the distributional consequences for low income 
families. 
A priority for change? 
As noted above, several state governments argued that removal of stamp duties 
could not be considered a priority for tax reform. For example, the SA Government     




responded that ‘it is unclear that stamp duty on residential property would be the 
highest priority state tax for abolition’ (sub. DR295,  p. 2). Similarly the NSW 
Government stated that ‘the Commission does not demonstrate that abolishing 
transfer duty should be a priority for taxation reform’ (sub. DR315, p. 3). 
The Commission acknowledges that some other state taxes may well require more 
urgent attention than stamp duties. Nevertheless, in view of the potential 
accessibility and efficiency benefits, it considers that initiatives to reduce reliance 
on stamp duties are warranted. The Commission notes that the recent Victorian 
Government Review of State Business taxes reached the same conclusion (Victoria 
2001, p. 78). 
The way ahead 
In responding to the Discussion Draft, some state governments contended that the 
composition of any state’s tax regime is a matter for individual state governments to 
determine.  
Individual state and territory governments have the authority and ability to change 
their own taxation arrangements, should they so wish. In the Commission’s view, 
any move by individual jurisdictions away from stamp duties towards more efficient 
taxes would be welcome. 
However, the Commission considers that the nature of some of the issues involved 
means that cooperation between the Australian and the state and territory 
governments would most likely be required to facilitate change in this area. For 
example, any change to GST arrangements to help fund a reduction in stamp duties 
would require inter-jurisdictional discussion and negotiation. The WA Government 
also observed: 
Because of the States’ limited tax bases, declining share of national revenues and, 
particularly in Western Australia’s case, the effects of the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission (CGC) process, any reduced reliance on property taxes would need to take 
place in the context of reform to Commonwealth–State financial relations. (sub. 190, 
p. 44) 
As several participants noted, the 1999 Intergovernmental Agreement on the reform 
of Commonwealth–State financial relations (the IGA) includes provision for stamp 
duties on business-related conveyances to be reviewed by 2005. In the 
Commission’s view, this would also be an appropriate forum in which to consider 
the priority that should be attached to the reform of stamp duties on property 
conveyances and the best means for doing so.  
     




The coverage of the review to be held by 2005 under the 1999 Intergovernmental 
Agreement on the reform of Commonwealth–State financial relations, should be 
extended to include consideration of how best to reduce stamp duties on property 
conveyancing. In particular, the review should examine the scope to replace 
stamp duty revenue with more efficient forms of taxation or sources of revenue. 
Indexing stamp duty rates 
As noted, revenues from stamp duties have increased considerably as house prices 
have increased. The HIA and the REIA, among other participants, described at least 
some of the increase as a ‘windfall’ and called for stamp duty thresholds to be 
indexed or rates reduced as prices increase. Certainly, because of the progressive 
rate structure, stamp duty collections have risen by more than house prices. 
However, such proposals were opposed by state governments. For example, the 
SA Government commented: 
Cyclical gains by their nature are transitory; they follow extended periods of stable or 
declining prices and will inevitably be followed by a period of subdued price 
movement if not price falls. (sub. 98, p. 44) 
Indeed, stamp duty revenues have fallen in some years (see figure 5.2). 
Indexation of rates — by stabilising revenue streams somewhat — might result in 
slightly less volatility in tax-inclusive house prices. Further, consistent with the 
previous discussion, appropriate indexation could bring some advantage in reducing 
the reliance of state governments on stamp duty revenue. 
However, formal indexation of rates aimed at stabilising revenue would introduce a 
new set of problems. In particular, implementation could be difficult, requiring 
formulas based on past trends, or estimation or ‘guesswork’ about future price 
trends. Poor indexation could destabilise, rather than stabilise, markets. In this 
regard, the NSW Government noted that ‘… changes to rates and thresholds 
undertaken in one housing market environment may be completely inappropriate for 
the market environment a following year’ (sub. 187, p. 49). 
Given these problems, attempting to develop formulaic methods of indexation could 
divert attention from the advantages of reducing reliance on stamp duties in favour 
of more efficient forms of taxation. In any event, it always remains open to 
governments to adjust stamp duty rates from time to time on an ad hoc basis 
according to their revenue requirements. 
RECOMMENDATION 5.1     




Taxes on taxes, multiple taxation and aggregation 
Stamp duties can apply to sales already subject to GST. And because stamp duty 
can be collected on more than one occasion as a property passes from seller to 
buyer, GST can also sometimes apply to stamp duty-inclusive sales amounts. 
The HIA proposed that there should be: 
… a provision for land developers and builders to claim exemption from stamp duty on 
trading stock, similar to the operation of stamp duty for motor vehicle traders. 
(sub. 177, p. xi) 
It also argued that ‘… the requirement to aggregate multiple land contracts for the 
purpose of assessing stamp duty’ should be removed (sub. 177, p. xi). Because of 
the progressive stamp duty rate scales, such aggregation results in higher tax 
payments than if the subdivided blocks were taxed separately.  
There could, in principle, be some efficiency gains from addressing these features 
of current tax arrangements. But, as the Commission noted in the Discussion Draft, 
a range of administrative and compliance complexities would at least partially offset 
these gains.  
In response, the HIA contended that these ‘… administrative and compliance 
complexities are grossly overstated’ (sub. DR260, p. 11). It also considered that: 
… the Commission should not be deflected from making a recommendation … if it 
considers that existing arrangements fail the ‘Principles of Good Tax Design’ tests or 
are otherwise inequitable or unjustified contributors to lack of housing affordability. 
(sub. DR260, p. 10) 
Notwithstanding the HIA’s view that the administrative requirements to effect 
change in this area are relatively straightforward, the Commission remains of the 
view that those requirements are still relevant in judging whether reform is 
worthwhile. For example, were quick action to remove or substantially reduce 
reliance on stamp duties a real possibility, devoting bureaucratic effort to the sort of 
changes proposed by the HIA would not seem sensible. 
However, if the current reliance on stamp duties is likely to continue for the 
foreseeable future, there is a stronger case for addressing ‘anomalies’ of the sort 
identified by the HIA — taking into account administrative and compliance cost 
issues, and the efficiency and equity consequences of making up the shortfall in 
revenue.     




If the 2005 intergovernmental review (or another mechanism) does not lead to 
reduced stamp duties on property transactions, a further forum should assess the 
potential gains from addressing property-related ‘tax on tax’ and ‘multiple tax 
collection’ issues.  
Taxation of owner-occupied housing 
As described earlier, there are a number of differences between the tax treatment of 
owner-occupied and investment housing. Unlike rent received from the ownership 
of housing purchased for investment purposes, the implicit rental benefits derived 
from owning one’s own home (that is, imputed housing rent) are not taxed. Further, 
in contrast to investors in rental housing, owner occupiers are not subject to capital 
gains tax nor, except for those living in very high value properties in NSW, subject 
to state land tax. By the same token, tax deductions for housing expenses are not 
available to owner occupiers.  
Whether imputed rental income should in principle be subject to tax has been the 
subject of long standing theoretical and policy debate. This is a very complex issue 
— especially when, as in Australia, the tax regime encompasses a mix of measures 
that variously tax income, consumption and asset holdings. For much the same 
reason, the theoretical basis for capital gains tax has also been much debated.  
Not surprisingly, those inquiry participants that commented on these issues had 
divergent views. Several considered that the current tax regime does provide 
significant advantages to those owning or purchasing their own homes. For 
example, the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) (trans., pp.  112-3), 
argued that along with perceived ‘generous’ tax treatment for those investing in 
rental housing (see below), the current ‘huge tax incentives to owner occupiers’ 
increase demand for housing, inflate house prices and reduce affordability. Some 
went on to comment on the inequity of perceived favoured treatment of owner 
occupiers over those who rent, especially as lower income earners are more likely to 
be longer term renters. Thus, in pointing to non-neutralities in current arrangements 
between owner occupiers and renters, Allan Hall stated that: 
… the main problem with the distribution of the taxation benefits of home ownership is 
not the ways in which they are shared between buyers and sellers in the home 
ownership market but that the net benefits of the tax subsidies are limited to home 
owners and are at the expense of renters who include a large part of the poorest 
members of the community. (sub. DR234, p. 4) 
RECOMMENDATION 5.2     




Although no-one specifically suggested imposing tax on imputed rental income 
derived from owner-occupied housing, some participants proposed that renters be 
‘compensated’ by allowing them a tax deduction for rental expenses. There were 
also some calls for the CGT exemption for owner-occupied homes to be ended. 
In contrast, the HIA denied that current arrangements provided a tax ‘subsidy’ to 
owner occupiers and said that a range of other considerations justify continuation of 
those arrangements. Amongst other things it argued that: 
•  no class of consumer durable is subject to taxation of imputed rental income; 
•  the estimated value of any ‘subsidy’ is grossly overstated, as owner occupiers, if 
subject to a similar tax regime to those investing in rental housing, would 
negatively gear to avoid tax; 
•  the social benefits that attach to housing provide a reason to support home 
ownership through the tax system; and 
•  taxing imputed rental income would have a ‘very serious’ impact on older home 
owners unable or unwilling to borrow (sub. 177, p. 13). 
Likely effects of present arrangements 
As noted, although owner occupiers are not subject to taxation of imputed rental 
income, CGT or (in most cases) land tax, current arrangements also deny them 
taxation deductions available to investors in rental housing, such as interest 
payments on loans and capital works allowances. These differences in tax treatment 
have two important implications: 
•  first, existing home owners, and those buying a family home who can finance 
their purchase from savings, are advantaged relative to those who need to 
borrow more or who are buying a rental property (whether equity or debt 
financed); and 
•  second, those borrowing to purchase an owner-occupied dwelling (often first 
home buyers) are potentially disadvantaged relative to highly-geared private 
investors in rental housing (and their tenants) — though investors bear imposts 
such as land tax which do not generally apply to owner occupiers. 
Of course, such distinctions can often be blurred in practice. In particular, over the 
life cycle, most home buyers will eventually pay off their mortgages or acquire 
significant equity in their homes, even if they borrowed heavily to enter the market. 
Also, as most first home buyers rent while saving for a deposit, any tax benefits for 
investors will indirectly assist them to purchase a home. However, these 
observations do not invalidate the general proposition that the current tax regime     




provides an advantage to equity investment in owner-occupied housing. This partly 
explains why home ownership is such an important goal for many Australians. 
It follows that, in terms of the overall level and mix of investment in housing: 
•  the tax preference to equity investment in owner-occupied housing may lead to 
over investment in housing from a community-wide perspective, especially if the 
wider social benefits that attach to home ownership are already targeted in other 
ways (chapter 10); and 
•  the way in which housing investment is financed, and the shares of owner-
occupied and rental housing, are likely to be distorted by the differences in tax 
arrangements outlined above.  
Detailed modelling would be required to trace through the net magnitude of these 
sorts of efficiency effects and the accompanying distributional impacts. However, 
as noted above, in the time available for this inquiry, the Commission has sought to 
focus on the central issue of housing affordability, rather than divert attention to 
inherently difficult and resource intensive detailed tax modelling. 
Revenue implications of change 
The revenue implications of seeking to achieve greater ‘neutrality’ in relation to the 
tax treatment of owner-occupied housing would clearly depend on the approach 
taken. For example, greater neutrality could variously be pursued by increasing 
taxes on owner-occupied housing, by making rent paid deductible, or reducing taxes 
on returns from investment in rental housing.  
Adoption of the former approach could potentially increase tax revenue. Yates, for 
example, estimated that revenue foregone in 2001 was as much as $22 billion. 
Based on recent market data, calculations by the Commission using the same 
methodology result in an amount of about $25 billion (see box 5.7).  
But, even if judged to be an appropriate policy approach (see below), the 
behavioural changes that would follow from placing owner-occupied housing on a 
comparable tax footing to other investments, would mean much less revenue would 
actually be raised. For example, taxation of imputed income would reduce 
investment in housing and thereby revenue collected. Also, in the medium to longer 
term, owner occupiers would respond to taxation of imputed rental income by 
gearing up (not necessarily spending loan proceeds on housing), in order to 
establish deductions and reduce income tax. Indeed, many owner occupiers might 
declare a ‘loss’ on their house, as many rental investors currently do. Again, 
detailed modelling which could take account of these behavioural changes, and 
allow for additional tax collected in other areas in response to gearing by owner     




occupiers, would be required to establish the overall revenue implications. Of 
course, if the government sought to make changes that were revenue neutral overall, 
there would be scope to reduce rates of other taxes.  
 
Box 5.7  Estimating the tax ‘preference’ for owner occupiers 
Owner occupiers are not subject to tax on imputed rental income and also receive 
exemptions from capital gains and land taxes. By the same token, unlike investors, 
they cannot claim deductions for borrowing costs, depreciation and other expenses 
associated with owning their properties. 
A recent, widely quoted, estimate by Yates (2003) suggested that the value of this tax 
preference was around $22 billion for 2001. Commission estimates for 2003, using the 
same methodology, are similar in magnitude. However, they are based on a 
considerably higher valuation for the housing stock and hence the implied tax 
preference is smaller in percentage terms. Specifically, the Commission’s calculations 
indicate that, subject to the important qualifications below, annual revenue foregone 
from:  
•  the non-taxation of imputed rental income is about $8 billion (after accounting for 
deductions such as borrowing costs, depreciation, maintenance and land taxes); 
•  the CGT exemption for the family home is around $10 billion; and 
•  exemptions from land taxes are a further $7 billion — though these taxes would be 
deductible were owner occupiers treated the same way as investors in rental 
properties. (This is reflected in the Commission’s imputed rental calculations.) 
However, such calculations overestimate the aggregate tax revenue likely to be raised 
if owner-occupied housing was made subject to these taxes. The Commission’s 
calculations for the value of the exemption for imputed rental income assume a gearing 
level of around 20 per cent — reflecting the fact that many owner occupiers own their 
properties outright, or have very significant equity in them. But with owner-occupied 
housing taxed on the same basis as investment in rental housing, much higher gearing 
levels could be expected. Tax collections on imputed rental would thereby be reduced.  
Further, these calculations are highly sensitive to short-term fluctuations in rental yields 
and rates of house price appreciation. Accordingly, it is also important to look at what is 
happening to the tax preference over time. The Commission’s calculations indicate 
that, as a percentage of the total housing stock value, the preference has declined in 
recent years because: 
•  rental yields have trended down as real interest rates have fallen, thereby reducing 
the value of the exemption for imputed rental income; and 
•  the change to the CGT regime in 1999 has reduced the (percentage) value of the 
exemption for the family home. 
This reduction in the percentage value of the tax preference weakens the case for 
policy change, especially given the likely transaction and other costs of achieving 
greater neutrality in the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing (see text). 
 
     




Potential advantages and disadvantages of change 
Modelling work undertaken by the Industry Commission in 1991 indicated that 
greater neutrality in housing taxation could have brought economic benefits at that 
time (IC 1991). However, that work was undertaken in the context of significant 
restrictions on the availability of capital generally, which no longer apply to 
anywhere near the same extent. Nevertheless, greater neutrality should still in 
theory yield economic benefits. 
But there are a number of major issues which would have to be addressed before 
any changes in this area were seriously contemplated. 
Most broadly, a judgment would be required as to whether some tax preference was 
justified in the light of social benefits attaching to home ownership (chapter 1) and, 
if so, of what magnitude. Such a judgment would need to take into account other 
forms of government support for home ownership (chapter 10) and how these might 
change over time. 
A decision would then be required on how greater tax neutrality was to be pursued. 
For example, CGT has important deficiencies — apart from administrative 
complexity it can also have similar lock-in effects to stamp duty. Thus, reducing the 
application of CGT in other areas could conceivably deliver better outcomes for the 
community than imposing it on owner-occupied housing. 
And even assuming that greater neutrality was best pursued by increasing the 
taxation of owner-occupied housing, a further suite of practical issues would arise:  
•  In particular, as has been illustrated by the experience of other countries, 
taxation of owner-occupied housing would have major and far reaching 
implications for tax administration, enforcement and compliance, with 
measurement of imputed rental income being particularly difficult and prone to 
disputation (section  5.2). Indeed, the almost inevitable exemptions and 
concessions would detract from the potential benefits of changes as well as 
further complicating administration.  
•  The need to match taxation of imputed rental income and capital gains with the 
same sort of deductions as are available to investors in rental housing would add 
a further layer of complexity.  
•  There would be significant cash flow implications for many owner occupiers, 
with the prospect that some low income households could experience 
considerable financial stress.      




Moreover, seeking to achieve greater neutrality through piecemeal, rather than 
comprehensive, change might add to the inefficiencies and inequities arising from 
the current tax preferences. For example:  
•  Providing tax deductions to renters for rent paid would not remove the existing 
non-neutrality between owners with significant equity and those with large 
mortgages. At the same time, it could add to already existing incentives for 
overinvestment in housing. 
•  Removing the capital gains tax exemption for owner-occupied homes as a stand 
alone measure would in one respect improve neutrality by reducing the tax 
preference for equity investment in owner-occupied housing. But it would put 
those borrowing to purchase a family home at an additional disadvantage 
relative to those borrowing to invest in rental housing. The net effects on 
community welfare would therefore be unclear.  
•  Allowing deductibility of mortgage interest payments would place those 
borrowing to purchase owner-occupied dwellings on an equal basis with equity-
financed owner occupiers. But that would increase the incentive to over-invest in 
owner-occupied housing.  
Conclusion 
Although greater neutrality in the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing offers 
the prospect of some efficiency and equity gains, a case for moving in this direction 
is not established. Apart from the likely reduction in home ownership and an 
accompanying loss of some social benefits, there would be major administrative, 
compliance, adjustment and enforcement costs in changing the current tax treatment 
of imputed rental income and capital gains. Also, extensive economic adjustments 
could follow from such a far-reaching tax change as imposing tax on imputed rental 
income, including significant effects on consumption, savings and investment.  
At the very least, any moves to address this tax preference would require a much 
more thorough examination than has been possible in this inquiry as to whether the 
potential gains justify the costs. 
Taxation of investment housing 
A major theme in many submissions was that general income tax arrangements are 
too ‘favourable’ in their application to investment in rental housing and have 
thereby contributed unwarranted price pressures during the recent housing boom.      




In this regard, the RBA contended that private housing investors in Australia 
receive more generous tax treatment than their counterparts in many other countries 
(see also box 5.8 and table 5.3) and concluded that: 
While [the more favourable Australian] taxation arrangements are not the source of the 
current speculative activity in the housing market, they may affect the price dynamics 
once the attractiveness of investing in housing has improved for other reasons. 
(sub. 199, p. 54) 
 
Box 5.8  The Reserve Bank of Australia’s views on the comparative tax 
treatment of investment housing across countries 
With negatively-geared investments particularly attractive to individuals facing high 
marginal tax rates, a high share of Australian taxpayers are attracted to property 
investment to lighten their tax burden. 
As with access to finance, the taxation arrangements for rental properties in 
Australia tend to be more favourable to investors than are the arrangements in other 
countries studied for this submission. 
… Under the Australian taxation system, there are no restrictions on the ability of 
taxpayers to negatively gear investment properties. 
… The treatment of depreciation in Australia also appears to be quite favourable, 
particularly when considered in conjunction with the fact that there are no 
restrictions on negative gearing. 
… One aspect of depreciation that does not typically receive much attention, but is 
important for some investors, is its interaction with the capital gains tax … [in 
combination this can be more favourable in Australia than in other countries]. 
… in most countries the earning of rental income is seen as the most important 
reason for investing in rental properties … This seems to stand in contrast to the 
situation in Australia where properties are commonly marketed on the assumption 
that they do not earn positive taxable income for a considerable period. 
Source: RBA, sub. 199, pp. 40–2. 
 
 
Though it did ‘not see a case for an outright prohibition on negative gearing for 
investment in residential property’, the RBA highlighted three taxation 
arrangements affecting such investment that ‘appear worthy of further 
examination’: 
•  the ability of investors to negatively gear an investment property for many years; 
•  the benefit arising from capital works deductions due to differences in income 
and capital gains tax rates; and 
•  the general treatment of property depreciation (sub. 199, pp. 54–5). 
In a submission made prior to the release of the Discussion Draft, Professor 
Cameron Rider and Miranda Stewart of the Melbourne Law School claimed that 
current tax arrangements cause significant distortion:     




The combined effect of a number of the tax reforms made in September 1999 has been 
to create a significant distortion of investment incentives in favour of negatively geared 
residential property investment. (sub. 206, p. 2) 
They contended that the main problem with the current regime is ‘the unique and 
highly preferential combination of the unrestricted negative gearing benefit and the 
CGT discount benefit’ (sub.  206, p.  7, emphasis in original). They went on to 
suggest that the key to a solution is to: 
… recognise that the interest expense on the property is being incurred in part to earn 
the rental income and in part to earn the discounted capital gain on sale. (sub. 206, p. 7) 
Rider and Stewart proposed two broad reform options for consideration: a phased-in 
moderation (but not total removal) of the unrestricted negative gearing benefit for 
residential property investors; and a partial recapture of the negative gearing benefit 
on sale of the property. In a second submission, responding to the Discussion Draft, 
Rider suggested another approach designed, as he saw it, to put negatively geared 
property investment on the same tax footing as a negatively geared investment in 
equities: 
The CGT discount should be expressed to apply to property investment in the same 
way as it applies to equity investment, i.e. it should only apply to so much of the capital 
gain on sale as represents the excess of sale proceeds over the initial acquisition cost. 
To the extent that sale proceeds recoup depreciation and capital works deductions, 
those proceeds should be treated as normal non-discounted income. 
(sub. DR275, p. 10) 
Similar themes are also evident in a recent discussion paper prepared by Professor 
Peter Abelson for CPA Australia: 
… although the income and capital gains tax provisions are not housing specific, they 
nevertheless have a particularly large impact on the housing sector and especially on 
house and unit prices … there would be advantages in tax provisions that provide tax 
relief for real rather than nominal income losses and that tax real income and capital 
gains. (CPA Australia 2004, p. 3) 
Changes were also proposed by a number of other participants concerned that 
taxation arrangements have magnified the recent housing boom. For example: 
•  ACOSS suggested that negative gearing should, in the medium term, be 
abolished for shares, property and collectables (sub. 147, p. 20); 
•  Uniting Care NSW stated that capital gains tax concessions on the sale of 
investment properties should be abolished (sub. 150, p. 9); 
•  the Australian Consumers’ Association recommended reversion to the pre-2000 
system of CGT, disallowance of deductibility of the inflation component of     




interest on borrowings, and allowing deductions for interest payments only 
against investment income (sub. 122, pp. 18–19); and 
•  the Australian Workers’ Union considered that if concessional capital gains tax 
continues to apply, then it may be appropriate to limit the tax benefit associated 
with negative gearing losses to a maximum of 24.25 cents per dollar of loss 
(sub. 170, p. 8). 
Participants from the social welfare and union sectors expressed particular concern 
about the equity implications of current tax arrangements, including the effects on 
lower income people in rental accommodation or seeking to buy their first home. 
For example, the CFMEU argued that: 
… these measures [negative gearing and changes to CGT] are significant public 
subsidies to investment in property, and serve to exacerbate a housing bubble, fuelled 
largely by inflated unit prices in the inner city. The speculative frenzy around 
investment property is driving up prices, and having a significant impact on 
affordability. (sub. DR255, p. 5) 
However, participants from the housing sector argued that changes to the tax 
arrangements affecting investment in rental housing are not justified. The HIA 
commented:  
Interest is a deductible expense for any income producing asset. Hence the negative 
gearing of any investment is not regarded as a distortion to the tax system and does not 
appear as a tax expenditure in the Federal Budget. Moreover, full interest deductibility 
has been available for investment in any income producing asset, except for a brief 
period in 1985 to 1987, so it is difficult to consider why it should suddenly become a 
significant contributor to declining housing affordability. (sub. 177, p. 13) 
Similarly, the REIA considered: 
Removal of negative gearing would discriminate against the real estate industry … and 
it would remove an important incentive to assist Australians to create wealth by 
investing in property … including self-funded retirement for their benefit and the 
benefit of the nation. (sub. 124, p. 14) 
And the Property Council of Australia commented: 
Any restrictions on negative gearing would also create further tax-induced 
inefficiencies among the investments held by investors, and would be almost 
impossible to implement in a simple and cost effective manner. (sub. 194, p. 33) 
Does income tax treatment discriminate in favour of investment in rental housing? 
On a simple tabular comparison of tax measures applying to investment in rental 
housing across a range of countries (see table 5.3), Australia’s provisions do appear 
relatively favourable. But, as previously discussed, whether this is so in reality     




depends on a range of factors — not included in that simple comparison — such as 
pre-tax rates of return for particular assets (which can vary cyclically), the length of 
time for which an asset is held, the level of interest rates and the individual 
investor’s marginal tax rate.  
In any event, the apparent generosity of Australia’s provisions compared with those 
in other countries is not the key policy consideration. From an efficiency and 
housing affordability perspective, what is at issue is whether the Australian tax 
regime encourages inefficient or excessive investment in rental housing. That 
depends not on whether the tax treatment of rental housing in Australia is more or 
less favourable than in other countries, but rather on how rental housing is taxed 
relative to other types of investment in this country. 
Several interconnected aspects of Australia’s tax regime are relevant in this context; 
namely, income tax rates, negative gearing rules, provisions for depreciation and 
capital works deductions and the CGT arrangements. 
As noted above, Rider and Stewart considered that investment in rental housing is 
favoured by a ‘unique and highly preferential’ combination of unrestricted negative 
gearing and the CGT discount available to individuals (who are responsible for the 
bulk of investment in this area). But they acknowledged that passive investments in 
shares can also benefit in this way: 
Possibly, the only other type of common non-debt investment which is capable of 
producing the unique combination, of a CGT discount benefit and unrestricted negative 
gearing, is a passive investment in shares, because shares also produce income in the 
form of dividends. (sub. 206, p. 5) 
The Commission further notes that it is easy to borrow for investment in shares. The 
investor’s own home can be used as security. As well, margin lending and protected 
equity loans also allow investments in shares to be heavily geared. Thus, it is not 
correct to assert, as some have done, that rental housing investment is unique in the 
manner and extent to which it can be geared. 
In responding to the Commission’s Discussion Draft, Rider further contended that 
the capital works deductions favoured investment in rental housing over 
investments in other assets such as shares: 
These [capital works] deductions are, of course, not available in respect of equities. 
Only property investments offer these deductions for part of the capital cost of the 
investments. (sub. DR275, p. 3) 
These issues were explored in some depth at the public hearings. Following 
discussion with the Commission, Rider accepted that although not as immediate as 
for those investing in residential property, the same tax benefits are effectively     




available to those who invest in commercial property through property syndicates, 
unit trusts and listed entities in infrastructure and utilities: 
… the tax advantages I have said are present in rental property would equally apply if 
you were to invest in commercial property. When you invest through a unit trust you 
would get the negative gearing deduction for the interest expense if you geared up. You 
wouldn’t get direct access to the capital works and depreciation deductions. They 
would remain in the trust and the benefit of those would come through in the cash flow 
distributed by the trust … having a tax-free component. (trans., pp. 386-7) 
Rider further acknowledged that the many small businesses which operate as 
individuals, rather than companies, can also receive the benefits of capital works 
deductions. Similarly, companies can pass on the benefits of any capital works 
deductions (and depreciation) to their shareholders through larger dividend 
distributions or an appreciation in the price of their shares. 
In the light of this discussion, the Commission therefore reaffirms its conclusion in 
the Discussion Draft that income tax arrangements in principle are broadly neutral 
between private investment by individuals in rental housing, equities, and 
(including via unit trusts, property syndicates, etc.) in commercial property. In each 
case, investors can benefit either directly or indirectly from negative gearing, 
depreciation and capital works deductions, and the CGT discount.  
This is not to suggest that the tax arrangements are equivalent across these different 
types of investment in the dollar benefit they confer on investors. For example, the 
direct benefits from capital works deductions to a private investor in housing might 
be greater than the indirect benefits for an investor in a pharmaceutical company 
(say) given the latter’s more diverse capital assets. But such differences in benefit 
are not of policy concern in themselves. It would not be sensible to argue, for 
instance, that fire fighters should be denied deductions for the cost of purchasing 
fire-proof clothing, simply because few other taxpayers could claim such a 
deduction. In the Commission’s view, taxation arrangements should aim for 
neutrality in application rather than, as some submissions implied, neutrality in 
effect. 
Inefficiencies will arise, however, if individual tax provisions as they apply to all 
investments are overly generous. In this case, they will tend to magnify any surges 
in investment in particular asset classes due to factors other than tax. As discussed 
in the next section, the recently modified CGT arrangements appear especially 
problematic in this regard.     




Are there distortions in individual tax provisions? 
Negative gearing provisions, capital works deductions and the CGT discount were 
all targeted by those concerned about perceived overinvestment in rental housing 
and its contribution to recent increases in house prices (see above). 
Yet, when judged against some ‘standard’ tax efficiency benchmarks, it is far from 
clear that there is a fundamental problem with the first two of these. 
•  Negative gearing facilitates risk-spreading among investments. In principle — 
and leaving aside tax avoidance issues — it would seemingly be both inefficient 
and inequitable to tax the returns from an investment in the year of gain, but not 
allow deductions that reduce an individual’s income in the year of loss. Negative 
gearing also provides neutrality between investors who borrow and those who 
use their own equity. 
•  Were negative gearing more confined in its application, tax arrangements would 
then favour investment in income-producing assets at the expense of riskier 
growth assets without the income yield to cover immediate expenses.  
In any case, even if the tax treatment of capital gains is ‘generous’ relative to the 
taxation of income, preventing negative gearing would not deter borrowing up to 
the point where no net current income was earned. Tax could still be deferred until 
capital gains were realised, with tax paid under the more generous CGT provisions. 
Moreover, removing negative gearing for housing investment alone could induce a 
potentially costly reallocation of investment portfolios, without necessarily having 
major effects on overall investment flows (see, for example, Sieper 1986, 
pp. 279-314). 
Denying capital works deductions for buildings (or depreciation on fittings and 
fixtures) would similarly conflict with the principle that the costs of generating 
taxable income should be deductible.  
However, the capital works deduction provisions and the current CGT arrangements 
do serve to illustrate the compromises necessary in moving from principles to 
practice, and the potential inefficiencies that can arise.  
Putting aside the more fundamental question of whether taxation of capital gains is 
necessary if income and consumption are also taxed, a ‘neutral’ income tax system 
would tax (real) capital gains on a full accruals basis year by year, rather than on a 
nominal basis, on realisation, with a 50 per cent discount. It would also allow full 
deductions in respect of capital losses, rather than, as at present, just against capital 
gains.     




An accruals-based regime would, of course, be extremely difficult to implement, 
raising a raft of revenue, administrative, compliance and transitional issues. The 
need to tax on a realisation basis may in turn support some discounting of CGT 
liabilities to reduce lock-in effects, as might a desire to encourage private 
individuals to invest in higher risk companies. Also, as Rider noted, ‘… so long as 
capital losses are not fully deductible, there is a certain equity in some kind of 
concessional treatment for capital gains’ (trans., p. 391). 
Clearly, the 1999 change in the basis for levying CGT, being more or less 
coincident with the decline in returns from equities, has added to the recent housing 
price boom by encouraging investors to reduce current income in favour of longer 
term capital gains. For the reasons just outlined, given a nominal basis for CGT, 
there may well be some justification for allowing a discount. But even if this is so, a 
question remains as to whether the current level of discount is appropriate, either 
from a general efficiency viewpoint, or in terms of the original ‘pro-investment’ 
rationale for change (section 5.1).  
The relationship between ‘economic’ depreciation and the rates claimable for tax 
purposes is another relevant issue in assessing whether the current tax regime is 
leading to inefficient investment in rental housing and other assets. If rates of 
depreciation for tax purposes exceed economic depreciation, then excessive 
investment in rental housing is likely to be encouraged. However, given the 
heterogeneity of the housing stock, differences in economic life between residential, 
commercial properties etc, setting rates of capital works deductions which mesh 
exactly with the circumstances applying to an individual building, or even certain 
property types, will be extremely difficult. The compromises necessary may, in 
turn, give rise to a ‘second best’ argument for modifications to other aspects of the 
tax regime. 
In sum, aspects of the current tax regime governing investment in housing and other 
assets have the potential to reduce housing affordability and lead to otherwise 
inefficient outcomes. As always, however, the real issue is whether there are 
practical changes that could improve on current outcomes. 
The way ahead 
In the Discussion Draft, the Commission suggested that these broader tax issues, 
and options for dealing with them, would need to be assessed in a review covering 
all the possible ramifications, rather than in a housing-specific context. However, it 
was ambivalent about the appropriate timing for such a review.      




Several participants endorsed the need to consider general tax measures impacting 
on investment in rental housing in a broad context. The RBA commented: 
Any changes in … arrangements cannot be divorced from the general tax structure, 
including the level of marginal income tax rates faced by investors and the point in the 
income distribution at which they cut in. Any changes would also need to take into 
account how they would affect other asset classes. (sub. 199, p. 6) 
And, in responding to the specific review proposal in the Discussion Draft, Paul 
Pollard stated: 
The draft report states correctly that tax changes need to be considered in the broader 
context of each tax, not just in relation to housing affordability. However it must be 
recognised that given the nature of Australian household wealth, the effect on the 
housing market of this tax [capital gains tax] [is] a very large part of that broader 
context, and a very strong ground for calling for a review of it. (sub. DR253, pp. 6-7) 
Other participants who endorsed the review proposal included ACOSS 
(trans. p. 107) and the Council of Social Services of NSW (trans. p. 236), with the 
latter suggesting that the review also encompass state-level taxes. And while not 
specifically endorsing a review, CPA Australia suggested that ‘… more work on 
this and other tax scenarios, including lower marginal tax rates, is required’ 
(sub. DR319, attachment, p. 3). 
But others explicitly, or implicitly through their suggestions for change (see above), 
called for more immediate action. In this regard, Rider implied that a general review 
is unnecessary given the recent Review of Business Taxation (the RBT or Ralph 
review) and that the ‘real problem which needs to be addressed is a comparatively 
narrow one’: ie what ‘fine-tuning of the … CGT discount needs to be made’ 
(sub. DR275, p. 10). He added: 
The fear that you shouldn’t change anything because you might have to change 
something else is extremely laudable. It’s not really borne out by the experience of tax 
reform. I think, in reality, we have to accept that it is a system which starts not from a 
plain piece of paper but has anomalies already well embedded and we spend our life 
trying to deal with one anomaly to keep things going. (trans., p. 390) 
That said, Rider acknowledged that tax changes designed to alter behaviour in the 
housing market would flow through to other forms of investment: 
I’d have to agree, of course, that any change you make at any level will have 
implications in other areas. (trans., p. 388) 
The Commission accepts that it is possible that some piecemeal changes to current 
taxation arrangements may deliver more affordable and efficient housing market 
outcomes. However, the preceding analysis illustrates that not only are the issues 
complex, but that any changes could not be quarantined to investment in rental     




housing. Indeed, ostensibly simple ‘fixes’ — such as abolishing CGT discounts for 
residential housing investment — could have far-reaching implications.  
Nevertheless, it seems likely that changes to these arrangements, as they apply to all 
asset classes, could improve the efficiency of investment outcomes. Assessing such 
changes, however, is beyond the scope of an inquiry looking at a wide range of 
influences on house prices and housing affordability. Thus, as the Commission 
argued in its Discussion Draft, what is required is a broad review covering all of the 
relevant tax arrangements and the complex interactions among them. Such a review 
would have the opportunity to draw on the Government’s current investigation of 
the appropriate tax treatment of capital works deductions for buildings, and to take 
into account any changes that ensue. (As noted above, the Australian Government 
has announced that any changes would not come into effect before 1 July 2005 
(Coonan 2002).) 
The initial focus of the review should be on the merits of changing CGT 
arrangements. The interaction of the CGT with high marginal tax rates boosts the 
incentive to reduce income and delay tax payments until capital gains are realised. 
In the Commission’s view, it is those arrangements, rather than access to negative 
gearing or capital works deductions, that give rise to most of the potential for 
inefficient investment. Subject to the outcome of the current investigation of capital 
works deductions, the review should also look at the relationship between economic 
depreciation on buildings and the rates of depreciation allowed for tax purposes. 
Further, if practical reasons were to militate against change to the CGT regime or 
capital works provisions, the review would need to look at the merits of ‘second 
best’ options for delivering more efficient investment incentives, including: 
•  more restrictive negative gearing provisions; and 
•  removing the CGT discount for that part of the gain previously claimed as a 
capital works deduction against current income (though again any changes from 
the current investigation would be relevant here). 
The appropriate timing of such a review remains a matter for judgment. On the one 
hand, holding a review near the top of the housing cycle could exacerbate any future 
market downturn. As well, there is as yet no experience of how the effects of the 
recent tax changes will play out over the whole housing cycle, nor of their influence 
on investment outcomes as returns on equities improve relative to housing. On the 
other hand, the complexity of the issues means that the review could take 
considerable time. Further, the implementation and transitional issues inherent in 
major changes to tax law mean that any policy changes ensuing from the review 
would not be in operation for some time. On balance, the Commission can see no 
reason for delaying the establishment of the review.      




In the interim, making housing-specific changes to taxation arrangements would run 
the risk of adding to existing distortions, or creating new ones, rather than 
improving the neutrality and efficiency of tax arrangements. 
The Australian Government should, as soon as practicable, establish a review of 
those aspects of the personal income tax regime that may have recently 
contributed to excessive investment in rental housing. The focus of the review 
should be on the Capital Gains Tax provisions. However, it should also assess 
‘second best’ options for addressing distortions in incentives to invest in housing 
and other asset markets, including: restrictions on negative gearing and changes 
to the capital works deduction provisions for buildings. Pending such review, it 
would not be appropriate to make housing-specific changes to negative gearing 
rules or to capital gains tax arrangements.  
RECOMMENDATION 5.3     
   
 
     




6  Has supply got tighter? 
 
Findings 
•  Constraints on the supply of land at the urban fringe have contributed to housing 
price pressures, particularly in Sydney. 
–  However, because recent price increases have been due mainly to the surge in 
demand in established areas, improvements to land release policies or planning 
approval processes could not have greatly alleviated them. 
•  Land release requires long lead times and needs to be informed by strategic 
planning in all jurisdictions. Such planning should involve public scrutiny of key 
assumptions about costs and benefits of different options. The tradeoffs between 
greenfield development and urban consolidation should be a key focus of the 
strategic planning process. 
•  Urban consolidation policies that introduce constraints on fringe development, 
including through ‘urban growth boundaries’, are likely to increase the scarcity value 
of land. Their effects on housing affordability depend on the scope to increase 
housing densities. This may have been overestimated. 
•  Current reviews of development approval processes have been concerned with 
problems of excessive ‘red tape’ and unnecessary delays. These reviews are better 
placed than this broader national inquiry to identify specific reforms to address such 
problems. 
•  Nevertheless, as part of this reform process, priority areas for government attention 
include the scope to: 
–  achieve greater separation of policy making and administration; 
– streamline permit approval processes to enable minor or uncontentious 
developments to by-pass unnecessary informational or consultative 
requirements;  
–  improve or expand ‘as of right’ development provisions, without detracting unduly 
from the property rights of existing residents; and  
–  reduce delays in appeal mechanisms, while maintaining the protections of due 
process. 
•  A precondition for effective reform are clear rules that have been developed through 
community consultation and have broad support. It is also important that all reforms 
are adequately scrutinised in advance and that their effectiveness is subsequently 
monitored. 
 
     




The recent increase in house prices raises questions about whether supply has been 
unduly constrained in responding to greater demand, especially in the past few 
years. Industry representatives claim that the surge in prices has been largely 
attributable to government policies constraining the supply side. The most 
significant problems cited — policies relating to land release and development 
approval processes — are examined in this chapter. Other potential supply-side 
problems, concerning housing-related infrastructure charges and aspects of the 
operating environment of the building and dwelling construction industries, are 
examined in subsequent chapters. 
The supply of additional housing stock is typically provided by building new 
dwellings on greenfield land, which pushes out the urban fringe, or on dispersed 
infill or major redevelopment sites, which increases the intensity of land use in 
established areas. 
Supply lags are an inherent feature of land development and dwelling construction. 
Housing supply cannot immediately respond to demand surges because of the lead 
times needed to service lots, to redevelop land and to construct dwellings. Industry 
representatives indicated that it can take several years for ‘developable land’ to be 
converted into construction-ready lots with roads, drainage, water supply, sewerage 
and electricity services in place. 
In the long term, supply is more responsive, but even large increases in the average 
production level of dwellings can have only modest effects on the stock of housing. 
Net additions to the total dwelling stock rarely exceed 2 per cent per annum. 
In the presence of a demand surge such as that from the mid-1990s, the inherently 
slow supply response can result in large price increases. Increased demand will 
boost prices of established housing as owner occupiers try to trade up, given that the 
availability of land for housing in premium locations often cannot be expanded at 
all. This has been a dominant influence in the recent upswing.  
Even so, a key question is whether the price raising effects of such inherent delays 
and constraints have been compounded by government restrictions and regulations 
on land use — either at the fringe or within cities.  
6.1  What is the evidence? 
In seeking to understand the nature of the supply-side contribution to rising house 
prices, it is useful to look first at trends in the price of different components of a 
dwelling — and in particular, what part of the overall trend is attributable to the     




rising value of land. These changes can be juxtaposed against trends in the number 
of lots and dwellings supplied, including comparisons with underlying demand. 
As noted in chapter 2, some of the increase in house prices can be attributed to 
improvements and renovations to the existing housing stock. A number of 
participants pointed out that the average size of new houses has been increasing and 
the quality of fittings improving. But these changes are gradual and they are likely 
to have had a minor role in the price surge since the mid-1990s. 
Another possible cause of rising house prices could be increasing building costs. 
However, as Caplin, Joye et al. (2003) observed, building material prices have 
generally risen at similar rates to the consumer price index (see figure  6.1), 
suggesting that the main contributor has been rising land prices. 
This is further demonstrated by comparing the ABS index of prices of ‘established’ 
houses (including land) with the index of the prices of project houses (excluding 
land), which is shown at the national level in figure 6.1. The growing divergence 
between the two can be attributed to faster growth in the price of land. The trend is 
strongest in Melbourne and Sydney, but is apparent in most capital cities. 

























Established house prices (including land) Project house prices (excluding land)
Consumer prices Building material prices
 
Data sources: ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat no. 6401.0; House Price Indexes: Eight Capital 
Cities, Cat. no. 6416.0). 
There is evidence of a growing preference for centrally located land within 
expanding cities. For example, along transport corridors in Sydney and Melbourne, 
the change in median prices from the early 1990s to 2002 was proportionately 
greater close to the central business districts of each city than at the fringe (see 
figure 6.2). In Sydney, the real median house price five kilometres from the city     




increased by more than 100 per cent, while at 40 kilometres it increased by less than 
50 per cent. 
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a The 18 suburbs shown for Sydney are adjacent to the Campbelltown line. b The 22 suburbs shown for 
Melbourne are adjacent to the Nepean Highway. 
Data sources: DSE (2003a); NSW Department of Housing. 
This trend is consistent with rising house prices being primarily due to the inherent 
scarcity value of land in established areas, which has risen as demand has increased.     




However, the Commission’s examination of price information for vacant blocks 
located at urban fringes also reveals some substantial price rises. For example, the 
price of a block of land in Melton Shire (Victoria) has almost doubled since 1995, 
and the price of a vacant block in Penrith (NSW) has much more than doubled (see 
figure 6.3). If anything, the chart may understate the rate of increase, as lot sizes 
have been shrinking in this period. 

























Penrith (NSW) Melton (Vic)
 
Note. Prices are in nominal terms. 
Data sources: Australian Property Monitors (unpublished); DSE (2003a). 
Another means of identifying potential supply problems is to examine trends in the 
supply of construction-ready greenfield lots and new dwellings. Data from Sydney 
and Melbourne are presented in figure 6.4. 
In Sydney, the number of dwelling approvals has remained relatively stable, while 
completion of construction-ready greenfield lots in 2002-03 was at its lowest level 
in eight years. The decline in the number of greenfield lots produced has forced a 
greater reliance on infill developments, where planning objections and delays are 
more prevalent (section 6.3). 
In Melbourne, the available information suggests that aggregate supply may have 
been somewhat less constrained than in Sydney (see figure 6.4). There have been 
trend increases in dwelling approvals and, to a lesser extent, greenfield lots since the 
mid-1990s.     




Figure 6.4  Trends in ‘greenfield’ lot production and dwelling approvals, 

















































































Average annual lot development Total dwelling approvals
 
Note.  Dwelling approvals are the total number of private dwellings approved, which includes both single 
detached houses and the total number of multi-unit dwellings. Average annual lot development is an estimate 
of the number of greenfield construction-ready lots (DSE, pers. comm., 1 December 2003). 
Data sources: DIPNR (2003a); Victorian Government (sub.  85, appendix D, table  D1); ABS (Building 
Approvals, NSW, Cat. no. 8731.1; Building Approvals, Victoria, Cat. no. 8731.2). 
Sydney can be distinguished somewhat from other cities in that the number of 
housing approvals is dominated by multi-unit dwellings, which far exceed the 
production of construction-ready lots in greenfield areas. The trend to multi-unit 
developments could partly be a response to undersupply of greenfield lots. 
However, an increasing preference to live in high-density housing closer to 
amenities is also likely to have been influential. For example, part of the investment     




surge in inner-city apartments has catered for increasing numbers of overseas 
students and temporary business visitors (chapter 4). 
The existence of a small overall shortage in the supply of new dwellings finds some 
support in estimates of the gap between underlying demand (based on population 
and household formation trends) and private and public dwelling completions. BIS 
Shrapnel data indicate a shortfall in dwelling completions in most jurisdictions over 
the last seven years, but particularly so in NSW and Queensland (see table 6.1). 
However, the differences between aggregate dwelling completions and underlying 
demand are not large. For example, in NSW the shortfall represents about 5 per cent 
of total underlying demand for the period. In Victoria, underlying demand and 
supply appear broadly in balance, even though prices in Melbourne and some 
regional areas have risen sharply in recent years. 
Table 6.1  Difference between dwelling completions and underlying 
demand estimates, 1996 to 2003 
000’s of dwellings 
 NSW  Vic  Qld WA SA Tas ACT  NT  Australia
Completions 307.7  255.2  220.6 52.2 122.4 11.9 10.5 13.9  994.4
Underlying 
demand 323.2  256.4  243.2 52.5 126.0 13.0 7.4  14.5  1036.2
Shortfall -15.5  -1.2  -22.6 -0.3 -3.6 -1.1 3.1  -0.6  -41.8
Note.  Underlying demand is estimated using historical relationships between population and household 
formation and rates of demolitions. 
Source: BIS Shrapnel (2003). 
The population and immigration data used for estimating underlying demand, 
present some difficulties. Specifically, the population estimates used by BIS 
Shrapnel do not include people who stay for less than a year, but who nevertheless 
may demand housing. An offsetting consideration is that the most recent population 
estimates employed by BIS Shrapnel use net immigration figures that are higher 
than the latest ABS estimates (chapter 4). 
In any case, aggregate state-level data can hide demand-supply imbalances in 
metropolitan or regional areas, or within particular segments of the metropolitan 
market. For example, the construction of inner-city apartments may not relieve 
shortages of housing suitable for first home buyers.  
Although there appears to have been a shortfall in housing supply at the urban 
fringe — at least in Sydney — it is the increased demand for existing dwellings in 
established areas that has been the primary reason for recent price rises. As 
highlighted in figure 6.2, there have been substantial variations in the rates of price 
increase across suburbs in the major cities over the past decade, with the greatest     




increases being in suburbs close to the central business districts, where land is most 
scarce. 
That said, the impact of demand pressures on land prices may well have been 
accentuated by rigidities in the supply chain, such as government interventions 
which unduly limit the supply of additional land at the urban fringe or the 
construction of additional dwellings within cities. Land release arrangements and 
the processes for approving developments in greenfield and infill sites are clearly 
relevant in this regard. A particular issue for this inquiry is whether these processes 
have changed such as to reduce the responsiveness of supply and thus compound 
price pressures from strongly growing demand. 
6.2  The supply of ‘new’ land 
Traditionally, Australian cities have accommodated growing populations through 
expansion at the fringes. As a result, Australian capital cities cover large areas and 
have among the lowest city population densities in the world. Over the past 
10  to  15  years, governments have sought to control the resulting ‘sprawl’ by 
encouraging higher density redevelopments within established areas, in order to 
achieve better use of existing economic and social infrastructure. 
Industry participants in this inquiry contend that such policies have served to reduce 
the supply of new land and have thereby contributed to rising prices and declining 
housing affordability. As noted in the previous section, land prices in a number of 
fringe locations have increased rapidly, although some have argued that this partly 
reflects an increase in the cost of providing services to building lots (chapter 7). 
Aspects of policy bearing on land supply and some related issues are examined in 
this section. A key question is the impact of such policies on housing affordability. 
However, it has not been possible for the Commission to review the diverse 
arrangements across jurisdictions in any detail. There are also important social and 
environmental dimensions to policy in this area to be taken into account, as well as 
economic costs and benefits. The Commission has therefore focused on some high 
level issues which are crucial to ensuring that land release processes are efficient 
and effective in all jurisdictions. 
Current processes in brief 
The supply of housing lots created from ‘greenfield’ land (for example, existing 
farmland) depends on: 
•  the land being re-zoned for future residential development; and     




•  the timely provision of trunk infrastructure to allow such re-zoned land to be 
subdivided into serviced lots. 
State and territory government approaches to urban development differ widely (see 
box  6.1). Strategic planning — taking economic, environmental and social 
objectives into account — underpins these approaches to varying degrees. The 
planning process generally involves some consultation with the public. Plans are 
usually updated from time to time, to take account of changing economic 
circumstances and community priorities. 
 
Box 6.1  Examples of current land release policy 
•  In Sydney, land for future urban development is identified through metropolitan and 
regional planning strategies. Following detailed investigation of service availability, 
transport and environmental issues, the land is re-zoned in liaison with local 
councils and relevant government agencies. Since 2001, it has been government 
policy that release areas accommodating more than 1000 dwellings must include 
mechanisms to fund regional transport and other infrastructure. Apart from already 
committed release areas around the metropolitan fringe, two large sectors in the 
north–west and south–west of Sydney are currently under investigation as potential 
new urban communities (Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural 
Resources, Sydney, pers. comm., 18 March 2004). 
•  In Melbourne, land is first identified for urban development without any formal 
changes to zoning. Under the strategic development plan Melbourne 2030, 
preferred development sequences are to be defined in designated growth areas, to 
provide better coordinated infrastructure planning and funding. According to 
Melbourne 2030, this has to include an indicative 10 to 15 year development and 
land supply program, regularly updated, to identify the areas (both greenfield and 
major infill redevelopment sites) in which development is expected to meet 
projected housing demand.  
•  In Queensland, land for future development is identified by the publication of 
land-use and trunk infrastructure development plans. Local governments release 
land for urban development after satisfying broad state government land-use and 
infrastructure planning objectives. 
 
 
A major economic concern in all jurisdictions is the cost of providing infrastructure. 
Most plans are predicated on the objective of ensuring more efficient use of existing 
urban land and services by constraining urban sprawl. Some governments have 
imposed an explicit ‘urban growth boundary’ to implement this objective (discussed 
below). 
Governments generally monitor land supply using a ‘balance sheet’ approach. In 
forecasting demand, attention is given to the intensity of land use and the extent to     




which expected housing demand is likely to be met by dispersed infill and major 
redevelopments. 
Whether these strategic plans promote efficient consumption of housing services, 
depends on whether they are based on a robust analysis of benefits and costs. 
Developing strategic plans is a complex process, depending on many assumptions. 
Consequently, the resultant strategies necessarily involve a considerable element of 
judgment. This makes public consultation and good process critical elements in 
effective decision making. 
Is fringe supply unduly constrained? 
There was broad agreement among inquiry participants that to avoid speculative 
pressures and to promote efficient production, it is desirable that sufficient 
undeveloped land be designated for future residential use to meet around 15 years’ 
projected demand. The Urban Development Institute of Australia (Victoria) (UDIA, 
sub.  121) contended that, at the next level, some five  years of supply of 
‘developable land’ (serviceable by infrastructure providers) is necessary to cope 
with sudden increases in demand, with 18 months to two years of completed stock 
‘on hand’. 
Governments have generally endorsed the need for 15 years’ fringe supply, but 
consistent with a desired shift to more compact cities, have anticipated in their 
planning that over time a rising share of total supply will come from infill 
development. The NSW Government observed: 
From the late 1970s up until early 1990s, more than 40 per cent of the additions to 
dwelling stock each year in metropolitan Sydney were located in new greenfield areas. 
That share has dropped significantly since 1993-94 to an average of 28 per cent for the 
period 1996 to 2001. It is projected to fall further to 25 per cent over the next five 
years. (sub. 187, p. 30) 
Constraints in Sydney 
Sydney has its own problems, being: 
… physically hemmed in by the Blue Mountains to the west and a string of national 
parks on its flanks. In addition, all prospective development on the existing urban 
frontier drains into the Nepean/Hawkesbury river system, a system vulnerable to 
pollution. (Birrell and Healy, 2003, p. 51)  
The Property Council of Australia (PCA) (sub.  194) and the Housing Industry 
Association (HIA) (sub.  177) whilst acknowledging physical constraints, argued 
that the supply of new lots in Sydney has been inadequate and also falls short of     




what will be needed to meet underlying projected demand for some 27  000 
dwellings per year. The more restricted supply in Sydney is evident in figure 6.4, 
even allowing for a higher level of infill development compared with Melbourne. 
The NSW Government noted that it has recently taken initiatives to make more 
greenfields land available for housing, including investigating the release of over 
20 000 hectares of land in south– and north–western Sydney (see box 6.1). This 
response further suggests that supply has been inadequate in recent years. 
Constraints in Melbourne 
In Victoria, some controversy has centred on the imposition of an ‘urban growth 
boundary’, as part of the Melbourne 2030 strategic plan (see box  6.2). The 
boundary is part of a strategy to ‘manage’ development at the urban fringe and 
encourage more dense development both in established and designated growth 
areas. An urban growth boundary has existed in Perth for some time, with a 
boundary adopted in Adelaide in May 2003. 
The Victorian Government has stated that some 15  years supply of land was 
encompassed within the original plan. Nevertheless, prices for broadacre land 
within the urban growth boundary increased sharply just after it was implemented. 
According to the UDIA (Victoria) (sub. 121), these price increases resulted from 
industry uncertainty about the scope to relax the urban growth boundary over time, 
leading to perceptions of potential supply shortages. However, the Victorian 
Government contends that the price increases were due to a number of factors, not 
least a rapid rate of land take-up associated with high levels of housing demand and 
greater competition from large, interstate land developers (sub. DR301, p. 6). 
The Victorian Government has recently completed its Urban Development Program 
review and released an additional parcel of residential land in the Hume growth 
area, with the effect of extending the urban growth boundary in that area. However, 
the UDIA argued that a longer-term strategy that identifies corridors where future 
expansion will occur is required, rather than periodic incremental extensions of the 
boundary.     




   
Box 6.2  The Melbourne 2030 urban growth boundary 
Melbourne’s urban growth boundary was established as part of a broader strategy. Its 
stated purpose is to: 
•  set clear limits to metropolitan Melbourne’s outward development; 
•  concentrate urban expansion into areas that are served by high-capacity public 
transport; 
•  manage the sequence of development in growth areas so that services are 
available from early in the life of new communities; and 
•  protect the green wedges of metropolitan Melbourne. 
The plan was developed in consultation with a reference group comprising 
representatives from local government, peak industry bodies and community-based 
organisations and professional experts. 
Two principal goals of establishing a boundary are to produce an urban form that can 
be serviced efficiently by making best use of existing infrastructure and to give 
long-term certainty about growth areas, to minimise speculative pressures on land 
values in nearby areas. 
In areas other than the designated growth areas, the intention is to set the boundary 
permanently, following consultation on the implementation of the plan. In the 
designated growth areas, the boundary will be set on completion of the review of 
development plans for each area. 
Future variations to the urban growth boundary are expected to occur after periodic 
reviews of the growth area plans and assessment of land supply levels. It is claimed 
that the urban growth boundary, as proposed, includes enough land for development to 
provide for metropolitan Melbourne’s needs in the future, given the redirection of 
priorities. 
Source: DoI (2002). 
 
 
The Commission observes that, to the extent that an urban growth boundary is 
intended to constrain development, it is inevitable that it will have some effect on 
land prices. For this not to be so, people would need to be indifferent to housing 
type and location, and the supply of dwellings would need to be just as readily 
expanded from established urban areas. Moreover, from the development industry’s 
perspective, delineation of such a boundary reduces the risk of investing in the 
designated areas and signals that services are to be made available that will enhance 
the value of the land. As the Planning Institute of Australia (PIA) (sub. 163) noted, 
the differential impact of such arrangements on the prices of raw land within and 
outside urban boundaries has been well documented for the Green Belts in Southern 
England.     




Moreover, while a nominal stock of some 15 years’ supply of land available for 
development accords with the lead times regarded as necessary to avoid shortages, 
the actual supply of construction-ready lots can still fall short as a result of delays in 
local government re-zoning, or the unavailability of necessary major infrastructure. 
Making new land available requires coordination between state governments, local 
governments and utilities. Wyndham Council observed: 
In growth areas in particular, infrastructure constraints may severely constrain land 
release. In Wyndham, for example: 
•  Water supply constraints have retarded industrial development in Truganina, and 
until recently, residential development at Wyndham Vale; and  
•  Arterial road constraints are currently retarding residential development south of 
Leakes Road, in Tarneit and Truganina, and threaten to do so in Point Cook. 
(sub. 210, p. 13) 
Towards better processes 
Economic efficiency requires that the conversion of non-residential land to 
residential (or from one kind of residential use to another) occurs only when the 
extra value, aggregated across all those affected, exceeds the cost of conversion; 
and when that cost is minimised. However, economic efficiency is not the only 
criterion against which to judge the relevant processes — fairness must also be 
considered. A practical difficulty, therefore, when designing decision-making 
processes, is that changes to land use have many effects, on many different 
interests, with these effects difficult to measure objectively. 
While circumstances vary across jurisdictions, long lead times are inherent to the 
process of converting greenfield land into construction-ready lots. In the 
Commission’s view, these long-term land release processes cannot be calibrated to 
meet general surges in demand, such as most Australian cities have experienced 
since the mid-1990s.  
Historically, fringe expansion has accounted for only a fraction of housing turnover 
and cannot cater for much of the demand for upgraded or better positioned housing. 
Even so, addressing any bottlenecks in the conversion of greenfields land would 
moderate growth in prices at the urban fringe to the benefit of first (and other) home 
buyers and this would have some flow-on effects on the general housing market 
over time.  
Some inquiry participants were critical of existing processes and argued in favour of 
more formalised strategic planning, akin to the Melbourne 2030 process. However, 
as noted, the outcomes of that process were not always viewed favourably.     




Strategic planning and controls on development can be justified on the basis that 
some of the social costs and benefits of locational decisions, such as environmental 
impacts, are not reflected in prices faced by participants in the market. A problem 
with relying on supply-side controls though is that they may not account adequately 
for community preferences. One benefit of a progressive shift to ‘user pays’ systems 
for infrastructure services (chapter 7), is that it should reduce the extent to which 
prescription is necessary to determine where new development can occur. However, 
there is little evidence that, in practice, the degree of prescription has diminished. 
In the Commission’s view, governments should test publicly the assumptions and 
tradeoffs implicit in their decisions about urban development when formalising their 
plans. The apparent lack of publicly available information in some cities suggests 
that such processes are not always adequate. 
Relevant considerations in the development of such plans include, in the case of 
urban consolidation policies, the scope for savings in infrastructure costs, and 
assessment of the effects on the environment and neighbourhood amenity. For 
example, while in most cities there is generally some spare capacity in economic 
infrastructure, this can vary markedly according to location and between different 
forms of infrastructure, as noted in submissions by the WA Government (sub. 190) 
and the SA Government (sub. DR295).  
All state and territory governments should have long-term land release strategies 
that are based on extensive public scrutiny of projections and key assumptions. 
The tradeoffs between greenfield development and urban consolidation should be 
a particular focus of such processes. 
A range of inquiry participants favoured a nationally coordinated approach to urban 
development planning. In particular, the PCA (sub. 194) proposed that the Council 
of Australian Governments (CoAG) develop a ‘national strategic planning 
framework’ that would ‘establish urban, regional and rural development plans 
across the nation’ over a 30 year horizon, with a focus on infrastructure needs and 
including ‘mirror’ strategies for land release and zoning.  
Others saw a need to ‘reinvent’ the Indicative Planning Council (IPC) to provide a 
national perspective on land supply and demand forecasting. 
In the Discussion Draft, the Commission indicated its preliminary view that a 
national strategic planning framework would have difficulty accommodating urban 
and regional diversity and produce few tangible benefits. It expressed similar 
reservations about proposals to re-establish the IPC.  
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The Commission sought further input from participants on the potential role and 
contribution of such arrangements. Little elaboration was forthcoming from the 
proponents, however, while some other participants expressed support for the 
Commission’s position. For example, the PIA noted that it ‘strongly supports 
greater national involvement in urban policy, but would advocate a less centralised 
model, based on subsidiarity principles’ (sub. DR271, p. 7). The PIA called for a 
CoAG-endorsed ‘Australian Sustainable Development Charter’, involving 
overarching principles and national targets covering a wide range of performance 
standards for urban life.  
While the Commission remains doubtful about the scope for, and indeed value of, 
nationally coordinated planning, it sees considerable benefits arising from processes 
and forums that promote comparisons and learning across jurisdictions about issues 
in common. However, it is unclear that existing institutional vehicles, such as the 
Local Government and Planning Ministers, and the Housing Ministers councils, 
cannot adequately discharge such a role. 
On the question of whether better data could be made available to government and 
market participants on prospective trends in population and household formation, 
the Commission is similarly unconvinced that a further national initiative is required 
to supplement what is already done by the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. However, there may be scope 
to improve the information base by recategorising migrants and visitors to better 
reflect their likely impact on housing demand (chapter 4). 
One specific alleged deficiency in information about potential land supply raised by 
the HIA and PCA relates to land owned by government. Those organisations 
proposed that an audit be undertaken of Australian, state and local government 
property that could be surplus to requirements and made available for residential 
development. 
The Commission sought responses from governments on this matter. These 
indicated that, both at the Commonwealth level and among a number of state 
governments, reviews of this kind have been taking place. For example, the SA 
Government said there are strong financial incentives to identify and dispose of 
such land. It has in place a centralised system for assembling surplus land and 
undertaking, prior to disposal, a strategic assessment of future use (sub. DR295, 
p. 5). The PIA similarly noted that there are strong incentives for governments to 
release unused land.     




6.3 Planning  approvals 
From a price or affordability perspective, a critical consideration in decisions about 
constraints on the rate of expansion of fringe development is the scope for ‘infill’ 
development to meet the ongoing growth in demand. As in the case of conversion of 
greenfield land to construction-ready lots, local governments play a key role in the 
re-zoning or approvals processes that enable higher-density redevelopment to take 
place. The effectiveness of this stage of the supply chain is examined in this section. 
The planning approval process is critical to the timely and appropriate expansion 
and reshaping of cities. However, the overwhelming view put to this inquiry by 
those involved in seeking planning approvals is that the processes are deficient and 
have become increasingly so — and that this has played a role in the recent 
escalation in house prices. 
State and territory governments directly influence the land that is potentially 
available for the construction of dwellings. However, decisions about what 
development is permissible and where, within these parameters, are generally made 
by local governments. It is in this context that some state governments have 
initiated reviews or are making changes to planning approval processes in 
recognition that things can be done better at a local level. 
As noted, in the present national inquiry, it has not been possible for the 
Commission to get to the bottom of all the various concerns in different 
jurisdictions. The approach taken, therefore, has been to identify some common 
issues and avenues that would offer the prospect of improvement in all jurisdictions. 
Clearly, doing better in this area could prove critical to governments achieving their 
urban consolidation goals without unduly reducing housing affordability. 
The processes in brief 
The need for planning controls in themselves is generally not in dispute. Such 
controls are intended to meet legitimate public and private interests, including 
environmental amenity and the wellbeing of communities, and to enable 
coordinated provision of economic and social infrastructure. 
Local government, under state delegation, is generally both the planning authority 
(for local plans) and the planning approval consent authority for its municipal 
district. Local governments have discretion about how development assessments are 
conducted and legislative requirements are interpreted. Hence, though it is possible 
to provide a stylised summary of the approval process (see box 6.3), there are many 
local differences in procedures and requirements (see below).     




The decisions that councils make as the principal consent authority are constrained 
by state legislation and planning policies. For example, multi-dwelling and 
subdivision development in Victoria requires a planning permit to be issued, with 
the application assessed against provisions outlined by the state government in 
Rescode — a package of provisions for residential development, including character 
and heritage overlays. Also, there are statutory time limits in most states and 
territories both for councils to make determinations, and for referral authorities to 
provide input into applications. These vary across jurisdictions, but typically are in 
the range of 30 to 60 working days for a determination (with a wider range for 
referral decisions). 
 
Box 6.3  A typical planning approval process 
•  Prelodgement — During this stage, applicants are informed of the types of 
development permitted, what development controls may apply and the informational 
requirements of the approval process. Discussions may also be held between the 
applicant and residents from neighbouring properties or residents of the wider local 
area. 
•  Submission to council or consenting authority — Submissions are often required to 
be accompanied by specific information (such as environmental impact reports). 
•  Public notification  and objection resolution — Applications for particular types of 
development are typically required under legislation to be advertised. There may be 
further advertising requirements in local government rules. If there are objections 
from third parties, a resolution process may take place before the assessment 
proceeds. 
•  Assessment — The consenting authority assesses the merit of the application 
against the provisions or rules stipulated in relevant planning instruments.  
•  Determination — The consenting authority decides whether or not to grant the 
approval and, if so, what if any conditions are attached to the approval. 
•  Appeal — An applicant who is dissatisfied with the determination generally has a 
right to appeal the decision in a court of law. There may also be review mechanisms 
that applicants can pursue as an alternative to litigation. 
 
If developers or ‘objectors’ are not satisfied with a determination, they can 
generally seek a review. For example, under section 82A of the NSW Environment 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979, local councils are able to review 
determinations. Alternatively, parties can seek to appeal a decision in the Land and 
Environment Court. In other jurisdictions, appeals may be heard by administrative 
tribunals (for example, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) in 
Victoria and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in the ACT).     





Planning approvals require due process and this inevitably takes time, as the 
prescribed statutory limits suggest. However, many inquiry participants claimed that 
delays have increased considerably in recent years, as have the associated 
compliance costs and the uncertainty about outcomes. The views of one such 
participant — Langford-Jones Homes (sub. 126) — are reported in box 6.4. The 
HIA (sub. DR250) cited the case of Masterton Homes, which in a recent submission 
to the NSW Minister for Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources, had 
indicated that approval times for its projects had increased from 27 days prior to 
1998 to 84 days in 2002.  
Are delays getting worse? 
In its submission to this inquiry, the Royal Australian Institute of Architects (RAIA) 
(sub. 148) reported the results of a recent survey of its members, which suggested 
that processing times for both single (new) homes and medium-density 
developments have increased in nearly all states. 
The survey revealed (in both NSW and Victoria) that the average processing time 
for a new house was now around seven months, compared with four to five months 
in 2000. The reported increase in delays was even greater for medium-density 
housing projects, with application times having risen from six months in both states 
to nine months in NSW and 11 months in Victoria in 2003. As shown in figure 6.5, 
while estimated processing times in the survey increased elsewhere, they remain 
much lower. 
It has been difficult to reconcile these estimates against data available from official 
sources. For example, information reported by NSW municipalities, while showing 
wide variation between jurisdictions in the time taken to determine development 
applications (from two to 117 working days), does not reveal any increase in delays 
at the aggregate level (see figure 6.6), though it is notable that they are around 
50 per cent longer in inner-metropolitan areas than at the fringe.     





Box 6.4  Building a house in South Gippsland: one company’s 
experience  
Under the Planning and Environment Regulations 1998, all councils in Victoria are 
required to process a planning application in 60 days. This timeframe may be extended 
by a further 28 days if a council needs to forward the application to a referral authority. 
But even with these requirements in place, Langford-Jones Homes claimed that in the 
South Gippsland Shire it can take eight months for the council to process a planning 
application: 
Not withstanding there are referral periods within the process whereby external departments 
and authorities are required to assess the application, 8 months still appears to be an 
extraordinary amount of time to wait for a single house to be approved. (sub 126, p. 2) 
According to the company, such delays in the planning approval process can add 
$6000 to $7000 to the cost of building a house in the South Gippsland Shire (trans., 
p. 298).  
It was noted that all builders in the South Gippsland Shire need a planning permit to 
comply with a standard set of regulatory design requirements for a single dwelling — 
the installation of a colorbond roof, a sewerage treatment plant, a water tank and pump 
for fire protection, vegetation clearance within two metres of where the dwelling will be 
located, and a requirement that building products be finished in muted tones. 
Langford-Jones Homes argued that these six standard requirements should be 
covered only by a building permit, thereby reducing considerably the costs of planning 
delays. 
Langford-Jones Homes also argued that ‘overlays’ should be dealt with at the 
subdivision stage, claiming that this would eliminate the necessity for new buildings to 
be subject to a full planning assessment. 
Sources: Sub 126; trans., pp. 298-305. 
 
 
A further source of information comes from a recent survey commissioned by the 
Local Government Association and Shires Association of NSW (sub.  DR323), 
involving development applications lodged at 56 councils over a four week period 
in 2003. The survey found that nearly two-thirds of development applications were 
determined within the 40 to 60 working day limits, with the median time ranging 
from 29  working days for ‘simple single dwellings’ to 69  working days for 
‘integrated’ development applications where approval is required from more than 
one authority. These outcomes seem broadly consistent with the ‘official’ data 
collections summarised in figure 6.6.     






















Data source: RAIA (2003). 




















Metropolitan  Regional Fringe
 
Note.  The processing time for an application starts when the application is lodged and ends at the date of the 
notice of determination. From 1999-00, councils have been able to deduct the days the assessment clock was 
stopped because of requests for additional information. 
Data source: DLG (NSW) (2003). 
It is possible that the introduction of the ‘stop-the-clock’ counting rule has masked 
an increase in the time taken to process applications. Since 1999-00, councils have 
been allowed to ‘stop the clock’ when additional information is being sought. 
However, it seems improbable that this could explain the large difference between 
the RAIA survey and data collected from municipalities, even converting council 
working days into total lapsed time.     




Apart from methodological issues, another possible explanation for the difference 
between the trends in municipal statistics and the RAIA survey results may be in the 
time taken for prelodgement procedures — which are not covered by data from the 
Department of Local Government. Anecdotal reports suggest that there has been an 
increase in processing times at this stage, but how significant it has been is unclear. 
In considering the possible reasons for any increase in delays in the last few years, 
the surge in demand documented in earlier chapters is clearly relevant. The PIA 
noted that ‘Complaints about planning delays seem to be cyclical … Any system 
has trouble coping with peaks and troughs’ (sub. 163, pp. 9-10). 
Nonetheless some systemic issues may be compounding the cyclical pressures. The 
key ones raised by participants are considered next. 
Skill shortages 
Reports of a decline in the capacity of many municipalities to process applications 
efficiently have come from a variety of sources. For example: 
•  The RAIA’s member survey provided evidence of under-resourcing and lack of 
experience or training of personnel. 
•  The  PIA  noted  (sub. 163, p. 11)  that  heads of planning agencies had been 
sufficiently concerned to commission a national inquiry into planning education 
and employment. 
•  A 2001 profile of local government planners in Victoria found that 44 per cent of 
council planners had less than two years’ experience (DoI 2001). 
•  A Victorian judge noted that an increase in the number of matters subject to 
planning approval, and in the discretion required of planners, have not been 
matched by an increase in staff: 
These days it is increasingly common for citizens to need a permit for such things 
as painting of dwellings, lopping of trees, extensions to dwellings and the like. 
But the growth in discretionary decisions has not been matched by a growth in the 
number of planning officers to consider them. (Morris 2003, pp. 1–2) 
In discussions with the Commission, senior industry representatives said that they 
have been obliged to recruit skilled, experienced people to help their companies 
navigate more extensive and complex approval requirements. Many of those 
recruits have been attracted or diverted from council employment. 
Local government associations acknowledged the problem in submissions and at the 
public hearings. For example the Local Government Association of Queensland 
(LGAQ) said:     




The lack of experienced staff has been recognised as a major focus for LGAQ in 2004. 
It is anticipated that a number of policy and project responses will be required to 
commence addressing the skills shortage in Queensland Local Government. 
(sub. DR246, p. 4) 
The PIA (2004), in a draft report for its National Inquiry into Planning Education 
and Employment, stated that over the last three years, the rate of unfilled positions 
has been over 19  per cent. The vacancies are greatest in local government, the 
largest employer of planners. The problem was found to have become critical in 
major cities (Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney) and has been a longstanding 
problem in rural and regional Australia. 
The PIA is currently consulting on a number of initiatives, including: 
•  increasing the number of funded places at Australian universities for planners; 
•  including planning on the ‘Migration Occupation Demand List’; 
•  ‘pooling’ planning resources where shortages arise in rural and regional areas; 
•  improving the development assessment process by establishing assessment 
panels; and 
•  improving its accreditation processes. 
The Commission sees the inquiry and the emerging policy initiatives as a positive 
development. However, some consideration of the role of remuneration and 
working conditions would also seem important. The scope for contracting out is 
also a key issue for councils. At the public hearings, Cr Maire Sheehan noted that 
Leichhardt Shire had provided the option for applications to be processed by 
specified private agencies for an extra fee, and that this had worked well for both 
the Council and the applicants. However, the ‘experiment’ was terminated by the 
State Government because of perceptions of inequity (trans., p. 163). 
More complex and demanding processes 
Responses to the RAIA survey indicated that, in most jurisdictions, considerably 
more time and effort are now needed to prepare a planning application than three 
years ago. Among other things, the RAIA identified the following matters that 
could have contributed to the additional work: 
•  ‘unreasonable demands’ for material relating to ‘technically simple’ jobs; 
•  a rise in the incidence of heritage and landscape issues; 
•  rigid application of planning submission requirements for ‘very small’ projects; 
and     




•  requirements to provide reports that ultimately prove redundant. 
The HIA (sub.  177) similarly alleged that planning systems have become more 
‘fragmented, complex and unpredictable’. Among the issues raised by the HIA 
were: 
•  expanded coverage of planning approval requirements; 
•  a ‘plethora’ of legislation and referral agencies; 
•  ‘layered’ planning systems; and 
•  rigid application of development standards. 
Councils also pointed to the increased number of matters to which they must now 
have regard, including many environmental or heritage issues that were not seen as 
important even 20 years ago.  
Given the changes within cities and in community values, such additional 
requirements are inevitable. Thus the PIA argued that planning approval processes 
today needed to reach standards of rigour and community consultation well above 
what was acceptable in the past. 
To some extent, the ‘relative speediness of approval process[es]’ of the past — a 
feature often fondly recalled by industry stakeholders — was won at the expense of 
environmental quality and sustainability ... The community now demands much better 
outcomes and it is inevitable that planning approval processes will be more exhaustive 
and time consuming as a result. (sub. DR271, p. 3) 
A question remains, however, as to whether the requirements have caused more 
work and delay than is warranted. The Victorian Government noted: 
There are about 150 permit triggers in planning schemes resulting in some confusion in 
the identification of the appropriate triggers. Many planning permit requirements in 
schemes exist where there is little nexus between the matter being controlled and the 
achievement of a planning outcome. (DSE 2003b, p. 5) 
The implication is that there is likely to be scope to streamline or rationalise 
processes in ways that reduce transaction costs and delays without compromising 
legitimate environmental or heritage goals. 
Objection and appeal processes 
Due process requires that planning approval procedures provide scope for those 
adversely affected by a decision to object or appeal. How extensive or accessible 
those provisions should be is subjective, and involves balancing the interests of     




potential new residents against the interests of incumbents, and sometimes the wider 
community. 
Those representing applicants have been most vocal on these matters in this inquiry. 
They have argued that the scope for residents to block new development is 
excessive, causing significant delays and costs. For example, the UDIA (Victoria) 
(sub.  121, p.  15) claimed that the objection process is often ‘frustrating and 
time-consuming’, noting among other things that: 
•  objecting is free of charge and easy; and 
•  the basis for objection is often poorly informed. 
The Victorian Government has observed that its planning legislation gives wide 
discretion to local councils in deciding whether or when ‘material detriment’ may 
be caused, and that ‘there has been a tendency for councils to extensively notify 
almost all applications’ (DSE 2003b, p. 17). In the context of increased ‘activism’ 
by residents in protecting their perceived rights, this has resulted in one-third of 
applications in the metropolitan area receiving objections. 
Data for NSW and Victoria show a rise in the number of appeals since 1994 (see 
figure 6.7). In Victoria, 6 per cent of all permit applications were appealed to VCAT 
in 2002. The rise in Victoria is from a higher base, but the number of dwelling 
approvals has also risen strongly in Victoria since 1994 (see figure 6.4), such that 
the growth in appeals has been broadly in line with the increase in building activity.  
In NSW, the number of appeals has grown from a lower base (see figure  6.4). 
However, unlike Victoria, the number of dwelling approvals has not grown, 
suggesting that there may have been an increase in the incidence of appeals. This 
may reflect the higher proportion of development activity occurring within 
established areas in NSW, which is where disputes are more common. Even so, the 
proportion of approvals appealed is lower in NSW than in Victoria. 
Complaints have been made that the appeals mechanism has been increasingly used 
to resolve planning issues that should be resolved by planning staff and approved by 
councils. The RAIA noted that there are examples where some architects requested 
that a planning application be lodged for approval with the expectation that, after 
waiting until the statutory processing period had expired, the planning application 
could be determined via appeal rather than having to face the process of dealing 
with a local council. The use of the appeals process in this fashion was 
acknowledged by the NSW Department of Local Government: 
Councils at times are reluctant to take responsibility for the determination of some 
matters at the local level due to their being contentious and subject to political,     




factional, environmental or community pressures. Accordingly, councils abrogate their 
responsibilities and allow the court to make decisions. (LECWP 2001, p. 21) 
Utilisation of court processes can be costly. The UDIA (Victoria) (sub. 121) noted 
that the time taken typically ranges from three to six months. Hence, it is important 
that legal remedies apply only as a last resort and not, for example, to circumvent 
blockages in the approval process. More broadly, it is also important that the 
appeals process provides for an appropriate balance between due process and the 
cost of delays. Some possible avenues for achieving a better balance are set out 
below. 
Figure 6.7  Trends in development appeals, NSW and Victoria 
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Data sources: LEC (NSW) 1996-2002; VCAT, Victoria, pers. comm., 10 October 2003.     





In discussions with the Commission, some industry representatives raised more 
fundamental questions as to whether current decision-making processes met the 
tests of good governance. Of particular concern was political interference in the 
approvals process. For example, Yarrum Equities contended: 
Local government elections are now a battleground for votes between major political 
parties and political pressure groups. Strategic power plays add costs to development as 
councillors are obliged to demonstrate public support for the interests of their 
constituent power base, often against the interest of, and benefit to, the wider electorate. 
(sub. DR251, p. 12) 
It was alleged that councillors frequently intervened in development application 
processes in response to lobbying from local residents and that this is leading to 
poor decisions. 
The involvement of councillors in planning policy and administration is provided 
for under legislation in most states. As Spiller observed: 
This opens up multiple opportunities for development capital to influence outcomes 
through forceful lobbying. And it also opens up multiple opportunities for sectional 
interests in local communities to stymie socially useful investment … In the meantime, 
life becomes very difficult for planners in development assessment. They are often the 
meat in the sandwich. (Spiller 2004, p. 2) 
Ideally, political representatives who devise rules should stand back from their 
application in particular cases, leaving others to assess those cases against clear 
criteria, which have been developed through public consultation.  
In practice, however, it will often prove impossible to codify policy in terms that 
eliminate all ambiguity about what development is acceptable. This is especially so 
in situations where performance standards are used to overcome some of the 
rigidities of highly prescriptive regulation. As the PIA observed: 
Discretion often needs to be exercised in terms of such matters as streetscape 
continuity, urban design, impact on social networks and infrastructure and cultural 
implications. (sub. DR271, p. 3) 
The Local Government Association and Shires Association of NSW (sub. DR323) 
argued that councillors already determine staff delegations appropriate to local 
circumstances under statute and, as the community’s elected representatives, need 
to ‘retain control’ of the planning process. The Associations argued, based on the 
recent survey cited above, that in reality only a small proportion (4 per cent) of 
development applications are determined by councillors, but that because these tend 
to be the most complex and controversial, they attract disproportionate attention.     




Nonetheless, the PIA, while recognising the policy importance of planning 
decisions, considered that they are: 
... more likely to be delivered consistently and impartially under delegation by 
professional planners, or panels which include professional planners and elected 
members, such as in the South Australian DAP [Development Assessment Panel] 
model. (sub. DR271, pp. 3-4) 
The Commission accepts that some involvement of elected members in planning 
decisions is appropriate in some circumstances. However, there are still the issues 
of whether more effective separation can be achieved, and whether additional 
measures are required to ensure transparency and accountability of all decision 
making (see below). 
Towards better processes 
The Commission’s brief review of the evidence and issues raised thus far, suggests 
that while the extent of any unwarranted increase in delays is unclear, there is likely 
to be scope to improve decision-making processes in ways that would enhance 
efficiency while maintaining the protections of due process.  
Governments themselves have recognised the need to do better and some have 
already initiated useful reforms (see box 6.5). 
Moreover, as the Australian Local Government Association noted, most states and 
territories are currently undertaking reviews of their planning systems and/or 
development assessment processes ‘to improve their transparency and efficiency’ 
(DR307, p.  11). These reviews include the NSW Regulation Review — Local 
Development Taskforce, the Victorian review ‘Better Decisions Faster’, the SA 
Development Assessment Panel and, at a national level, the work of the 
Development Assessment Forum (DAF) — comprising representatives of 
Australian, state, territory and local governments; the development industry and 
related professional associations. 
The NSW Regulation Review–Local Development Taskforce (see box 6.6) and the 
DAF (see box 6.7) are concerned with assessment activity, appeals mechanisms and 
governance issues. ‘Better Decisions Faster’ (see box 6.8) is focussed mainly on the 
processing of applications. 
The combination of state-based reviews and the work of the DAF at a national level 
provides an important opportunity for informed debate and assessment of 
potentially useful reforms. As noted, these reviews are better placed than this 
broader national inquiry to assess in detail problems in different jurisdictions and to     




develop specific options for addressing them. Nevertheless, in the Commission’s 
view, the following four areas deserve close attention as the proposals and direction 
for reform identified in such reviews are carried forward. 
 
Box 6.5  Examples of reforms to planning approvals 
•  Prelodgement certification — Initiatives in this area have been aimed at speeding up 
the approval process through the formalisation of the prelodgement stage. For 
example, in Victoria, procedures have been developed aimed at ensuring that 
applicants submit applications that meet the information requirements of the 
approval process. 
•  Fast-tracking approvals — There have been various changes made to speed up the 
approval process on major projects. However, this may involve some diminution of 
the rights of third parties to object to planning decisions. For example, the SA 
Minister can define a development as a ‘major development’ (development of major 
social, economic or environmental significance) in which rights such as merit 
appeals, judicial review and civil enforcement are removed. 
•  Integrated approvals process — The intention is to reduce the number of agencies 
that applicants have to deal with to gain approval. For example, the NSW 
Government has introduced a single point of contact for developers to obtain the 
separate applications required by different referral or approval bodies. 
•  Outsourcing assessments — A number of councils, including Leichhardt, Woollahra 
and North Sydney, have trialled private sector involvement in planning approval 
assessments on a fee-for-service basis in order to speed up the process and 
overcome skill shortages. 
•  Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms — Such changes have mainly been 
aimed at reducing the number and duration of appeals by resolving disputes early in 
the planning approval process (usually the prelodgement stage). Examples include 
the Independent Hearing and Assessment Panel (Liverpool City Council 1997, 
Fairfield City Council 1999) and the introduction of facilitation committees (Gosford 
City Council). 
•  Speeding up court hearings — Before an appeal proceeds to a hearing in the SA 
Environment, Resources and Development Court it is referred to a compulsory 
conference. The conference, which is generally chaired by a Commissioner of the 
Court, provides an opportunity for all parties involved to express their views and 
resolve differences in relation to the development proposal without the need to 
invoke formal court proceedings. In 2003, around 47 per cent of applicant appeals 
were resolved by compulsory conference, compared with 35 per cent in 2000. 
 
 
     





State and local governments need to give priority to the scope to: 
•  achieve greater separation of policy making and administration; 
•  streamline permit approval processes to enable minor or uncontentious 
developments to by-pass unnecessary informational or consultative 
requirements;  
•  improve or expand ‘as of right’ development provisions, without detracting 
unduly from the property rights of existing residents; and 
•  reduce delays in appeals while maintaining the protections of due process. 
 
Box 6.6  Local development assessment review in NSW 
In October 2003, the Regulation Review–Local Development Taskforce reported the 
outcome of its review into the local development approval process, making over 
60  recommendations to improve the speed and quality of those processes. These 
included: 
•  Creating a common set of standards for streetscapes, setbacks, open spaces, 
privacy and sunlight protection, with the aim of removing up to 70 per cent of 
development applications for single houses, alterations and carports from the 
coverage of councils’ development assessment. 
•  Establishing mechanisms that speed up approvals for the majority of houses with a 
safety net process to deal with the more complicated proposals. 
•  Establishing  best practice guidelines for councils to write clear standards and 
development policy that make it easier to prepare, review and assess development 
applications. 
•  Reforming governance to achieve better strategic planning and policy making by 
councillors, reducing the level of councillor involvement in development application 
assessment and providing greater opportunities for independent decision making by 
technical experts. 
•  Improving the certification process by removing council responsibility to audit 
certification, clarifying the roles and responsibilities of certifiers and achieving more 
stringent levels of government accreditation, auditing and regulation. 
•  Allowing fast tracking of development approvals for a fee. 
Source: DPNIR (2003b). 
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Box 6.7  The Development Assessment Forum’s ‘leading practices’ 
1  Separation of roles 
It is recommended that elected politicians take responsibility for the development of 
planning policies and that independent bodies (such as panels) be responsible for 
assessing applications against these policies. 
2  Technically excellent assessment criteria 
The community values and policy objectives set by governments should be codified as 
objective tests and rules. 
3  A single point of assessment 
Decisions on development applications, based on technically excellent criteria are best 
integrated by a single entity. Relevant government agencies, with a defined statutory 
role, will also provide their advice. However, this advice must conform to technically 
excellent assessment criteria. 
4  Independent and expert assessment 
It is proposed that panels be established at local or regional level to assess projects 
not determined by professional staff, and to review staff decisions. It is anticipated 
Ministers may wish to retain call-in powers based on criteria prescribed by statute. 
5  Appeals as a second assessment 
Discretionary decisions should be reviewable. In a merit appeal, applications should be 
assessed against exactly the same criteria by a more senior independent expert body. 
6  Defined third party involvement 
Under the proposed model, a development assessment is made against technical 
criteria that enshrine policy developed after community consultation. Unless an error in 
administration occurs, third parties are encouraged to advocate change to the policy 
driven criteria. 
7  Private sector involvement 
In specified circumstances it is recommended that private sector experts provide 
advice that attests to compliance with technically excellent criteria. In most cases, this 
advice would be considered by the assessing authority (whether government officer, 
panel or commission). 
8  Stream assessment into tracks 
Early in the development assessment cycle, a project application should be streamed 
into a specific assessment track. Each track comprises a specific set of 
decision-making steps relevant to the project’s complexity and impact on the built and 
natural environments. 
9 Built-in  improvement  mechanisms 
Formal feedback loops with the development assessment are proposed. This approach 
would incorporate lessons learned by key stakeholders into overall planning policy, 
technical assessment criteria and the operation of the development assessment 
system. 
Source: DAF (2004). 
 
     





Box 6.8  ‘Better Decisions Faster’: Victoria’s planning system review 
The objective of the Victorian review is to produce ‘substantial improvements to the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the ‘process’ component of the planning system’, 
including in timeliness and decision making, reducing unnecessary complexity and 
informational requirements, and clarifying roles and responsibilities. 
A recent discussion paper sets out a range of options relating to each stage of the 
permit process, including: 
•  encouraging external prelodgement certification; 
•  imposing time limits on requests for further information; 
•  imposing administration fees on objectors; 
•  increasing ‘deemed to comply’ provisions; 
•  extending self-assessment opportunities; 
•  streamlining the permit process; 
•  providing guidelines to help inform VCAT reviews; and 
•  undertaking regular process auditing. 
Source: DSE (2003b). 
 
 
As responses from participants to the Discussion Draft illustrate, there are no single 
or uncontentious solutions in any of these areas. In each of them, a core issue is the 
extent to which clear rules, with broad community support, can be established. 
Some have argued that lack of clarity in assessment criteria has been a major cause 
of dispute, as well as being a constraint on greater delegation or self-assessment. 
In the Commission’s view, it is critical that the clarity issue be addressed, as 
recognised in the DAF’s ‘leading practices’ (box 6.7). That said, it is inevitable that 
subjective criteria and scope for discretion will be needed in some areas. Indeed, 
excessive prescription in the pursuit of objective standards would bring its own 
costs.  
To the extent that necessary judgments cannot all be technical in nature, a role for 
councillors seems inevitable. However, as noted by the PIA, this could be 
accommodated in ways that provided more formal separation than currently exists, 
such as through ongoing (minority) participation of councillors in expert assessment 
panels (South Australia’s Development Assessment Panel model) and/or the 
development of strict guidelines for circumstances in which councils can review 
delegated assessments. Such structures could in themselves encourage councils to 
place more emphasis on developing sound assessment criteria. Similar requirements 
should also apply to ministerial call-in powers.     




The extent to which processes can be streamlined, or include ‘as of right’ provisions 
(as in DAF’s six ‘assessment tracks’) is especially contingent on having clear and 
accepted rules. Local government associations noted that some initiatives had 
already been made in these areas, but raised concerns about how beneficial they 
have been (for example, in areas such as private certification). Also, ‘as of right’ 
provisions are likely to be more readily applicable to single dwelling than multi-unit 
construction, and for houses in new subdivisions at the fringe than for 
redevelopment projects in established areas. 
Under the DAF proposal, third parties are encouraged to advocate change to the 
criteria by denying them a right of appeal. Although third-party appeals may be a 
source of delay and frustration to those seeking approval, in the Commission’s 
view, ruling out third party appeals would seem to place too high an expectation on 
achieving clarity and objectivity in the rules.  
There would seem to be scope to reduce costly appeals through procedures such as 
compulsory conferences and mediation, or the provision of second ‘expert’ 
assessments prior to any access to courts or tribunals. Such ‘low level’ appeal 
mechanisms appear promising as a way forward in what will always be a difficult 
and contentious area. 
Concluding remarks 
In the Commission’s judgment, given the small size of net additions to housing in 
any year relative to the size of the stock, improvements to land release or planning 
approval procedures, while desirable, could not have greatly alleviated the price 
pressures of the past few years. Nonetheless, removing unnecessary impediments on 
the supply side is clearly important to affordability in the long run, particularly in 
the context of the focus on planning to contain ‘urban sprawl’. A question remains 
though as to the feasibility and desirability of achieving urban consolidation on the 
scale contemplated in the current planning of some governments. 
In an area as complex and contentious as land-use planning and development, there 
will inevitably be an element of ‘experiment’ in any initiatives adopted to improve 
regulatory processes. This underlines the importance of not only subjecting new 
proposals to adequate testing and scrutiny, but also conducting periodic reviews to 
assess the performance of those that are implemented. It also cautions against 
seeking to impose uniform national approaches before likely outcomes have been 
properly assessed. This in turn highlights the importance of having mechanisms to 
enable best practice to be communicated across jurisdictions on an ongoing basis.     




7  Are infrastructure charges excessive? 
Findings 
•  While infrastructure charges, like other costs of bringing housing to the market, have 
increased over time, they cannot explain the surge in house prices since the 
mid-1990s. 
•  The claimed cost savings and improvements in affordability from reducing reliance 
on developer charges for infrastructure appear overstated: 
–  Most categories of charges are both justified and desirable on efficiency/equity 
grounds. 
–  Housing affordability should not be significantly affected by greater reliance on 
upfront charging as opposed to charging over time. 
– Developer charges for those items of social or economic infrastructure that 
provide benefits in common across the wider community have generally been 
relatively small — though such infrastructure should desirably be funded out of 
general revenue sources. 
•  Even if the cost of providing infrastructure to new developments were shifted onto 
the wider community, housing affordability might not be greatly enhanced. 
•  Developer charges and contributions for infrastructure should be: 
–  necessary, with the need for the infrastructure concerned clearly demonstrated; 
–  efficient, justified on a whole-of-life cost basis; consistent with maintaining 
financial disciplines on service providers by precluding over-recovery of costs; and
–  equitable, with a clear nexus between benefits and costs, and only implemented 
after industry and public input. 
•  Those imposing developer contributions and charges should: 
– follow guidelines based on these principles and be subject to independent 
regulatory scrutiny; 
–  provide for ‘out of sequence’ development if developers are prepared to meet the 
cost consequences; 
–  be open to proposals for alternative infrastructure arrangements that meet the 
needs of the households concerned; 
–  allow appeals on the amounts charged, or their coverage; and 
–  be accountable for how money raised from charges is spent. 
 
     




Australians today expect to have a range of basic urban services when they purchase 
a house. These include sewerage, drainage, water, electricity, roads, public transport 
and facilities such as parks and libraries — collectively described as infrastructure. 
Planning approvals for construction are not normally granted unless most of these 
services are available. 
Historically, some of this infrastructure was put in place only after new housing had 
been established. The infrastructure would be paid for either through general rates 
or tax revenue, or by charging the households in certain districts a special rating 
levy to cover the costs of the infrastructure installed for their benefit — for 
example, sewerage, curbing and guttering. The initial capital outlays would be paid 
for out of capital works funding or borrowings, or from infrastructure utilities’ 
retained earnings. 
For at least the last 20 years, however, the trend has been to install infrastructure 
from the outset, with more of the initial funding burden shifted onto developers 
through upfront charges. Developers have in turn sought to pass the charges on in 
higher prices for serviced lots and house and land packages. These changes have 
been driven by a combination of demands from households for earlier access to 
‘necessary’ infrastructure and constraints on government finances that have led to 
pressure to reduce outlays on housing-related infrastructure. 
The shift in infrastructure charging has always been contentious, in part because of 
concerns about the implications for housing affordability — as well as efficiency 
and equity — and no doubt in part because of developers’ concerns about the 
implications for housing demand and their returns. 
In this inquiry, concerns have been raised about infrastructure financing, the 
expanding coverage of cost recovery, the time over which costs are recovered, and 
the structure of the charges. 
The Housing Industry Association (HIA), the Property Council of Australia (PCA) 
and others claim that infrastructure charges are too high and that they are being 
levied on an inappropriate basis. They have highlighted the potential to reduce 
charges, or at least reallocate the infrastructure cost burden away from new 
development and onto a broader group of ratepayers. For example, the HIA has 
suggested that such changes could reduce the costs for a typical new house and land 
package in a Sydney greenfield development by about $30 000 plus tax (sub. 177, 
p. 97).  
These contentions arise against the backdrop of moves by governments to constrain 
the outward expansion of cities, partly as a result of rising infrastructure costs at the 
urban fringe (chapter 6). This raises a potential dilemma for the industry, as the     




move to developer charges has arguably enabled more rapid development at the 
fringe than had infrastructure supply been dependent on borrowing by government 
agencies. Moreover, as the HIA’s submission (sub.  177) has acknowledged, a 
properly constituted ‘user pays’ system promotes efficient location decisions by 
home buyers, reducing the need for regulatory constraints directed at the same 
objective. 
Taking account of these perspectives, the Commission has focused on three key 
issues central to the efficient and equitable provision of, and charging for, 
housing-related infrastructure: 
•  Who should pay for what quality and quantity of infrastructure? 
•  When should they pay?  
•  What are the implications for house prices and affordability? 
The scope for the Commission to go beyond these key high level issues and to 
assess actual practice has been constrained by time, the limited information 
available, and diversity of practice across jurisdictions. Nonetheless, this high level 
assessment has helped to identify some deficiencies in current practices and 
potential ways to improve on outcomes. 
7.1  Types of infrastructure and magnitude of costs 
There are two main types of infrastructure — economic and social — for which 
developers can incur charges:  
•  economic infrastructure provides services such as water, sewerage, drainage, 
electricity, gas, telecommunications, public transport and roads; and 
•  social (or community) infrastructure is used to provide a range of community 
and recreational services; for example, libraries, community centres, sports 
grounds and parks.  
It is useful to separate economic infrastructure into two further categories — 
‘major’ and ‘basic’. These categories are distinguished by the extent to which the 
infrastructure can serve other developments, with ‘major’ infrastructure generally 
servicing a number of subdivisions and ‘basic’ infrastructure mainly providing 
services to a particular subdivision (see box 7.1). Major infrastructure is generally, 
but not always, ‘external’ to a development. Basic infrastructure is located ‘on-site’ 
within a development.     





Box 7.1  Types of infrastructure 
•  Economic infrastructure — traditional infrastructure such as water, sewerage, 
drainage, electricity, gas, telecommunications, public transport and roads. 
–  Major (shared) economic infrastructure — infrastructure that services a number 
of land subdivisions. Examples include trunk water, sewerage and drainage, gas, 
electricity and telecommunications, urban rail services, major roads and airports. 
–  Basic economic infrastructure — infrastructure within a subdivision, in most 
cases connecting each lot to major infrastructure, (for example, roads, water, 
sewerage, gas and electricity connections). Basic infrastructure is sometimes 
referred to as private infrastructure, because the benefits accrue overwhelmingly 
to the residents of the particular subdivision. 
•  Social (or community) infrastructure — infrastructure used in the provision of 
community services. It can primarily be for the use of residents within a subdivision 
(for example, parks), or it can service a whole range of subdivisions (for example, a 
library or a sports ground). 
 
 
Government and private utilities are normally responsible for providing major 
economic infrastructure services. The infrastructure concerned may be constructed 
by the council or utility, or alternatively by the developer, who must hand it back as 
a ‘contributed’ asset. With the exception of main roads departments and public 
transport authorities, government utilities are now expected to operate commercially 
and recover their costs. 
Basic economic infrastructure is generally constructed by the developer and handed 
over to the relevant authority as a contributed asset. (In some small developments, 
the developer will make a contribution to the local council and utilities as 
reimbursement for infrastructure to be provided). Where developers construct the 
infrastructure, they need to meet standards set by the relevant utility or authority. 
Social infrastructure is often provided outside the area of a development. It is 
sometimes provided by a developer directly, but more often through payments to 
the local council. If it is to be provided within a development, the developer can be 
required to donate the land needed for it (for example, for a park). 
As noted in chapter  6, there is a link between government land release and 
infrastructure provision. When land is zoned for residential development, it creates 
the expectation that major infrastructure will be provided to allow the land to be 
serviced. The lead times required for infrastructure planning and provision at the 
extremities of the urban fringe are considerably longer than for servicing infill lots 
when the major infrastructure is already in place or available nearby.     




What is the magnitude of the charges? 
The costs of infrastructure provision are substantial.  For example, in 2002-03, 
capital expenditure on new water, sewerage and drainage infrastructure in Sydney 
alone amounted to around $185 million, of which $165 million was contributed by 
developers. It can cost $3  million per  lane kilometre to replace roads and 
$14 million per kilometre to replace double track rail. Water and sewerage pipelines 
can cost about $300 per metre. 
The level of infrastructure charges and contributions varies among jurisdictions. It 
is generally acknowledged that the imposts in Sydney are more extensive and 
typically higher than in other cities. However, getting comparable information is 
difficult.  
For illustrative purposes, the Commission obtained data for two municipalities — 
Penrith in Sydney and Wyndham in Melbourne (see table 7.1). The Commission’s 
case studies suggest that differences between Sydney and Melbourne in the total 
cost of a house and land package mainly relate to the non-dwelling components. 
Land acquisition, infrastructure charges and fees are all higher in Penrith than in 
Wyndham, supporting claims that land-related costs account for a relatively high 
proportion of housing costs in Sydney. (The tax and margins components are also 
higher in Sydney; however, this is in mainly a result of the higher cost base.) 
In regard to infrastructure, the case studies: 
•  confirm that infrastructure costs are a substantial component of development and 
construction costs; 
•  show that charges for both economic and social infrastructure are substantially 
higher in Penrith than in Wyndham — this is partly because the value of land 
contributed for open space and roads is twice as high in Penrith; and 
•  support the contention that infrastructure costs generally make up a higher 
proportion of the total cost of a house and land package in Sydney (15 per cent 
in Penrith) than in Melbourne (11 per cent in Wyndham) — though this appears 
to be attributable to contributions for major infrastructure not being required for 
the Wyndham site, which is not necessarily typical of greenfield areas. 
However, given variations in infrastructure charges within cities, it is difficult to 
draw strong conclusions about differences between Sydney and Melbourne from 
individual case studies. For example, case study data supplied by the HIA, 
comprising averages for developments in four of Sydney’s fringe suburbs, indicate 
significantly lower overall infrastructure charges (excluding the $15 000 transport 
levy) than in Penrith with lower total charges for economic infrastructure 
outweighing higher charges for social infrastructure (see table 7.2).      




Table 7.1  Case studies of developer charges and other costs, Sydney 
(Penrith) and Melbourne (Wyndham), 2003 
Cost Penrith   Wyndham
  (dollars) (per cent)   (dollars)  (per cent)
Landa  92 522 21.5   42 436  14.6
Economic infrastructure chargesb  61 818 14.3   31 482  10.8
Social infrastructure chargesc  2 737 0.6   450  0.2
Planning and building fees  4 820 1.1   1 073  0.4
Dwellingsd  155 500 36.1   139 000  47.7
Marginse  60 916 14.1   45 964  15.8
Taxf  52 762 12.2   30 942  10.6
Total  431 076 100.0   291 347  100.0
a This item comprises various land acquisition costs, including raw land purchase — $62 745 per lot in Penrith 
and $29 598 per lot in Wyndham. b Economic infrastructure charges in Penrith comprise roads, drainage, 
water, sewerage, electricity and telecommunications (including $6000 for major infrastructure). It also includes 
that portion of the section 94 contributions in NSW applying to economic infrastructure. For Wyndham, the 
charges cover similar items of economic infrastructure, excluding telecommunications and major 
infrastructure. c Social infrastructure costs for Penrith include that portion of section 94 charges that relate to 
community infrastructure. Social infrastructure for Wyndham is funded by the Community Infrastructure Levy 
applicable in Victoria ─ previously capped at $450. d Assumed dwelling size is 220  square metres. 
e Estimated developer plus builder margins. The developer margin used for Penrith is a gross margin ex GST 
of 16 per cent of the expected selling price of land. The builder margin for Penrith was based on 15 per cent of 
the value of the dwelling package. The developer margin used for Wyndham is a gross margin ex GST of 
17 per cent of the expected selling price of land. The builder margin for Wyndham was based on 20 per cent 
of the value of the dwelling. f Tax, includes GST, state land tax and stamp duty. 
Sources: Estimates based on HIA (2003); Penrith City Council; Wyndham City Council; Henley Properties 
Group, Victoria, pers. comm., 3 December 2003. 
Charges for what the HIA has termed ‘social’ infrastructure have been of special 
concern to industry, particularly in Sydney. However, the HIA case study and 
(especially) the Commission’s case study for Penrith indicate that, as commonly 
defined, social infrastructure charges still comprise a relatively small proportion of 
total developer charges. In responding to the same conclusions in the Discussion 
Draft, the HIA clarified that its definition of social (or ‘community’) infrastructure 
also included major or shared economic infrastructure. But even charges for this 
infrastructure seem to be dominated by charges for infrastructure specific to 
individual developments. In the Commission’s Penrith case study, they amount to 
less than $9000 out of total developer charges of nearly $65  000, or only 
two per cent of the house price. In the HIA case study, such charges (excluding the 
$15 000 transport levy in two of the four development areas) amount to $14 092 out 
of $35 917 in total developer charges. 
There is limited information on how infrastructure charges have moved over time. 
A recent report by ACIL Consulting (2002) indicates that in those parts of 
Melbourne where detailed data are available, charges rose by around 40 per cent in 
real terms over the period 1992 to 2002. However, ACIL went on to estimate that,     




as a proportion of the net selling price of a construction-ready lot, the value of these 
charges fell from to 25 to 15 per cent. Indeed, ACIL estimates that over this same 
ten-year period, government taxes and charges (including those for economic and 
social infrastructure) fell in all the areas surveyed except in Adelaide and Brisbane. 
Table 7.2  HIA case study of infrastructure charges for a pooled set of 
greenfield developments in Sydney 
Infrastructure type  Dollars
Basic infrastructure  21 825
Local drainage  600
Local roads  2 900
Local open space  7 000
Utilities  11 325
Major infrastructurea  7 355
Trunk drainage  2 800
Main roads  2 700
Urban design and landscaping  1 855
Social infrastructure  6 737
District open space  1 800
Regional open space  440
Open space embellishment  2 170
Local community facilities  2 327
Total  35 917
Note. Includes developments in Blacktown, Baulkham Hills, Liverpool and Pittwater (for Warriewood). a  Major 
infrastructure charges do not include the $15  000 public transport levy, which only applied to case study 
developments in Blacktown and Baulkham Hills. 
Source: HIA (sub. DR260, p. 30); HIA, Canberra, pers. comm., 27 February 2004; HIA, Sydney, pers. comm., 
24 March 2004. 
Notwithstanding this evidence, developers have been concerned about increasing 
charges, particularly in relation to section 94 levies in NSW. For example, the HIA 
(sub. DR260) reported that one Sydney council (Liverpool) has adopted a section 94 
plan that allows a levy of $51  224 for lots greater than 450 square metres and 
$46 447 for smaller lots, including around $14 000 for social infrastructure. 
Section 94 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 enables NSW 
councils to require developers to improve infrastructure services where a 
development increases the demand for such services (see box  7.2). Councils 
implement this by making the granting of a development consent conditional upon 
the developer contributing land free of cost, making a monetary contribution, or 
both.     





Box 7.2  NSW section 94 levies 
Section 94 of the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 empowers 
local councils to levy developers for services and amenities rendered necessary as a 
consequence of development. This may be for the provision of new facilities in a new 
area, or for the expansion of existing facilities to meet the service needs generated by 
further development. 
Under the Act, councils can require from developers the dedication of land free of cost, 
the payment of a monetary contribution, or both. The levies thus imposed are generally 
known as ‘developer contributions’ and are imposed through development consent. 
Councils are required to prepare a Development Contribution Plan (DCP). The purpose 
of a DCP is to provide public accountability in a document covering the council’s policy 
for the assessment, collection, administration and spending of contributions.  
Section  94 of the Act contains a number of principles for levying development 
contributions, and the Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources 
has produced a guidelines manual to give substance to these principles. The key 
principles relevant in the decision to prepare a DCP include: 
•  Nexus between the expected types of development in the area and the demand for 
additional public facilities created by those developments. 
•  Reasonableness in terms of the manner of provision, amount of contribution and 
timing of provision. The courts have suggested that three to five years is a 
reasonable time to hold contributions. 
•  Recoupment of costs for facilities already provided in anticipation of future 
development. 
•  Assessment of a contribution having regard to any previous contributions (monetary 
and land dedication). 
A DCP has to be in place before a contribution may be required. 
Source: NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. 
 
 
Section 94 contributions can be levied for both economic and social infrastructure. 
For example, the contributions in Penrith have been used to fund road and traffic 
management, trunk drainage, recreation facilities and a town centre. 
Criticism of such ‘community’ infrastructure charges has been heightened by the 
recent introduction of the additional public transport levy — equivalent to $15 000 
per lot — in four Sydney localities (see box 7.3). The fear is that such charges, 
additional to section 94 levies, will be introduced more widely.     





Box 7.3  The NSW Transport Levy 
The NSW Government has announced a hypothecated transport levy of 
$15 000 per lot in four new development areas. The Government has justified the levy 
on the basis that it would extract what otherwise would be windfall gains to existing 
owners of raw land from extension of the urban rail system. 
The extent of any ensuing increases in property prices will depend on proximity to the 
rail extension; the degree to which the charge matches the value of the benefit 
provided (see text below); and, if there is a gap in this regard such that the levy 
contains a ‘tax’ element, the relative price responsiveness of supply and demand for 
land/housing (box  5.2). Any increase in property values is likely for both new 
developments and existing properties in proximity to the new rail system, suggesting 
on equity grounds that the levy should be applied to both. Yet it is only applied to new 
developments. 
Access Economics pointed out that this levy is an interim measure and concluded: 
The implicit tensions between the financing of new public transport and the ultimate 
beneficiaries, as well as the fact that enhanced user charging regimes are currently only 
available to the State Government through differential ticket prices, suggests that this area is 
ideally suited to a fundamental review. (sub. 177, p. 45) 
However, it is not clear that such a review would provide definitive answers to the 
issues raised by public transport contributions, given the complexities and tradeoffs 
involved in this area, and the consequent need for judgments. At the very least, this 
levy illustrates the need for transparency in infrastructure charging arrangements, 
underpinned by some clearly enunciated principles (section 7.2). 
 
 
Both the HIA and PCA also raised concerns about the amount of unspent section 94 
contributions. Councils are entitled to retain developer charge revenue for a 
‘reasonable’ period of time, which the courts have interpreted as three to five years 
(see box 7.2). However, no evidence was provided to the Commission on whether 
the holding of contributions for longer periods occurs to any significant extent.  
Are developer charges affecting affordability? 
The impact of developer charges on housing affordability has long been the subject 
of debate and was again so in this inquiry. The HIA (sub. 177), PCA (sub. 194) and 
other industry representatives argued that developer charges are passed on in full to 
home buyers through prices paid for serviced land and for house and land packages, 
thereby reducing affordability. However, in line with the position previously put by 
Abelson (1999), others claimed that these charges are largely passed back in the 
form of lower values for raw housing land and therefore have little impact on house 
prices.      




The incidence of developer charges 
Developer charges are a form of user pays charging, involving the upfront payment 
for infrastructure. Hence, though there are parallels with the analysis of the 
incidence of housing taxes (chapter 5), an important distinction is that a developer 
charge is used to pay for services that enhance the value of serviced land or a new 
home. In contrast, revenue raised from taxes on housing (such as a land tax) 
provides no specific benefit to home buyers. 
In general terms, this suggests that if the value to home buyers of infrastructure 
financed by a developer charge is more or less equal to that charge, then home 
buyers would willingly meet the higher cost in the price paid for serviced land or a 
house and land package. The implication is that such charges could, and would, be 
passed in full to the buyer. 
Conversely, if the perceived value of the infrastructure is less than the charge, then 
that charge will effectively incorporate a tax component. This component will be 
shared between buyers and the owners of raw land in line with the tax incidence 
analysis in chapter 5. In this case, the charge would not be passed on in full to the 
final buyer, and the price of raw housing land would fall somewhat. However, the 
various requirements now in place to ensure that there is a nexus between service 
provision and need, and that charges reflect the efficient costs of supply (see 
below), together suggest that any ‘tax’ component in developer charges is likely to 
be relatively small. 
The proposition that soundly-based developer charges should be passed on to home 
buyers need not be at odds with the view that a shift to upfront developer charging, 
which simultaneously involves the removal of subsidies on the infrastructure 
concerned, may see a significant element of ‘pass-back’ to the value of raw housing 
land. In line with the tax incidence analysis in chapter 5, where infrastructure has 
previously been provided to households below cost, the value of that subsidy will 
have been partly, or largely, capitalised into the price of housing land. It follows 
that the removal of those subsidies, as part of a shift to upfront developer charging, 
will see the value of undeveloped land fall. This in turn means that the cost of 
serviced land, and house and land packages, will rise by less than the full amount of 
the upfront developer charge. But such ‘pass-back’ of charges in this situation is 
clearly due to the unwinding of subsidies, rather than to the switch in the type of 
user payment to upfront charging.     




Impacts on affordability 
While the incidence effects of a move to upfront charging are complicated if there is 
a simultaneous removal of subsidies on the infrastructure concerned, the impacts on 
affordability are much clearer.  
In the case where all that is involved is a change from payment over time to 
payment upfront, the increase in the cost of serviced land or new homes to reflect a 
‘prepayment’ for infrastructure should, in principle, lead to a matching reduction in 
ongoing housing costs. That is, while a move to charging upfront will require 
households to take out larger mortgages, ongoing utility charges and council rates 
will be lower than otherwise. Households would be no worse off over time. 
Moreover, where the move to upfront developer charging involves the simultaneous 
removal of subsidies on infrastructure provision, higher charges for that 
infrastructure will be largely offset by a fall in the price of raw housing land. The 
corollary of this argument is that, even if more of the cost of providing 
infrastructure to new developments were shifted onto the wider community, housing 
affordability might not be greatly enhanced. That is, the price of land in new 
housing developments would rise, meaning that the gains from lower infrastructure 
costs would be largely captured by the owners of raw land or by developers. 
In summary, greater use of upfront developer charging is unlikely to have any 
substantial effect on housing affordability, irrespective of whether infrastructure 
was previously subsidised. However, as discussed below, depending on the 
borrowing criteria applied by lending institutions, it may make it somewhat more 
difficult for ‘marginal’ home buyers to enter the market. 
7.2 Principles  and  practice 
The preceding discussion illustrates that upfront charging in itself should not be of 
concern on either efficiency or affordability grounds. However, industry 
representatives claimed that a variety of other aspects of infrastructure charging 
policies are also of concern. These include: 
•  charges inappropriately imposed on individual developments, when they should 
be spread more widely; 
•  charges or standards for infrastructure provision that are excessive for their 
given purpose, sometimes because of ‘gold plating’ to minimise future 
maintenance costs for councils;     




•  residents of developments effectively paying twice for some items through both 
upfront charges and rates or ongoing charges (double charging); 
•  funds not being spent on the designated purpose; and 
•  lack of scope for, or excessive costs in, appealing against particular charges or 
requirements. 
Some key requirements 
In principle, there is a strong case on both fairness and efficiency grounds for the 
user or beneficiary of a good or service to pay for what they receive. A charge on 
users, if it reflects the true costs of supply, ensures that demand is not excessive and 
resources are not wasted. In the case of housing infrastructure, such linkage 
between the benefit received and the payment made is particularly important in 
helping to ensure that the level of investment in housing reflects its opportunity 
cost, and that efficient locational choices are made. 
Most infrastructure is ‘lumpy’, with high capital costs and relatively low running 
costs. Moreover, these fixed capital costs can vary across locations. Hence a critical 
policy issue is how best to apportion the fixed costs of infrastructure provision 
across users or beneficiaries so that charges: 
•  fully recover costs; and 
•  encourage a spatial pattern of housing development that reflects underlying 
costs. 
Allocating costs among users 
In general terms, the appropriate allocation of capital costs hinges on the extent to 
which a given piece of infrastructure provides services to those in a particular 
location or development, rather than across the community.  
For a ‘private’ capital item — such as the sewerage pipes that connect individual 
houses to collector and trunk lines — all the capital (and ongoing) costs should be 
borne by the households concerned. 
But for a ‘communal’ item of infrastructure, benefiting a wide group across the 
community — such as a major sewerage treatment plant — some form of 
mechanism for allocating costs across dispersed beneficiaries is required. The 
simplest option, for example, is that all beneficiaries contribute equally towards the 
capital costs.      




Self evidently, the dispersion of benefits across the community will vary 
considerably for individual items of infrastructure. Indeed, major utilities typically 
supply infrastructure that spans the spectrum from assets benefiting only households 
in particular developments to systems servicing large parts of major cities. Such 
diversity adds to the complexities of apportioning the costs in an efficient and 
equitable manner over time. Typically, tradeoffs will be required between 
efficiency, equity and administrative costs. 
Allocating costs over time 
For the reasons outlined above, if charges for infrastructure services are 
commensurate with the value of the service provided and are properly allocated, it 
should not in principle make any difference to affordability whether those charges 
are levied upfront or over time. Either way, the home owner will effectively pay for 
the services over time: through higher mortgage repayments, higher charges, rates 
or taxes.  
However, the distribution of benefits across users, and hence the way in which costs 
should be allocated, may impact on the timing of charges. For example, as 
discussed below, where the benefits are widely distributed across the community, 
cost recovery through council rates and/or regular payments for utility services may 
deliver more efficient and equitable outcomes than seeking to recover some costs 
through upfront charges.  
Moreover, there could be a difference for housing accessibility if lenders take no 
account of home buyers having larger disposable income in the future, and hence 
the capacity to repay a larger loan, when developer charges are levied upfront. As 
the HIA argued: 
There is no assurance that home lenders will increase automatically loan-to-valuation 
ratios or repayment capacity limits when new house prices are affected by increases in 
development charges. (sub. DR260, p. 22) 
Some lending institutions have now adopted lending rules which take greater 
account of households’ capacity to repay a loan from a given income (chapter 3). 
But it is not clear that under current arrangements, this would typically extend to 
making allowances for the effects of upfront payments for infrastructure on the 
income required to pay council rates and ongoing utility charges. 
Application of efficient and equitable charging practices 
Various means to facilitate efficient and equitable apportionment of costs are 
employed around Australia. For example, most utilities providing housing-related     




infrastructure are subject to regulatory controls on the charges they can levy on both 
developers and home owners (see below). Also, under Victorian legislation, local 
governments must prepare ‘Development Contribution Plans’ for the purpose of 
apportioning costs, based on common law principles of ‘need, nexus, equity and 
accountability’ (see box 7.4).  
 
Box 7.4  Established principles for development contributions 
Need — demonstrating that a development is likely to create a need. 
Nexus — demonstrating a connection between the need and the infrastructure 
provided. 
Equity — the amount charged must be a fair and reasonable apportionment of the 
cost.  
Accountability — revenues need to be spent on the infrastructure for which it was 
collected. 
Source: Victorian Government (sub. 85, p. 29). 
 
Although such general principles seem appropriate as far as they go, industry 
representatives expressed concerns about their application in practice. These mainly 
related to the interpretation of ‘nexus’, how existing residents are treated, whether 
standards of infrastructure are appropriate and costs are efficient, and whether it is 
appropriate for home buyers to pay upfront for some types of infrastructure.  
Such issues are best addressed separately for the three broad categories of 
infrastructure: basic, major and social. 
‘Basic’ economic infrastructure 
There is no dispute that home buyers should pay for the minor infrastructure works 
on their own properties or those linking their properties to local networks. There is 
also general agreement that the cost of such local infrastructure networks should be 
borne by residents of the developments concerned. The practice of developers 
constructing local roads, paving and guttering and hydraulic systems, and 
contributing these assets to local government, is of long standing.  
This charging practice clearly meets the tests of demonstrated need and nexus and, 
with the assets being predominantly used by or for the benefit of local residents, it is 
also equitable that they pay the full costs. Accountability is promoted when 
residents bear the costs of providing the assets. It is also more efficient and 
convenient to have such infrastructure installed when the land is being subdivided.     




Further, there are advantages in paying for these assets upfront. While councils and 
utilities have in the past funded such infrastructure and charged residents through 
hypothecated levies, with a proliferation of developments, the transactions costs of 
operating a levy regime could now be high. Moreover, as Access Economics has 
noted, this would involve councils and general ratepayers bearing the risk of a 
development not being successful (sub. 177). 
However, one potential problem with funding such infrastructure through developer 
contributions, is that councils and utilities could have both the incentive and the 
scope to insist on standards that are excessively high, either in relation to what 
home buyers want, or to the efficient costs of providing infrastructure over the 
whole life of the assets. Some participants suggested, for example, that councils 
might do this in order to reduce maintenance and replacement costs in the future, 
when assets are their responsibility. 
To the (possibly limited) extent that developers can pass on any excessive costs, 
housing affordability will be reduced. An onus on councils to justify standards on a 
whole-of-life costing basis would therefore be desirable.  
That said, the scope for councils to ‘gold plate’ their assets will tend to be reduced 
by competition between municipal areas to attract developments (or, for utilities, by 
regulation, where this applies). Moreover, some governments and independent 
regulators have or are in the process of issuing guidelines that provide developers 
with the opportunity to comment on infrastructure development plans. And some 
utilities allow developers to propose alterations to these plans. Such mechanisms 
will tend to be a further constraint on gold-plating behaviour. 
‘Major’ (shared) economic infrastructure 
The ‘beneficiary pays’ approach is not straightforward when applied to networked 
infrastructure investments that are both required for a particular development and 
shared with other developments. Specifically, the extent to which any investment 
will be used by those in the development relative to others has to be established.  
Even so, the Commission sees considerable merit in the use of upfront charging to 
finance major infrastructure where the incremental costs can be well established 
and, in particular, where such increments are likely to vary across developments 
(because of location and terrain). This suggests, for example, that the costs of trunk 
infrastructure provision, such as water mains or collector sewers, should be 
attributed in line with incremental costs. 
One advantage of upfront charges or developer contributions for this type of 
infrastructure is that they can potentially accommodate ‘out  of  sequence’     




development — where land is not developed contiguously along networks of major 
infrastructure. Out of sequence development can help to overcome constraints that 
adversely affect the responsiveness of housing supply, such as fragmented land 
holdings, thereby reducing price pressures arising from an increase in demand. If 
developers bear the holding costs of infrastructure that has been provided ahead of 
schedule, utilities should be indifferent about meeting the infrastructure 
requirements of this type of development. 
In this inquiry, the Commission has not been able to review in detail how charging 
decisions for major economic infrastructure have been made and implemented. 
However, while charges for major economic infrastructure can be significant in 
some cases — and appear to be becoming more important (for example, the $15 000 
NSW transport levy) — case study evidence cited above indicate that to date they 
have been dominated by basic infrastructure costs. (Indeed, in the Wyndham 
(Victoria) example, there were seemingly no charges imposed for major 
infrastructure). Moreover, the Commission’s examination of charging regimes for 
water supply, drainage and sewerage in Sydney and Melbourne revealed that most 
authorities are applying the principles in box 7.4. These arrangements have been 
established in consultation with developers and appear to have attained broad 
acceptance. 
That said, the Commission considers that investment to install, upgrade or augment 
system-wide components that provide comparable benefits to users in 
long-established areas, would in principle be better funded out of borrowings and 
recovered through rates or taxes (or the fixed element in periodic utility charges). 
This would include, for example, water supply headworks and major sewerage 
treatment plants.  
The PCA (sub. 194) argued that debt financing of capital costs should play a larger 
role generally, with repayments funded by the whole community through taxes or 
rates. The Commission would endorse this for infrastructure that provides benefits 
that are widely distributed across the community, provided that adequate disciplines 
exist for cost recovery and debt repayment over the life of the assets. 
The case for debt financing should not, however, hinge on the public sector’s lower 
borrowing costs, as the analysis undertaken by the Allen Consulting Group on 
behalf of the PCA seems to suggest. Public borrowing costs are lower largely 
because of the implicit government repayment guarantee, based on the taxing power 
of the state and the associated (involuntary) transfer of risk to taxpayers. If the 
argument about the public sector’s lower borrowing costs were taken to its logical 
extreme, governments would borrow on behalf of the community for all major 
assets. The well documented cost recovery and debt repayment problems that have 
characterised various major government-funded investments are a further caution on     




the extensive use of this financing approach. In any event, public utilities already 
have the option of borrowing to fund major infrastructure investments, and 
recovering the costs through user charges. 
It is of course important that whatever charging mechanisms are employed for 
major infrastructure, costs are not excessive and are apportioned on an appropriate 
basis. In general terms, this requirement is no different to the charging principles 
that should apply to basic infrastructure. However, a specific concern raised by the 
HIA and others is the scope that exists for new home buyers to pay twice for major 
infrastructure — once upfront through the pass-through of developer contributions, 
and again through general property rates or taxes, or regular payments made for 
utility services. 
Conversely, in its response to the Discussion Draft, the Municipal Association of 
Victoria (MAV) submitted that councils should be entitled to apply development 
contributions in new urban development and still charge the same general rates to 
all property owners in the municipality. In essence, the MAV argument is that rates, 
being a general revenue source equivalent to taxation, are not bound by the 
user-pays principles that apply to developer charges (sub. DR272, pp. 1-2). 
For the reasons outlined above, over-recovery of the capital costs of major 
infrastructure from developments subject to upfront developer charges will not 
necessarily increase proportionately the prices of the serviced land and the houses 
affected. As this would amount to a tax on those developments, much of its impact 
on house prices may be offset by falls in the value of the undeveloped land. 
Even so, the Commission does not accept that over-recovery is a legitimate practice. 
It would seemingly contravene standard equity principles, particularly if the 
proceeds are used to cross subsidise infrastructure provision to those living in 
established, more expensive areas. Moreover, as a non-transparent source of 
taxation revenue to local governments, it may undermine incentives for cost 
effective service delivery by them. 
Thus, it is not surprising that a variety of regulatory measures have been put in 
place to reduce the likelihood of double charging. For example, the Independent 
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal in NSW has developed guidelines on developer 
charges and also monitors usage charges levied by utilities (see box 7.5). These 
guidelines also require utilities to expose infrastructure development plans to public 
scrutiny.     





Box 7.5  Regulation of utilities’ developer charges in NSW 
In NSW, the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) regulates the 
maximum charge that the four water agencies under its jurisdiction can levy for water, 
sewerage and drainage services. This includes setting the maximum water and 
sewerage charges levied, and also more specialised charges such as developer 
charges. 
Rather than setting individual developer charges, IPART determines a methodology for 
fixing the maximum developer charges. 
Water agencies must advertise and exhibit a Development Servicing Plan (DSP) 
describing the area covered and assets used, and the basis on which the developer 
charge has been calculated. 
Once prepared, the agency is required to exhibit the DSP and invite public comment. 
A developer who is dissatisfied with how an agency has calculated a developer charge, 
may have the dispute arbitrated under section 31 of the Independent Pricing and 
Regulatory Tribunal Act 1992. 
Developers have argued that insufficient information has been made available to 
enable them to asses the appropriateness of the assets used to service a development 
and the basis on which the charge has been calculated. 
IPART responded to these criticisms in September 2000 by requiring revised 
publication processes for DSPs. In particular, IPART now requires a minimum 30 day 
exhibition period and more detailed and transparent exposition of the calculations 
involved. In addition, the agencies must inform the Urban Development Institute of 
Australia, the HIA, and any relevant developers and landowners of the start date of the 
exhibition period, at least ten working days beforehand. 
 
 
It is notable that some utilities seek to avoid over-recovery by having explicit regard 
to the element of subsequent cost recovery in determining periodic charges or rates. 
For example, Sydney Water and Yarra Valley Water in Melbourne subtract future 
contributions to capital (above recurrent costs) made through ongoing charges, from 
the capital costs of new infrastructure. And, some regulators exclude contributed 
assets from the regulatory asset base when determining ongoing charges 
(see box 7.6). 
In the Commission’s view, there would seem to be a good in-principle case for 
councils as well as utilities to have regard to the element of prospective capital cost 
recovery through (uniform) rates or other periodic charges when setting developer 
contributions. However, as developer contributions must be set in advance, this 
might not be straightforward. Similarly, the alternative approach of adjusting rates 
to reflect upfront contributions towards infrastructure costs by some households 
could also raise administrative problems.     





Box 7.6  Sydney developer charges for water, drainage and sewerage 
infrastructure 
In 2000, the NSW Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) reviewed the 
basis of setting developer charges for the provision, or upgrading, of water supply, 
sewerage and drainage facilities. The review was undertaken because of industry 
concerns about the application of the methodology used since 1996.  
Among other things, IPART determined that from 1 October 2000: 
•  In keeping with the general provisions applying in NSW (see box  7.5), Sydney 
Water must prepare a Development Servicing Plan (DSP) to a specified format and 
promulgation process. DSPs, and therefore developer charges, are to be reviewed 
every five years. 
•  The charges are set to recover the difference between the capital cost of an asset 
and the agency contribution (the net present value of the difference between 
operating revenue and operating cost). The contributions are only for assets that 
have a clear nexus with the development. They extend to headwork and sewerage 
plant, as well as trunk connections. 
•  Assets are valued using an optimal replacement cost methodology. 
•  The discount rate for assets commissioned after 1996 is to reflect the opportunity 
cost of capital (the weighted average cost of capital). A holding charge is to apply 
from 1996 for assets commissioned between 1970 and 1996. The amount to be 
recovered is to reflect the interest foregone on the capital tied up in the 
infrastructure between the date of commissioning and the date at which the charge 
is determined. 
•  The amount to be recovered through charges is to be apportioned among 
developments on a per hectare or Equivalent Tenement (ET) per development basis 
(a measure of the demand a development will place on the infrastructure). The 
charges per ET vary by location and reduce as land use density increases. The 
charges are discounted to deal with the staged release of blocks in large 
developments that span a number of years. 
•  Disputes over the application of the methodology should be resolved by the parties 
concerned. However, there are mechanisms under IPART’s legislation for resolution 
of disputes. 
Source: IPART, 2000. 
 
 
But in the Commission’s view, these difficulties do not validate the practice of 
double charging, or detract from the case for upfront charging where the benefits of 
investment in infrastructure can be attributed to a particular group of households 
rather than being spread widely across the community.  
The fact that some utilities are making adjustments to avoid double charging 
suggests that the problem is not insoluble and not a reason for abandoning otherwise     




efficient and equitable upfront charging. Indeed, adoption by councils of the general 
charging principles set out by the Commission in the final section of this chapter 
would make it incumbent on them to look for ways to make similar adjustments 
either to their developer contributions or rating regimes. 
‘Social’ infrastructure 
As noted, there has been an increasing tendency to fund social infrastructure 
through developer charges or contributions. This may include contributions towards 
sporting and recreational facilities (parks and open space), libraries and community 
centres.  
Such infrastructure may sometimes satisfy an identifiable demand related to a 
particular development (for example, a neighbourhood park or recreational facility 
used predominantly by local residents). In these cases, the costs should be allocated 
to that development, implying that upfront developer charges may be an appropriate 
financing mechanism. 
In most cases, however, the beneficiaries of the services are likely to be dispersed 
throughout the community. Reflecting this, such services were traditionally funded 
from general revenue sources drawn from the wider community. But charging 
practices have become more diverse. For example, Queensland legislation does not 
allow local governments to charge developers for social infrastructure; in Victoria 
charges have been capped at $450 per lot (although the Government has recently 
announced that this will be removed); and, as previously noted, in NSW, section 94 
provisions already give broad discretion to local governments to collect 
contributions for social infrastructure. 
Most of the concerns about upfront charging for social infrastructure have therefore 
focussed on NSW. However, debate has been clouded by the lack of precision in 
terminology noted previously, with the terms ‘community’ and ‘social’ 
infrastructure being used to encompass major economic infrastructure. That aside, it 
seems clear that in NSW, the ‘pure’ social component of developer charges has 
increased and some other states appear to be following suit.  
Various cost allocation mechanisms could be employed to set developer 
contributions for social infrastructure that provides broadly-based benefits to the 
community as a whole. In this regard, in responding to the Discussion Draft, the 
MAV (sub.  DR272) submitted that the Robins Review of the Development 
Contributions System in Victoria provides one such allocation mechanism (see 
box 7.7). This would require councils, as part of their strategic planning, to establish     




how much social infrastructure is required and how much of the benefit would 
accrue to each development; and then apportion charges accordingly. 
 
Box 7.7  The Robins Review’s proposal for apportioning social 
infrastructure costs 
The following eight step approach to apportioning the costs of social infrastructure with 
community-wide benefits has been proposed in the report of the Robins Review of the 
Development Contributions System in Victoria. 
Step 1 — Divide the municipality up into small 'analysis areas'. These can be Census 
Collectors Districts, or areas of similar size in districts where major development is 
expected. 
Step 2 — Make an inventory of existing development and project future development in 
each analysis area. All development which generates demand for infrastructure is to be 
included. 
Step 3 — Convert all existing and projected development into common 'Demand Units' 
using suitable equivalence ratios. A margin should be added to the Demand Units in 
each analysis area to allow for 'undefined' or non-standard land uses which might 
arise. 
Step 4 — Identify the infrastructure projects to be included in the developer 
contribution plan and document their justification. Projects must be essential to health, 
safety and well being or consistent with current community expectations of what is 
required to meet its health, safety and well being, and likely to be used by a broad 
cross section of the community. Project provision standards must not be ‘gold plated’. 
Step 5 — Identify the Main Catchment Area of each project and estimate the 
percentage of external usage. 
Step 6 — For each project in turn, calculate the Infrastructure Charge (IC), which 
should apply in its Main Catchment Area. 
IC for Project = (Project Cost – per cent of external use) / Total Demand Units 
Project Cost and Total Demand Units are to be expressed in present value terms to 
allow for cash flow effects. 
Step 7 — Add up the Infrastructure Charges applicable in each 'analysis area'. 
Step 8 — Aggregate the 'analysis areas' and their respective Charges into Planning 
Units. In aggregating 'analysis areas', care should be taken not to introduce excessive 
cross subsidy into any Planning Unit.  
Source: MAV (sub. DR272). 
 
 
Notwithstanding the desirability of at least using a systematic approach, the 
Commission’s view is that, for social infrastructure that provides broadly-based 
benefits to the community as a whole, accurate cost allocation will be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible. Hence, requiring developers to contribute upfront to     




finance the costs of providing such infrastructure will almost inevitably lead to 
inefficiencies and inequities. In some circumstances, general revenue may be the 
only realistic option for financing such services. Though where ‘exclusion’ from 
access to the service is possible — as in the case of a community swimming pool — 
direct user charges provide an alternative and more efficient means of recovering 
costs. 
7.3  Conclusions and policy implications 
Notwithstanding the complexity of this area, some general messages emerge from 
the preceding discussion: 
•  Infrastructure charges, like other costs of bringing housing to the market, have 
increased over time. But they cannot explain the surge in house prices since the 
mid-1990s. Indeed, the share of total house prices accounted for by 
infrastructure costs appears to have been declining in most Australian cities. 
•  The claimed cost savings and improvements in affordability from reducing 
reliance on developer charges for infrastructure appear overstated: 
–  Most categories of charges are justified and indeed are desirable on 
efficiency/equity grounds. (Reduced reliance on developer contributions 
would bring a requirement for similar dedicated charges to be collected from 
home buyers.) 
–  Housing affordability should not be significantly affected by greater reliance 
on upfront charging as opposed to charging over time. 
–  Developer charges for those items of social or economic infrastructure that 
provide benefits in common across the wider community have generally been 
relatively small — though such infrastructure should desirably be funded out 
of general revenue sources. 
Nonetheless, though changes in the level and form of infrastructure charges are not 
responsible for recent sharp declines in housing affordability, compliance with some 
general charging principles will help to promote more efficient and equitable 
outcomes.      





Developer charges (and charging for infrastructure generally) should be: 
•  necessary — with the need for the services concerned clearly demonstrated; 
•  efficient — justified on a whole-of-life cost basis and consistent with 
maintaining financial disciplines on service providers by precluding 
over-recovery of costs; and 
•  equitable — with a clear nexus between benefits and costs, and only 
implemented after industry and public input. 
Investments in items of social or economic infrastructure that provide benefits in 
common across the wider community should desirably be funded out of 
borrowings and serviced through rates, taxes or usage charges. 
Charges are more likely to satisfy the above principles if the processes for 
establishing and applying them are sound and transparent. Further, efficiency would 
be enhanced if charging regimes provide developers with some flexibility in the 
timing of developments and the design of the infrastructure.  
Authorities and utilities imposing developer contributions and charges should: 
•  follow guidelines based on principles set out in recommendations 7.1 and 7.2 
and be subject to independent regulatory scrutiny; 
•  provide for ‘out of sequence’ development if developers are prepared to meet 
the cost consequences; 
•  be open to proposals for alternative infrastructure arrangements that meet the 
needs of the households concerned; 
•  allow appeals on the amounts charged, or their coverage; and 
•  be accountable for how money raised from charges is spent. 
The Commission recognises that these principles and practices ostensibly apply 
already to much existing charging for housing-related infrastructure. There is also 
substantial regulatory oversight of the charging practices of utilities. However, 
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8  Are industry performance and 
building regulations appropriate? 
 
Findings 
•  The land development, (detached) housing and building materials industries appear 
broadly efficient and competitive.  
–  While in some areas land developers may have a degree of market power, other 
housing developments, the potential entry of new developers and the existing 
housing stock all limit the scope for overpricing.  
•  Productivity in the commercial building sector — which is responsible for 
constructing higher-density residential dwellings — appears to be below that in 
several other countries and well below that in the detached housing sector within 
Australia.  
–  While other factors are also relevant, work practices in the commercial building 
sector could clearly be improved. Such improvements could reduce some of the 
potential costs of urban consolidation policies.  
•  An effective regulatory framework for workplace arrangements in the building and 
construction industry is important to promote improved work practices by 
construction companies, employees and unions. 
•  Governments can help address shortages of skilled workers by ensuring institutional 
impediments do not restrict the matching of skill development to industry needs, and 
that the funding of training is efficient and effective.  
•  Building regulations should only be introduced after rigorous benefit–cost 




There is some evidence of recent cost increases in particular areas of the land 
development, housing construction and building materials industries. These 
increases, however, have been minor compared to the price increases for established 
housing (including land).  
Nevertheless, improvements in industry performance and reductions in regulatory 
burdens affecting housing could reduce costs and provide enduring improvements 
in housing affordability. Areas of particular importance raised by inquiry 
participants are considered below — these relate to the competitiveness and     




productivity of the abovementioned industries, industrial relations, shortages of 
skilled workers and trade contractors, and building regulation. 
8.1  The land development industry 
A number of inquiry participants questioned the extent of competition in the land 
development industry. In particular, concerns were raised about the capacity of 
some developers to exercise market power and restrict the supply of land for 
housing, leading to upward pressure on house prices (Pollard, sub. 94; Planning 
Institute of Australia (PIA), sub. DR271).  
More specifically, some contended that land developers engage in ‘land banking’ 
(holding land but not developing it) or ‘drip feeding’ (deliberately releasing land 
slowly so as to increase prices). For example, the PIA stated: 
Speculative land withholding is, arguably, a serious factor militating against housing 
affordability in some greenfield sub-markets … Anecdotally, major land owners and 
developers with a dominant position in particular markets, may be prone to the 
(oligopolistic) practice of sluggish land release, as profitability may not necessarily be 
boosted through more timely production of finished lots. (sub. DR271, pp. 4–5) 
Although acknowledging that there can be spatial monopoly in some areas, the 
Urban Development Institute of Australia (Victoria) (UDIA, trans., p. 254) claimed 
the industry is mostly competitive, with no developer holding more than around 
5 per cent of the market in Victoria. Further, the Master Builders Association of 
Victoria (MBA, sub.  188) said that although some developers ‘drip feed’ the 
amount of land released to builders, few in the industry engaged in land banking.  
Other participants argued that the industry is highly competitive and is not 
restricting supply. These included the WA Government, which observed: 
There is no evidence that land developers have unduly withheld land supply in order to 
bolster prices (although, of course, it is the prerogative of land developers to plan to 
release land at a time which potentially maximises their commercial returns). (sub. 190, 
p. 36) 
The WA Government also argued there were no ‘impregnable’ barriers to entry to 
the land development industry, and that a number of small developers were 
monitoring the market strategies of the larger developers and taking advantage of 
market gaps. Wyndham City Council (trans., p.  290) similarly highlighted that 
neighbouring developments helped to constrain any market power in the Wyndham 
area.     





Overall, the evidence available to the Commission is not sufficient to establish 
whether or not land banking or ‘drip feeding’ by land developers is a material 
problem. However, the Commission agrees that there are significant limits on the 
potential returns land developers may gain from such behaviour.  
Moreover, land banking or the slow release of land is not necessarily a sign that 
developers are exercising any substantial degree of market power. For example, it 
may show the need for land developers to recoup capital costs before undertaking 
further investment. Land developers might also be waiting for additional 
information on matters such as infrastructure development before committing 
resources to a project.  
That said, and as the Barker (2003) review noted, in some cases there may be a 
coincidence of interests between land developers, existing home owners and local 
councils to limit housing output, especially in infill areas. For this reason, it is 
important that government policies do not reinforce any such incentives to limit 
supply, but rather promote efficient outcomes that account for the need to meet 
increases in housing demand.  
On this latter point, several participants suggested that government participation in 
the market for serviced land may sometimes be beneficial. For example, the PIA 
argued that the market can fail to produce efficient outcomes because of the 
fragmentation of available land. To address this problem it suggested a government 
agency could buy fragmented land, package it and on-sell it to developers:  
One of the principle constraints to the rapid release of sites for urban consolidation 
around railway stations, activity centres and other suitable locations is the 
fragmentation of landholdings. The time and risks involved in assembling sites that can 
accommodate reasonable projects in these areas acts as a major disincentive to private 
sector production … (sub. DR271, p. 6) 
The UDIA (Victoria) (trans., p.  255) proposed a similar facilitation role for 
government in land development, including tasks such as aggregating disparate land 
holdings, overcoming planning issues and putting land packages to the market, 
claiming that this would reduce risks for land developers. Several government 
agencies currently undertake such activities, including VicUrban (Victoria), Land 
Management Corporation (SA) and Homeswest (WA). Some also undertake land 
banking to help manage fluctuations in demand and keep residential land prices 
down.  
In the Commission’s view, it is unclear how far governments can improve on 
market outcomes by purchasing, packaging and on-selling land. Government 
involvement in the market as a purchaser is not without costs, such as the 
opportunity cost to the community of governments holding land stocks (IC 1993a). 
Nonetheless, in keeping with their broader planning responsibilities, there may be     




some role for governments in this area. In particular, governments may be able to 
take a long-term perspective that has greater regard to external effects on the 
community (often significant in urban areas), and assists urban and land use 
planning. 
Governments can also affect the degree of competition in land development through 
land release and zoning policies. The UDIA (Victoria) considered that government 
land release strategies and zoning in some growth areas have restricted development 
opportunities, and thereby the number of developers and competition between them. 
Policies covering the release of government owned land are also relevant in this 
regard (chapter 6). On the other hand, the WA Government (sub. 190) argued that 
the public nature of its Urban Land Release Policy process places pressure on 
developers to prevent them from delaying land release.  
In conclusion, the Commission considers that the land development industry is 
broadly competitive. Although spatial monopolies may exist in some areas, the 
potential entry of new developers, and the existence of neighbouring housing and 
developments, help to limit market power. However, it is important that government 
policies on land development, land release and zoning do not inadvertently reduce 
competition and land supply.  
8.2  The residential construction industry 
Inquiry participants stressed that the residential building construction market is also 
competitive, especially the detached housing sector which is characterised by large 
numbers of small- and medium-sized firms and individual operators.  
While barriers to entry have increased in recent years because of growing regulation 
and more expensive insurance, there remain a large number of businesses 
competing for building work. Moreover, while the market share of large building 
companies providing project homes has increased, this has tended to stimulate 
competition, with cost increases for project houses (excluding land) having been 
relatively modest over the last decade (see figure 6.1). 
There were concerns about the competitiveness of some sections of the commercial 
sector involved in high-rise and medium-density residential construction, where 
there are fewer and larger businesses. But even here, there is a sufficient number of 
suppliers, along with the presence of the detached housing sector, to ensure that the 
market is kept competitive. According to the Housing Industry Association (HIA 
2002), the market share of the top four dwelling construction firms in each state is 
less than 40 per cent.      





In terms of productivity, at least two studies in the mid-1990s found that the 
Australian construction industry compared favourably with its European and North 
American counterparts:  
•  Pilat  (1996) found that labour productivity in the Australian building and 
construction sector was above that in the United States, Japan and all European 
nations. Only Canada had higher building and construction output per person. 
•  Lewis et al  (1996) similarly found that the Australian industry was close to 
world’s best productivity. 
However, a study in 1999 on the cost of construction across several countries 
ranked Australia in the middle in terms of performance, and below other highly 
industrialised countries assessed (DISR 1999). Further, Commission estimates 
(PC 2003c) suggest that multifactor productivity in the construction sector, though 
fluctuating from year to year, is now little higher than in the early 1980s.  
A recent PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002) study also suggested that the pace of 
innovation in the building and construction industry in Australia has been below 
that of other countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany and 
the United States. Industry risks and price volatility were considered major 
inhibitors to innovation. However, the picture emerging from the study is not 
uniform across sectors within the building and construction industry, with some 
sectors investing significantly more in research and development than others.  
Further, the Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry, which 
reported in 2003, found that several areas of the industry required reform and that 
productivity growth in the industry was below average for the market sector of the 
economy. As discussed in section 8.3 below, the Royal Commission’s findings are 
particularly relevant to apparent differences in productivity between the residential 
and commercial construction segments of the industry. 
Several participants to this inquiry also focused on differences in productivity 
between residential and commercial construction. For example, the HIA (sub. 177) 
argued that labour productivity in the commercial construction sector is well below 
that in the domestic residential building sector. More specifically, a study by 
Econtech (2003) suggested that lifting productivity in the commercial sector to the 
same level as in the residential sector would reduce commercial construction costs 
by 6 per cent. Such improvements in productivity would, by reducing costs in inner 
urban areas, help reduce the potential cost impacts of state government urban 
consolidation policies (chapter 6).      





There is general agreement that the building materials industry is broadly efficient, 
and has not contributed significantly to recent house price increases. As noted in 
Chapter 6, building material prices have remained relatively constant in real terms 
over the last decade (see figure 6.1). Further, despite rationalisations which have 
reduced the number of operators in some areas, most building materials markets 
appear to be broadly competitive. 
8.3 Industrial  relations 
According to industry representatives, industrial relations arrangements in the 
construction sector are inflating building costs. The HIA raised two specific 
concerns:  
•  the unclear legal treatment of trade contractors, and possible moves to deem 
them as ‘employees’ and bring them within the industrial relations system; and 
•  the industrial relations climate in higher density developments.  
On the first matter, the HIA noted that most housing construction is performed by 
trade contractors and that ‘extra and unnecessary administrative costs are imposed 
on the housing sector by the unclear legal treatment of these contractors’ 
(sub. 177, p. 71). The essence of the HIA’s concern is that under both common law 
and specific legislation, trade contractors are treated as independent contractors for 
some purposes and as employees for others. 
Accordingly, the HIA recommended that legal security for the status of trade 
contractors should be provided through all governments recognising that: 
… persons who have the status of a Personal Services Business for income tax 
purposes are independent businesses and should not be treated as employees for any 
purpose whatever. (sub. 177, p. 72) 
The HIA also contended that the ‘competitive advantage of trade contractors over 
unionised employees’ would be removed if they were made subject to industrial 
laws with negative consequences for housing affordability  (sub. 177, p. 71).  It 
referred to a study by Econtech in 2002 that projected that housing costs could rise 
by 20 per cent if work practices in the commercial sector were extended to the 
detached housing sector (sub. DR260). The HIA emphasised that it had fought hard 
over the years to prevent trade contractors becoming subject to industrial laws.  
However, the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) 
(sub.  DR326) disputed the conclusions reached in the Econtech report. The     





CFMEU, in claiming that the analytical methodology used in the report was flawed, 
drew on an evaluation of Econtech’s analysis by Toner (2003). The CFMEU further 
argued that characterising employees as contractors allows employers to avoid 
obligations under industrial awards and occupational health and safety legislation. 
On the matter of work practices and the industrial relations climate in higher density 
developments, the concerns raised by the HIA mainly relate to Victoria. The HIA 
claimed that the efficiency of high-rise and medium-density construction in that 
state is significantly lower than for single-storey domestic dwellings due to 
differences in work practices: 
While it might be expected that the more highly capitalised and mechanised 
commercial sector would be more efficient and not less [than detached housing 
construction], the difference is accounted for by union mandated industrial agreements 
such as limits on work hours, additional overheads and rostered days off, which restrict 
productivity in the commercial sector … By contrast, there is little or no union activity 
in the detached housing sector. (sub. 177, p. 72) 
The HIA went on to say that its estimates indicate that the per square metre cost of 
construction is more than 20 per cent higher for a six storey commercial building 
than for a six storey residential building, due to different industrial arrangements.  
The UDIA (Victoria) (sub. DR276, p. 7) likewise reported that costs could be up to 
40 per cent higher on fully unionised sites with similar delays in the duration of 
construction compared to non-commercial (non-union) sites. Further, the MBA 
(Victoria) (sub. 188) claimed that the costs of construction in the commercial sector 
are 20 per cent higher in Victoria than in NSW due to enterprise bargaining 
agreements entered into with construction unions in Victoria in 1999-00. 
The CFMEU (sub. DR326) disputed that there were cost differences between 
‘comparable’ union and non-union sites, and between Victoria and NSW. It argued 
that any differences between large commercial sites and smaller house building 
jobs, reflect the different tasks, regulations and equipment involved (such as the use 
of cranes and hoists), not the existence of union membership. It also contended that 
the industry is different from state to state and that cost comparisons need to 
account for these differences.  
Issues relating to labour relations and practices in the building and construction 
industry were the subject of the Royal Commission into the Building and 
Construction Industry referred to above. The Commissioner’s final report contained 
over 200 recommendations to improve workplace relations, industry conduct, 
contract practices and occupational health and safety (Cole 2003). These included 
reforms to improve bargaining at the enterprise level, increase accountability for     




losses due to unlawful industrial action, improve dispute handling, and establish an 
independent body to ensure compliance with industry-specific and general laws.  
Following on from that inquiry, Federal Parliament is currently considering the 
proposed Building and Construction Industry Improvement Bill, which would apply 
to all construction other than projects of less than five single dwellings. The Bill 
gives effect to a number of the Royal Commission’s recommendations, including 
the establishment of an Australian Building and Construction Commissioner and a 
Federal Safety Commissioner. The Bill was passed by the House of Representatives 
in December 2003, and is now being examined by the Senate Employment, 
Workplace Relations and Educational References Committee, which is expected to 
report in May 2004.  
The HIA considered: 
If [the bill were passed], these cost differentials [in commercial building] would be 
markedly reduced, as union power to act illegally to maintain their costly agreements 
would be curtailed. (sub. 177, p. 73) 
Inefficient or confrontational labour market practices come at a cost to the 
industries concerned, to home buyers and to the community generally. In its 
Discussion Draft, the Commission commented that achieving best practice in 
workplace arrangements should therefore be an important goal for all parties, and 
that cooperation between firms, employees and their unions is central to achieving 
this goal. However, in their responses to the Discussion Draft, some inquiry 
participants were critical of these comments, with the HIA (sub. DR260) claiming 
that the Commission had understated the extent of the problems facing the industry 
in this area and the difficulties of achieving change from within.  
The Commission accepts that cooperation and communication can only go part of 
the way to achieving best practice workplace arrangements, and that there is a need 
for an effective regulatory framework. The Commission also agrees that there is 
considerable scope for improvement in industrial relations in the industry. However, 
the complex legal and industrial relations issues involved in changing the regulatory 
framework are beyond the scope of this inquiry. Moreover, as noted above, these 
issues have already been subject to extensive recent review, with specific changes 
encompassed in proposed legislation currently before Parliament. 
8.4 Skilling  issues 
In recent years, industry associations have become increasingly concerned about 
shortages of skilled workers in the building industry and its subtrades. Indeed, the 
HIA considered there are now ‘chronic skills shortages’:     





Skill shortages in the residential building industry have the potential to dramatically 
increase the cost of construction and therefore affect housing affordability. In several 
previous booms in construction activity, severe skill shortages dramatically increased 
costs and with increasing skill shortages forecast in the next 7-10 years, it is important 
this issue is addressed. (sub. 177, p. 73) 
According to the MBA, shortages are most pronounced in NSW and Queensland 
(sub. 135, p. 30). 
Ageing of the workforce, difficulty in attracting new entrants, and a declining trend 
in apprenticeship numbers were some of the specific problems identified by 
participants. To address them, the HIA saw a need for ‘the provision of more 
flexible and accessible training options tailored to address specific areas of 
[identified] need’ (sub. 177, p. 77).  
Although some participants claimed that the collapse of HIH had reduced workforce 
numbers, evidence of its impact is mixed. The MBA (Victoria) noted that, in that 
state, building projects were delayed and 435 employees and apprentices were laid 
off due to the insurance crisis (sub. 188, p. 23). But the HIA contended that, while 
insurance premiums had since increased, there has not been ‘any material change in 
the number of residential builders in Australia’ (sub. 177, p. 14). 
In the Commission’s view, it is not surprising that shortages of labour, particularly 
skilled workers, occur from time to time when demand grows strongly. From a 
policy perspective, the key question is whether firms, industry associations, trade 
unions, educational institutions and associated training infrastructure have the 
capacity to respond to such surges in demand so that, over time, short-term skill 
shortages are overcome. 
In this regard, several structural factors may be restricting responses to skill needs 
and changes in demand, including the design of the training system, regulatory 
requirements, and resistance from some industry participants. For example, the HIA 
(sub. 177) contended that the current training for apprentices is too broad and does 
not account for the specialised skills required for residential building. It also argued 
that the current training system creates barriers to entry to the industry, restricting 
adjustment to the changing needs of the industry.  
The HIA further pointed to an increasing tendency for state and territory 
governments to use skill qualifications as a basis for licensing. It argued that if this 
continues without complementary initiatives to make the training system more 
flexible, it will create structural barriers that will inhibit the use of subtrade workers. 
Other participants also raised concerns about the potential for regulatory 
impediments to constrain the supply of skilled workers. For example, the Metal     




Roofing Industry Association of Victoria (sub. DR233) argued that regulations that 
compel builders to use registered plumbers to install and repair metal roofs 
substantially add to the cost of building many houses in Victoria — there are no 
such requirements in NSW or Queensland. It went on to suggest that a specific roof 
fixing traineeship replace existing arrangements so that ‘increasing demand for steel 
roofing in Victoria will be able to be met by an increased supply capability’ 
(sub. DR233, p. 1).  
Also, the HIA argued that efforts to improve training flexibility have been ‘stymied 
by union and trade association resistance’ (sub. 177, p. 75). It said that the main 
‘sticking point’ is the linking of training qualifications to award classifications, with 
the breaking of this link to achieve more flexible training issues becoming an 
industrial issue.  
In the Discussion Draft, the Commission said that the main responsibility for 
addressing skilling issues lies with the sector itself and education providers, rather 
than governments. This position was criticised by some participants such as the HIA 
(sub. DR260). Nonetheless, the Commission remains of the view that the sector and 
education providers have considerable responsibility for ensuring the availability of 
flexible training to meet the sector’s changing skill needs. For example, industry has 
a crucial role in alerting educational and training providers to emerging shortages 
and problems in the delivery of programs, while providers have responsibilities to 
tailor and modify programs in response to changing skill needs. 
However, governments also have important roles. In particular, they have important 
funding, facilitation and regulatory roles and, in doing so, contribute significantly to 
the broad training framework. For example, government funding of training needs 
to be well designed and periodically reviewed. Among other things, this requires 
adequate information on skill needs. In this regard, several participants noted that 
information on skill levels and emerging requirements is currently lacking (for 
example, HIA, sub. 177). This suggests that an examination of the statistical base in 
this area may be warranted. 
Some changes in policy may also be needed to address particular issues such as 
rural and regional skills shortages. The Commission notes that the Victorian 
Government, for example, has instituted a Community Regional Industry Skills 
Program to deal with such skills shortages (sub. 85, p. 33). In addition, policies in 
other areas (such as industrial relations) should not unnecessarily restrict the 
efficiency of the training system, but instead help facilitate flexible and needs-based 
training.  
Finally, it is important that regulations requiring specific skill levels for house 
building tasks, in aiming to protect consumers and workers, do not add     





unnecessarily to costs. While time constraints precluded detailed examination of 
specific skill-related regulatory concerns raised by participants, these concerns 
illustrate the importance of periodic regulatory review and the use of regulatory 
impact statement (RIS) processes when regulations are being developed or 
amended. 
8.5 Building  regulation 
The construction of dwellings is subject to a variety of building controls and 
regulations. They affect how dwellings are designed, specified, built and 
maintained, and, to some extent, how much they cost. The objective of these 
regulations is to protect the health, safety and amenity of the occupant and the wider 
community. 
Building control is largely a matter for the states and territories. However, under an 
intergovernmental agreement, the Building Code of Australia (BCA) has been 
introduced to provide a nationally consistent set of minimum technical standards for 
the design and construction of buildings. The BCA is maintained and developed by 
the Australian Building Codes Board (ABCB), a national body funded by the 
Australian and state and territory governments.  
According to the ABCB (sub. 198, p. 5), the intergovernmental agreement seeks a 
nationally consistent regulatory framework that aims to: 
•  make building regulation as uniform as possible between the states; 
•  limit additions or variations by the states as far as possible; 
•  develop more efficient and simplified building regulatory systems; 
•  encourage and enhance national acceptance and adoption of improved 
technology; and 
•  create an efficient regulatory environment to facilitate an internationally 
competitive building industry. 
Nevertheless, each state, territory and local government is still able to impose 
specific requirements on the design and construction of new dwellings in addition to 
the minimum standards contained in the BCA. Building controls for housing are 
generally administered at the local level, with local governments having some 
flexibility in interpretation and application. 
The ABCB considered that its processes and the BCA have contributed to a better 
building regulatory system over the past decade (sub. 198, p. 5). Specifically, the 
Board contended that the arrangements have led to ‘a CoAG consistent, national     




and rigorous social, economic and environmental evaluation approach to regulatory 
change proposals’ (sub. 198, p. 5). 
A number of other participants also indicated broad support for the BCA process. 
For example, the MBA noted that it was delivering regulations that generally work 
from an industry perspective. It also said that current work on creating a new 
national framework should ‘increase efficiency by allowing national building 
companies to design and build in multiple states using the same or similar criteria’ 
(sub. DR256, p. 10). 
However, while supporting a national approach, several participants, particularly 
the HIA (subs.  177, DR260) and the Building Products Innovation Council 
(subs. 31, 151), raised a variety of problems, including: 
•  a trend for the states and territories, and even local authorities, to override the 
BCA; 
•  slowness of the ABCB to respond to the needs of the states and territories; 
•  a lack of uniform administrative provisions; 
•  inadequate processes for approval of alternative solutions and product 
certification; 
•  proliferation in the number of standards and in the number of state agencies 
dealing with building regulation; 
•  intrusion of planning regulation into building control; 
•  prescriptive rather than performance-based regulation, particularly in areas such 
as environmental regulation; 
•  a lack of integrity and rigour in the RIS process; and 
•  conflict between the BCA and state fire regulations. 
Of specific concern were the processes (or lack thereof) governing changes at the 
local government level. The HIA claimed that, by including building regulations 
within planning schemes, local governments are able to bypass the regulatory 
scrutiny that is applied to the BCA (sub. 177). And, though generally supportive of 
the current approach, the MBA also referred to problems at the local government 
level: 
At present, local governments have no need or requirements to go through any RIS or 
similar process prior to creating a considerable amount of local laws pertaining to 
buildings and building sites that vary all over the country. The industry has real 
concerns at the frequency and variations of these ad hoc local government laws. 
(sub. DR256, p. 10)     





In illustrating the effects of such practices, the HIA (sub. 177) said that some local 
council planning requirements specify higher levels of sound insulation between 
attached dwellings than the minimum requirements of the BCA, potentially giving 
rise to numerous insulation requirements throughout Australia. Some participants 
went on to suggest that such local government requirements can negatively impact 
on housing affordability. For example, Clarke contended: 
… ‘cosmetic’/‘aesthetic’ building regulations set by local government can reduce 
housing affordability by imposing unrealistic or expensive requirements on modest new 
housing developments. (sub. DR283, p. 4) 
The HIA estimated that the possible additional cost of changes made to the BCA 
since its initial adoption in 1997 range between about $5600 and $24  600 per 
dwelling (sub. 177, p. 90). It further noted that additional costs have resulted from 
changes at the state level — claiming that in Victoria and the ACT, for example, 
these average almost $18 000 per dwelling.  
Improving regulatory processes 
Inconsistencies across jurisdictions, and a lack of certainty and transparency in the 
administration of building regulations, can increase building costs. But additional 
regulation, changes to existing regulation and, indeed, regulatory differences 
between jurisdictions are not in themselves indicators of problems. Regulation has 
benefits as well as costs. Further, as incomes grow, communities typically seek 
higher standards in such areas as energy efficiency and environmental protection. 
Thus, two threshold issues to address are whether the benefits to the community of 
each particular regulation exceed its costs, including costs of administration and 
compliance, and whether the regulatory approach proposed is the best option 
available for addressing the issue at hand. 
This in turn focuses attention on whether the processes for determining regulations 
and the related institutional structures — at the federal, state and local government 
levels — facilitate proper assessment of the benefits and costs for builders, home 
owners and for the community generally. 
Through the Council of Australian Governments (CoAG), Australian governments 
have agreed to undertake a RIS for all regulation and quasi-regulation (codes, 
advisory instruments or notes) made by Ministerial Councils or National Standard 
Setting Bodies where there is a reasonable expectation of a compliance burden, 
impact on the community, or restriction on competition. A RIS identifies the need 
for regulation, and provides an assessment of the benefits and costs of various 
policy options (CoAG 1997). Consideration of performance-based approaches to 
regulation is specifically required. Also, RISs developed under these CoAG     




requirements must be released for public consultation before being finalised and a 
regulatory decision made. 
As a National Standard Setting Body, the ABCB must prepare RISs for all changes 
made to the BCA. For example, a RIS was prepared by the ABCB on the impact of 
the proposed new four star energy standards for inclusion in the BCA. Recently, the 
Board has also prepared a RIS on proposed amendments to the regulations covering 
construction of dwellings in bushfire prone areas and the fire hazard properties of 
building materials and assemblies. 
But changes to building regulations, or new regulations, do not always invoke a RIS 
requirement. In particular, local governments are not subject to CoAG RIS 
requirements. Hence changes made to building regulations through local planning 
laws, or other local government instruments, may not be subject to a RIS unless it is 
required under state law.  
In the Commission’s view, all proposed regulatory changes should be assessed for 
their benefits and costs, and alternatives considered. This does not preclude separate 
regulation at the state and local government level. But there is a need for any 
differences between jurisdictions to be appropriately justified. The effective and 
consistent application of RIS processes, at the local government level in particular, 
could help provide a more transparent and rigorous basis for making such 
judgments. The Commission would expect that impacts on housing affordability 
would be addressed as part of any benefit–cost assessment of proposed new 
building regulation and alternatives.  
Another issue raised by the HIA was the need to address the ‘creeping [cumulative] 
impact of changes to building regulations’ (sub.  DR260, p.  26). While in some 
instances this issue could be addressed in considering new pieces of regulation, it 
will often be difficult to deal with using such a piecemeal approach. In the 
Commission’s view, periodic, more wide-ranging reviews of regulatory 
arrangements may better address issues of regulatory creep. 
The Commission has recently been asked by the Australian Government to conduct 
a research study specifically into national building industry regulatory reform 
(PC  2004). This will provide an appropriate means of assessing in detail the 
relevant institutional and administrative arrangements, as well as ways to improve 
the efficiency and responsiveness of building regulation.     




9 Have  prices  ‘overshot’? 
 
Findings 
•  Much of the increase in housing prices during the recent boom can be explained by 
‘market fundamentals’, especially cheaper and more available housing finance and 
higher incomes.  
–  If sustained, these changes will have brought about a structural shift up in prices. 
•  Inherent features of the housing market make it prone to price ‘overshooting’. One 
recent international study concluded that property price booms were three times 
more likely to be followed by a ‘bust’ than booms in the stock market. Price falls can 
be substantial, as Australian experience attests. 
•  While higher incomes, lower interest rates and more accessible housing finance are 
likely to sustain house prices at higher levels than before, a future softening of 
prices appears inevitable.  
–  Various price and ‘investment-related’ indicators suggest overshooting in parts of 
the market. 
–  Realistic expectations about income and population growth cannot support a 
continuation of recent rates of house price growth.  
–  Calculations that seek to justify current price levels on the basis of low after-tax 
costs of holding rental properties, ignore emerging risks confronting heavily 
geared investors. 
•  Indeed, there is evidence of market cooling, particularly in those segments where 
highly geared investors have been most active. 
•  While recent interest rate rises and further price increases in some markets may 
lead to further declines in affordability in the short term, a more subdued housing 
market and continued income growth should in due course make it easier for 
prospective home buyers to enter the market. 
 
 
9.1  The ‘fundamentals’ explain a lot 
As previous chapters have sought to emphasise, variations in prices and 
affordability around long-term trends are an inherent feature of the housing market 
in Australia and other countries.      





Moreover, while house prices have risen especially sharply in the last three years, 
much of the cumulative increase in prices during the recent upturn can be explained 
in terms of structural and normal cyclical demand pressures:  
•  Cheaper finance and the growth in average household disposable income have 
substantially increased the purchasing power of both owner occupiers and 
investors in rental property. For example, as noted in chapter 3, households can 
now borrow more than twice the amount in real terms for an owner-occupied 
dwelling than a decade or so ago. 
•  More competition among lenders has made it easier to obtain loans and has 
expanded the range of loan options available to meet the differing circumstances 
of individual households. 
•  The downturn in equities markets from 2000 to early 2003, more or less 
coincidently with changes to aspects of the tax regime, provided strong 
incentives for investors to shift into residential property. 
•  Demand has been augmented by the First Home Owner Scheme. 
Figure 9.1 provides a timing dimension for some of these demand-side pressures. 


















































































Data sources: ABS (House Price Indexes, Cat. no. 6416.0; and Consumer Price Indexes, Cat. no. 6401.0). 
Some of the ‘structural’ demand-side drivers — most notably growth in household 
disposable income and increases in population — will continue to put upward 
pressure on house prices in the future. However, short-term cyclical demand 
pressure from the previous downturn in the share market now appears to be 
reversing. Similarly, the shift up in house prices associated with cheaper and more 
available finance may largely have run its course, and will prove to have been a     




structural change if low inflation continues to support the sort of interest rate levels 
that have prevailed in recent years. 
But whatever their likely future impact, over the past few years, these demand-side 
pressures have led both owner occupiers and investors to seek to increase their 
exposure to property, including through higher quality and better located houses. 
Given the scarcity of well located land, and the inherent ‘stickiness’ in the supply of 
housing, this increase in demand would have caused land and house prices to rise, 
irrespective of the efficiency of supply. Nonetheless, various inefficiencies and 
inflexibilities in the processes for bringing new land and dwellings to the market 
have added to house price pressures, as have other increases in the costs of housing 
supply.  
However, demand-side ‘fundamentals’ and constraints on supply arguably do not 
explain all of the recent growth in demand and house prices — especially in the past 
couple of years. In any asset price boom, rising prices can create expectations of 
further price increases unrelated to market fundamentals. That is, people may expect 
prices to continue growing strongly simply because they have done so in the recent 
past. Where prices are bid up further solely on the basis of such expectations, an 
asset price ‘bubble’ is said to exist.  
As the submissions to this inquiry attest, there is a common perception that house 
prices in parts of Australia, or at least in particular market segments, have 
‘overshot’ relative to the fundamentals, and that this has been responsible for some 
of the recent decline in affordability. There is also concern that, were this perceived 
bubble to burst rather than subside, an ensuing reduction in consumer spending and 
building construction would adversely affect economic activity and employment 
generally. 
9.2  What is the evidence of ‘overshooting’? 
Features of the housing market make it prone to overshooting. Buying and selling 
houses is time-consuming and costly, making them much less liquid assets than 
bonds or equities. The enormous diversity in the housing stock means that markets 
for individual dwelling types in particular regions are typically quite thin. Also, as 
recent experience in the market for inner city apartments demonstrates, lags in the 
response of housing supply to a surge in demand mean that supply can continue to 
grow even after demand has abated.  
Moreover, contemporary house price outcomes appear to have a strong conditioning 
effect on people’s expectations about the future course of prices. For example,     





surveys in the United States suggest that even after a boom has seen prices rise to 
very high levels, home buyers typically expect that prices will continue to grow 
strongly for another decade (Case et al. 2003).  
A recent International Monetary Fund study (Bordo and Jeanne 2002) concluded 
that price booms in property markets were three times more likely to be followed by 
a bust than booms in equities markets. Two recent studies published by the Bank for 
International Settlements (Borio and McGuire (2004) and Tsatsaronis and Zhu 
(2004)), similarly pointed to the propensity for boom-bust behaviour in the housing 
market internationally.  
As noted in chapter 2, downturns in the Australian market have most commonly 
manifested themselves in a stabilisation in nominal house prices leading to a fall in 
real prices due to the effects of inflation, rather than by significant and widespread 
declines in nominal prices. However, past experience highlights that nominal prices 
can fall appreciably — for example, according to Real Estate Institute of Australia 
data, the median detached house price in Sydney fell by 25 per cent in the two years 
following the end of the boom in the late 1980s. Indeed, with inflation now much 
lower in Australia than in the past, the sort of cyclical declines in nominal prices 
that have been common in some overseas countries, may become more frequent 
here. 
Establishing the extent of any overshooting in the Australian housing market is very 
difficult. The ‘true’ value of a house at a point in time cannot be determined with 
much precision. Among other things, it will depend on the future value of the rental 
services provided to owner occupiers (implicitly) and investors (explicitly), the 
expected course of interest rates, and the rates of return available across the sweep 
of asset markets. These relative rates of return may in turn be influenced by taxation 
arrangements. Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish between overshooting 
resulting from unrealistic price expectations, and short-term price surges before 
supply can adjust to a ‘well-founded’ increase in demand.  
In the face of these problems, the use of econometric techniques to evaluate whether 
house prices are compatible with underlying fundamentals has not proved fruitful 
(chapter 4). Reflecting a widely held view, the Economist (2003) remarked that a 
‘bubble can never be positively identified until after it has burst’. 
These ‘identification difficulties’ notwithstanding, in the Discussion Draft, the 
Commission set out several (investment-related) indicators of potential for a 
downward adjustment in Australian house prices, at least in real terms: 
•  Gross yields on investment in residential rental property — and thus implicit 
rental yields on owner-occupied housing — have fallen well below their       




long-term averages in most of Australia’s capital cities (see figure 2.5). While 
some decline in rental yields was to be expected given the fall in real interest 
rates, price-to-earnings ratios for houses relative to many other asset classes are 
well above historical norms. 
•  Yields on commercial property, where institutional rather than individual 
investors predominate, have remained at much higher levels and currently 
average 8 to 9 per cent (gross). 
•  Similarly, gross yields on residential rental property in some other ‘comparable’ 
countries appear to be much higher than in Australia (chapter 2).  
•  While trends in the availability and cost of rental accommodation vary 
considerably between locations and types of rental property, vacancy rates, 
especially for inner city apartments, have recently increased in some of the 
major cities. And, despite rising purchase prices, there is evidence that some 
landlords have had to reduce rents to find tenants for their properties. Moreover, 
with a large number of new inner city apartments likely to come onto the market 
in coming months, pressure on landlords will increase. 
•  Since the commencement of the recent price upswing, the ratio of median 
Australian house prices to average per capita income has grown by 50 per cent, 
and now appears to be high by international standards (section 2.3). 
Also, in a discussion paper prepared for the CPA (2004), Professor Peter Abelson 
noted that (until recently) prices for apartments had risen by a similar amount to 
prices for detached homes, suggesting that this was ‘unusual’ given that the land 
requirement is much smaller for a high density dwelling. As noted in chapter 2, 
investors have been particularly active in the apartment market. 
However, as the Discussion Draft pointed out, none of these indicators provides 
conclusive proof that prices have overshot. For example, greater rental yields on 
residential property in some other countries may partly result from regulatory 
controls and other market rigidities that limit private investment in those countries 
to high return properties. In forming a judgment on whether yields on residential 
property are high or low by international standards, returns on other asset classes in 
the countries concerned are also relevant.  
And, the Commission’s further analysis of returns in the commercial property 
market indicates that the decline in average gross yields in the past three or four 
years has been similar to that in the residential market. This suggests that the 
difference in yields between the two markets may well be a soundly-based outcome, 
rather than the result of irrational investment in residential property.     






Moreover, as some of those responding to the Discussion Draft emphasised, it is 
after-tax rather than gross returns that ultimately dictate investment behaviour. 
Hence, in comparing returns across asset classes within countries, as well as 
between countries, differences in tax treatment are yet another relevant 
consideration. In an Australian context, differences in tax treatment according to 
whether a property investment is undertaken by an individual, by a company, or by 
a superannuation fund, can make such analysis very difficult (chapter 5). 
Notwithstanding such complexities, a number of inquiry participants argued that 
when account is taken of the combined impact of private investors’ access to 
unrestricted negative gearing, capital works deductions for buildings, and the 
discounted rate of capital gains tax, current house price levels in Australia appear 
more reasonable. Thus, in discussions at the public hearings, Professor Cameron 
Rider from the Melbourne Law School, observed:  
There is a suggestion that the housing price increases [are the result of] some kind of, to 
use someone elses words, irrational exuberance, but when you look at the tax 
advantages here you might say people are being exuberantly rational because its a good 
deal. (trans., p. 382) 
More specifically, Bassanese (2004) recently contended that, at current financing 
costs and rental yields, nominal price appreciation of less than 2 per cent a year 
would allow an investor borrowing the full amount of the purchase price of a house 
to break even — that is, to recoup the after-tax cost of the excess of expenses over 
rental income while holding the property. The calculation was based on estimates 
by the Reserve Bank of Australia (sub. 199, p. 48) of the out-of-pocket costs of 
holding a fully geared rental property. 
However, such calculations do not refute claims that there has been bubble-like 
behaviour in at least some parts of the Australian housing market. In the first place, 
they ignore several emerging risks confronting heavily geared investors. In 
particular, with a lot more rental housing coming on stream, gross rental income for 
tenanted properties may well fall further. Also, with increasing vacancy rates in 
some market segments, the difficulty of finding suitable tenants is likely to increase, 
leading to longer periods where rental properties are untenanted.  
Any such reductions in rental income will in turn push up holding costs. While this 
may not be a major problem for those investors with other sources of income, 
investors without such cover could be forced to sell at a time when the expected 
capital gains are not realisable. For investors with a large number of heavily geared 
properties, the financial consequences could be severe, even requiring the forced 
sale of the family home.      




Whichever way additional holding costs are covered, the preceding discussion 
illustrates that heavily geared investors potentially have much more at stake than is 
assumed in calculations which abstract from the risks attaching to this form of 
investment. Indeed, ‘holding cost’ calculations that ignore important risks have 
been used by some property investment advisers to attract new investors with 
limited resources into the property market. 
This is not to deny that when account is taken of the taxation regime applying to 
investment in residential property, the extent of any bubble in the Australian 
housing market may have been overstated in some quarters. In responding to the 
Discussion Draft, several participants from the property sector argued that housing 
market ‘fundamentals’ were still strong. 
Nonetheless, these and other inquiry participants also pointed to particular locations 
and market segments where the sustainability of recent house price growth, and 
even current price levels, is problematic. Notably, there is already evidence of 
market cooling, particularly for apartments where highly geared investors have been 
the major source of recent demand and price pressures. Several proposed high 
density projects have been cancelled. Inner city apartment prices have recently 
fallen in Sydney, matching a trend evident for a much longer period in Melbourne 
(RBA 2004e, p. 26). And, the well publicised collapse of a high profile property 
marketing company which had been focussing its activities and advice in this area, 
has contributed to a recent decline in investor confidence (chapter 3). 
But there is also growing evidence of a more general slow-down in the market: 
•  New lending for both owner-occupied and investment dwellings appears to have 
peaked (see figure 9.2), with declines in lending since October 2003 ending the 
strong upward trend of the preceding three years.  
•  Auction clearance rates for established homes have fallen in a number of capital 
cities and there has now been a marked deceleration in average price growth in 
Sydney and Melbourne. As noted in chapter 2, sizeable price increases in these 
two markets heralded the beginning of the recent boom.  
Also, in suggesting that the new housing market has peaked and is beginning to 
slow, the Master Builders Association (sub. DR256, p. 4) commented that ‘… the 
recent two increases in the cash rate will further temper any remaining exuberance’.  
To summarise, an expectation of continuing appreciation in house prices, in 
combination with aspects of the taxation regime, appears to have driven recent 
market outcomes, and especially demand by investors. But realistic expectations 
about population and income growth cannot support a continuation of recent rates 
of price increase. Moreover, interest rates have now adjusted to the lower inflation     





environment, meaning that there is unlikely to be a repeat of the structural surge in 
demand for housing driven by cheaper finance. While lower interest rates and more 
available housing finance are likely to sustain house prices at higher levels than 
before, a future softening of prices appears inevitable. However, the timing and 
extent of that softening is likely to vary across regional markets and dwelling types.  


















Investor finance Owner occupier finance Total finance
 
Note. Seasonally adjusted. Excludes refinancing and financing for alterations and additions. 
Data source: ABS (Lending Finance, Cat. no. 5671.0). 
9.3  Implications for policy 
Much of the increase in house prices during the recent boom is attributable to 
sustained growth in household incomes and cheaper and more accessible housing 
finance. Self evidently, these demand drivers should not be targets for ‘remedial’ 
policy intervention.  
But income growth and financial market developments have not been the only 
causes of recent house price increases. Moreover, the effects of some of the other 
contributing factors have been exacerbated by inefficiencies in the housing market 
and in related policy settings. Hence, as previous chapters in this report have sought 
to establish, government policy initiatives can, over the longer term, help to 
promote more efficient and affordable housing outcomes:  
•  Initiatives to address structural factors that either encourage excessive demand 
for housing, or unnecessarily reduce the responsiveness of supply to increases in 
demand, will reduce ‘average’ house prices over the demand cycle and provide 
enduring affordability benefits to both home buyers and renters. As such, they     




could help to narrow, though probably not eliminate, the gap that has long been 
evident in Australia between the trend increase in house prices and the growth in 
household disposable income.  
•  In addition, by increasing the responsiveness of supply or decreasing the 
amplitude of fluctuations in demand, some of these initiatives will reduce the 
volatility of house prices. This would mean that the benefits from acquiring a 
house would be less dependent on the time of purchase — reducing the risks 
attaching to both home ownership and investment in rental housing.  
In previous chapters, the Commission has recommended several new policy 
initiatives, or endorsed current proposals, which could bring such benefits. These 
relate to the taxation of housing, land release and development approval processes, 
infrastructure charging and provision, and the regulation of home lenders and those 
providing investment advice to property investors. 
However, the scope for governments to improve housing affordability in the short 
term is much more limited: 
•  In several of the policy areas noted above, the complexity of the issues involved 
and the need to address transitional concerns, means that further review is 
required before specific policy changes could be implemented. Possible 
modification to Australia’s personal tax regime, which would have effects 
extending well beyond housing, is a case in point.  
•  Some initiatives to improve the responsiveness of housing supply — and 
especially any designed to increase the supply of housing land — could take 
several years to have a material impact on affordability outcomes. 
Nonetheless, while recent interest rates rises and further price increases in some 
markets may lead to further declines in affordability in the short term, a more 
subdued housing market and continued income growth should in due course make it 
easier for prospective home buyers to enter the market. 
Especially in a heated housing market, seeking to improve affordability through 
direct assistance to particular groups of home buyers also poses considerable 
challenges. Not the least of these is the likelihood that much of the benefit of such 
assistance is likely to be dissipated through ensuing increases in house prices. Even 
so, well targeted and appropriately configured support may allow some additional 
households to enter the market. Possible options for governments wishing to help 
more households achieve the goal of home ownership are the subject of the final 
chapter of this report. 
     
    
 
 
     





10  A case for direct assistance 
measures? 
Findings 
•  The case for providing direct financial assistance to foster home ownership is not 
strong.  
•  While conceived as compensation to first home buyers for the introduction of the 
GST, First Home Owner Scheme (FHOS) funding might provide a greater return to 
the community were it redirected to support the housing needs of low income 
households in rental, public or community housing. 
•  Many low income households, including in Indigenous communities, appear to be 
facing significant housing affordability problems. Their housing needs, and the 
nature and extent of assistance to help meet those needs, should be subject to a 
national public inquiry.  
•  If governments wish to continue to assist first home buyers directly, a scheme along 
the lines of the existing FHOS has attractions in terms of administrative simplicity 
and flexibility. But a greater impact on home ownership levels could be achieved if 
that assistance were better targeted at lower income households, with assistance 
rates commensurately increased.  
–  Targeting would be best implemented by limiting support to those purchasing 
homes valued below regionally differentiated price ceilings.  
•  Any of the many other schemes put forward to encourage home ownership would 
also have to be targeted and provide substantial assistance to make any real 
difference to ownership levels. Most would involve more administrative 
complications than a better targeted FHOS. 
•  ‘Shared-equity’ arrangements of the sort considered by the recent Home Ownership 
Taskforce, would effectively allow for the purchase of part of a home and may 
therefore make ‘ownership’ more accessible for lower income households. The test 
of such arrangements is whether, once regulatory and tax uncertainties are 
overcome, the home lending market can develop products which are attractive to 
both borrowers and lenders.  
 
The terms of reference ask the Commission to ‘identify and examine mechanisms 
available to improve the ability of households, particularly low income households, 
to benefit from owner-occupied housing’. In particular, the Commission is asked to 
assess rent and direct ownership subsidies, loan guarantees and shared-equity 
initiatives.     




Accordingly, this chapter examines possible rationales for providing assistance to 
foster home ownership, considers how much assistance would be appropriate, and 
assesses a range of possible measures for delivering it against relevant evaluation 
criteria. 
In addressing these issues, the Commission has been cognisant that benefits for the 
community arise not only from home ownership, but also from access to affordable 
housing more generally. Hence, the chapter also discusses whether the community 
could benefit from the diversion of direct assistance currently provided to first home 
buyers to, for example, public housing and/or rent assistance for low income 
households.  
10.1 Existing  measures 
First Home Owner Scheme (FHOS) 
The main instrument providing direct assistance to first home buyers is the FHOS, 
introduced in July 2000 as an offset to the GST. The basic grant of $7000 is funded 
and administered by state and territory governments. Over the period from 
March  2001 to June 2002, the basic grant was supplemented by top-up grants 
funded by the Australian Government — the rationale for these was to provide 
additional support to the building construction industry.  
By January 2004, the scheme had provided around $4.3  billion in assistance, 
including the top-up grants, to over half a million first home buyers. (More details 
on the scheme are provided in chapter 4.) 
Other measures 
All state and territory governments assist first home ownership through a range of 
stamp duty exemptions and concessions (chapter 5).  
Most also provide a range of other support for housing purchases, including direct 
lending, deposit assistance, interest rate assistance, advisory and counselling 
services and mortgage relief. These programs are not all specifically targeted at first 
home buyers. But eligibility is often linked to income and other household 
characteristics and may require that applicants do not already own, or part own, a 
home or land. 
     





As specific examples of these programs:  
•  HomeStart Finance in South Australia offers an ‘Advantage Loan’ of up to 
$165 000 to eligible home buyers. 
•  The Keystart Home Loan scheme in WA offers low deposit loans to low income 
earners who do not own or part own a home or land. Fee assistance of up to 
$2000 can be capitalised into the loan, which does not require mortgage 
insurance. Historically, the Keystart interest rate has been marginally lower than 
the standard variable rates offered by the major banks (BGC Residential, 
sub. DR292, p. 4). 
•  The Victorian Government provides mortgage interest relief of up to $15 000 
over a maximum of two years for people who have experienced an unavoidable 
change in circumstances for which adequate preparations could not be made, and 
where mortgage repayments exceed 27 per cent of income.  
•  The Streets Ahead program in Tasmania offers a range of incentives to low to 
moderate income home buyers. Assistance may be provided in one or more 
forms, including deposit assistance, payment of transactions costs (such as stamp 
duty and mortgage insurance), prepayment of rates for the first year, 
contributions towards home improvements, and provision of advice on home 
finances or property condition. Also, Housing Tasmania’s Sales Program gives 
precedence to public housing tenants and others on low incomes when public 
housing properties are put up for sale (sub. DR320, pp. 19–20). 
The states and territories also fund schemes designed to increase the availability of 
land and housing. For example, the Victorian Group Self Build program provides 
help for eligible groups of households to build or purchase new housing. And, in 
addition to provision of public housing, government-owned land development 
agencies operate in most jurisdictions alongside private developers to supply 
serviced residential building lots. Some of these agencies have affordability as well 
as commercial objectives:  
•  VicUrban is required by the Victorian Government to contribute to 
improvements in housing affordability in Victoria whilst undertaking its 
functions in a commercial manner (sub. 85, p. A3).  
•  The ACT Government’s Land Development Agency intends to make a 
proportion of its serviced land affordable to specific sectors of the market, such 
as first home buyers (sub. 204, p. 8).     




10.2  Rationales for direct assistance to foster home 
ownership 
As noted in chapter 1, generally acknowledged benefits such as increased social 
stability and better educational outcomes for children help to explain why 
governments in Australia provide considerable support for home ownership. 
However, that chapter points out that: 
•  affordable rental housing also provides social and distributional benefits; 
•  policies to assist home buyers must have regard to any costs imposed on those in 
private rental, public or other forms of community housing; and 
•  there are wider economic and social costs from promoting home ownership 
which must be included in the policy calculus. 
Moreover, as ownership levels rise, some of the additional ‘spillover’ benefits for 
the community from subsidising home ownership will decline (possibly to very low 
levels). Conversely, the assistance required to achieve additional increments in 
home ownership will increase (possibly to very high levels).  
The stated purpose of the FHOS, the largest budgetary program specifically 
designed to help first home buyers, is somewhat different. Its rationale is not to 
foster increased home ownership as such, but rather, as noted, to compensate first 
home buyers for the increase in housing prices associated with the introduction of 
the GST. Such compensatory measures are often employed by governments when 
new taxes are implemented. 
As a compensation instrument, the FHOS is not particularly well targeted. In 
contrast to GST collections on new housing, which rise in proportion to prices, the 
FHOS grant is a flat $7000. Indeed, once the purchase price exceeds about $77 000, 
the grant becomes less than the notional GST (assuming full pass through of the tax 
into new house prices). Also, grants are paid to those purchasing existing dwellings. 
As discussed in chapter 5, the extent to which GST-related price increases for new 
dwellings have flowed through to prices for established dwellings is uncertain. 
In the Commission’s view, it therefore makes more sense to take the new tax regime 
as given, regard the FHOS as a form of assistance to encourage first home 
ownership, and assess the case for its retention in the longer term on the basis of the 
following two questions: 
•  Is the FHOS likely to have socially beneficial impacts on home ownership 
levels?     





•  Would funding for the scheme — whether termed GST ‘compensation’ or 
support for first home buyers — provide better returns to the community if it 
were spent in other ways? 
A number of factors are relevant in this regard (and in considering other forms of 
direct government assistance to promote home ownership): 
•  While Australia’s rate of home ownership has declined somewhat recently, it 
remains high by international standards (see table 2.3) and the large majority of 
people will own a home during their lifetimes. This suggests that there may be 
only limited scope for policy to increase the overall time spent in home 
ownership, as most people will prefer to rent at some stage in their lives. 
•  As well as direct assistance to first home buyers, Australian governments 
provide encouragement for home ownership over renting through the tax system 
(for example, the non-taxation of imputed rental income and exemptions from 
land tax and capital gains tax for the family home — see chapter 5). 
•  History suggests that a cyclical adjustment in home prices almost inevitably 
follows the sort of price rises of the past few years. Consequently, some of the 
recent sharp decline in affordability is likely to be reversed in the short to 
medium term. This will in itself facilitate home ownership, without the provision 
of more government assistance.  
These considerations taken together suggest that the rationale for continuing to 
provide direct assistance specifically aimed at increasing home ownership levels is 
not strong. Further, as noted above, any direct support for first home ownership 
needs to be assessed against other possible programs to promote better housing 
outcomes and, ultimately, against uses for funds outside the housing sector. The 
issue of whether the current support provided through the FHOS and other direct 
assistance arrangements would provide a greater return to the community were it 
redirected into other measures to help meet the housing needs of low income 
Australians is particularly pertinent in this context. 
10.3  Housing needs of low income households 
A number of inquiry participants from the social welfare and union sectors 
considered that the housing needs of low income households require greater 
attention, especially those in public and private rental accommodation (see 
boxes 2.1 and 10.1). In this regard, reference was made to:  
•  declining levels of investment in public housing;  
•  inadequate supply of low cost private rental accommodation; and      




•  growing affordability problems facing Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA) 
recipients.  
Moreover, two submissions devoted special attention to perceived inadequacies in 
the extent to which the housing needs of low income Indigenous households were 
being met (see box 10.2). 
 
Box 10.1  Participants’ comments on the housing needs of low income 
households 
Australian Council of Social Service 
Demand for low cost [public and private] rental housing is rising at a time when investment in 
such provision has fallen to an all time low. (sub. 147, p. 6)  
The Commonwealth Rent Assistance program … is … increasingly being found to be 
inadequate in delivering affordability, especially in capital cities and other locations where 
jobs are more plentiful. (sub. 147, pp. 6–7) 
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, Construction & General Division 
The Union believes that Australia is in the grip of a housing crisis. This crisis is not only 
characterised by declining affordability in first home ownership, but by increasing levels of 
housing stress among low to middle income participants in the private rental market, the 
degradation and running down of public housing stock across Australia, and finally, by 
growing levels of homelessness in the community. (sub. DR255, p. 2) 
National Shelter 
Unfortunately, there is now ample evidence indicating that there is a grossly inadequate 
supply of affordable rental housing at the bottom end of the market. (sub. 157, p. 8) 
Victorian Government 
A key concern of the Victorian Government … is the supply and cost of suitable rental 
accommodation for low income earners. As a matter of policy, the price of public rental is set 
at levels which are affordable. Despite additional action by the Victorian Government, real 
funding reductions under the Commonwealth–State Housing Agreement have prevented 
public housing supply keeping pace with the growth in the eligible population. (sub. 85, 
p. 10) 
Queensland Shelter 
All three regions surveyed by Queensland Shelter reported a serious decline in housing 
stock at the affordable end of the rental market. This translates into an overwhelming 
demand for housing assistance in the State. (sub. DR247, p. 3) 
Brotherhood of St Laurence 
More households are now spending longer periods in the private rental market, but the 
market has failed to respond to this increased demand with an increased supply of 
affordable housing. In addition, the supply of public housing has not kept pace with demand 
and existing stock now has to be targeted to the most disadvantaged households — those in 
receipt of income support and with barriers to participation in the labour market. (sub. 211, 
p. 2) 
 
     






Box 10.2  Housing needs of Indigenous people 
Northern Territory Government 
Surveys and censuses over the past decade have shown that Indigenous households are 
twice as likely as other Australian households to be in need of housing assistance. The data 
also shows that Indigenous people experience high rates of (before and after) housing 
poverty, homelessness, overcrowding, and lack of adequate standard of housing, 
infrastructure and basic services. These poor living environments are factors that contribute 
to and exacerbate Indigenous people’s poor health. Addressing this continuing high level of 
unmet need is a key issue for the Territory in delivering affordable housing. 
Unmet housing need in Indigenous communities is estimated to be $2 billion nationally, of 
which the Territory has an outstanding need of over $800 million. Demographic projections 
point to a further explosion of housing need in Indigenous communities over the medium to 
long term, exacerbated by the youthful profile of the population. In Wadeye, for example, 
where the current occupancy rate is 14 people per household, a further 144 dwellings will be 
needed by 2023 to maintain the existing occupancy rate. An additional 448 dwellings would 
be required to ‘normalise’ occupancy rates. Any consideration of home ownership 
affordability should be considered in the context of this unmet need. (sub. 197, pp. 2–3) 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) 
The success of ATSIC’s Home Ownership Program suggests that mainstream lenders could 
consider adjusting their lending policies and practices to accommodate the needs of first 
home buyers, without jeopardising the overall integrity of their loan portfolios. 
ATSIC has found that by removing impediments to home ownership for low income earners 
that rates of repayment are similar to those which are achieved by mainstream lenders, and 
that the rate of account delinquency compares more than favourably when compared to 
commercial lending portfolios. 
For many reasons … Indigenous Australians have not been able to participate in home 
ownership at the levels enjoyed by the broader Australian community. Currently less than 
32 per cent of Indigenous Australians participate in home ownership compared to around 
72 per cent for the wider Australian population. 
Disparity in home ownership participation by Indigenous people is of particular concern to 
ATSIC because of the significant positive correlation that exists between home ownership 
and social and economic participation. Various studies have highlighted that home 
ownership is associated with a higher probability of mainstream employment, and a lower 
probability of criminal charges and family violence within the Indigenous population, both of 
which are key areas of government intervention for improved outcomes for the Indigenous 
population. (sub. 149, pp. 2–3) 
 
 
Various ways to address these problems were canvassed by participants. There were 
calls for large increases in government funding for public housing through the 
Commonwealth–State Housing Agreements — for example from NCOSS and 
Shelter NSW (sub.  DR257) and the CFMEU (sub.  DR255). As well, there were 
requests for changes to enhance the CRA, with ACOSS (sub. 147) and National 
Shelter (sub. 157) proposing that eligibility be extended and that it be modified to 
take account of variations in rent levels across Australia.     




Further, several participants called for government initiatives to stimulate private 
investment in affordable rental housing, to cater for low income households that 
currently are ineligible for public housing and rental assistance. In this context, 
there was reference to financing mechanisms proposed in a recent report prepared 
by the Allen Consulting Group for the Brotherhood of St Laurence, the Committee 
for Economic Development of Australia, Melbourne Affordable Housing and 
VicUrban (see box 10.3). As discussed later, some of these mechanisms could also 
potentially be used to finance schemes that explicitly seek to increase home 
ownership levels. 
 
Box 10.3  Stimulating private investment in affordable housing 
A recent report by the Allen Consulting Group considered the advantages and 
disadvantages of three options to increase private sector investment in affordable 
housing. Each would be dependent on government subsidies to leverage ‘large 
volumes’ of private finance to expand the supply of affordable housing. The three 
options were: 
•  the Bonds Model — government investment in affordable housing financed by 
government bonds, supplemented by a recurrent government subsidy; 
•  the Partnerships Model — private sector investment in affordable housing financed 
by private equity and/or debt investment, supplemented by a flexible government 
capital grant or recurrent subsidy; and 
•  the Tax Credits Model — private sector investment in affordable housing financed 
by private equity and/or debt investment, supplemented by a fixed recurrent subsidy 
delivered through a tax credit. 
The report noted that each of the models examined has advantages and 
disadvantages and concluded that ‘no single model is likely to produce the best 
outcome on all [assessment] criteria’. 
Source: Allen Consulting 2004, p. vii. 
 
 
In submitting such proposals to an inquiry on the affordability of home ownership, 
several participants argued that there was a strong link between assistance for low 
income public and private rental housing, and first home ownership. They 
contended that such assistance can help tenants save for a housing deposit and, by 
increasing the number of low cost houses, moderate price pressures in the market 
more generally.  
However, while there is no doubt that such links exist, their strength is doubtful. For 
example, public rental dwellings comprise only around 5 per cent of Australia’s 
housing stock (ABS 2001 Census data), with only a minority of public housing 
tenants subsequently purchasing their own homes. In any case, although flow-on     





ownership effects are a relevant consideration in formulating policies to help meet 
the housing needs of low income households, the case for assisting those 
households through public housing, rental subsidies or other measures does not 
hinge on those effects. Of more importance are the nature and extent of these 
housing needs, and how these are most effectively addressed. 
These are complex issues which the Commission has not been in a position to 
evaluate during this inquiry. Moreover, the information base in this area is far from 
comprehensive and sometimes conflicting, making it difficult to judge whether the 
problems confronting low income households have worsened substantially during 
the recent price upswing. Nevertheless, housing affordability is clearly a significant 
problem for many low income households.  
A ‘National Affordable Housing Project’ (NAHP) is working under the auspices of 
the Commonwealth–State Housing Ministers Council to promote ‘a national, 
strategic, integrated and long-term vision for affordable housing in Australia, 
through a comprehensive approach by all levels of government’ (Victorian 
Government, sub. 85, p. A4). Possible ways to better meet the housing needs of low 
income households were also canvassed as part of a recent Senate Inquiry into 
poverty and financial hardship (Senate Community Affairs References Committee 
2004). 
But it is now more than a decade since the last independent national review of these 
issues (see box 10.4). The Commission considers that the time is now right to 
conduct a similar review encompassing the full range of affordability issues raised 
by participants to this inquiry. Such an inquiry could both draw on and help inform 
the work currently in train under the NAHP. 
A national public inquiry should be established to examine the housing needs of 
low income households across Australia, including in Indigenous communities, 
and the nature and extent of assistance to help meet those needs. 
10.4  Criteria for assessing assistance measures 
In the Commission’s view, as discussed above, the case for direct assistance 
specifically aimed at increasing levels of home ownership is not strong. This of 
course does not negate the case for broader policy changes (discussed in earlier 
chapters) that might facilitate home ownership — such as reducing reliance on 
stamp duties in favour of more efficient taxes, and improving the efficiency of land 
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supply. However, they should be pursued for their broader efficiency and equity 
benefits, rather than simply because they could increase ownership levels.  
 
Box 10.4  The Industry Commission’s report on public housing 
In 1993, the Industry Commission undertook a detailed inquiry into the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the delivery of public housing and rental assistance. The inquiry found 
that public housing was a cost effective way of meeting government housing 
objectives, to be used as part of a mix of assistance measures also likely to include 
rent assistance, community housing and leasing of a property by a housing authority or 
community group (for on-leasing to a tenant).  
The Industry Commission did not come to a view on the appropriate level of funding, 
seeing welfare priorities as an issue for governments, although it noted that the inquiry 
findings pointed to many areas of unmet need. Based on the assumption that funding 
constraints are inevitable, the Industry Commission called for better targeting of public 
housing and rent assistance.  
Amongst other things, it recommended that rent assistance be extended to all low 
income tenants in the private rental market (rather than only recipients of welfare 
payments) and pointed to inequities stemming from the cap on rent assistance, with 
people who pay higher rents in some regions receiving the same level of assistance as 
those renting in low cost regions. The report also commented that the private rental 
market tended not to provide enough affordable dwellings for those on low incomes 
and was ‘slow to respond to changes in demand at the low cost end’.  
Since the inquiry, there has been a move to greater targeting of public housing 
assistance to applicants in greatest housing need in line with the Industry 
Commission's recommendations. Governments have continued to provide a mix of 
assistance including public housing, community housing and rental assistance. The 
Australian Government has also extended eligibility for Commonwealth Rental 
Assistance, with funding increasing significantly in real terms since 1993. 
Source: Industry Commission (1993b). 
 
 
Nevertheless, if governments wished to continue providing explicit assistance to 
first home buyers, then a number of criteria provide guidance on approaches that are 
likely to deliver the highest payoff for the community. These relate to effectiveness, 
flexibility, administrative costs and distributional outcomes. 
Effectiveness 
In accord with the perceived social benefits of home ownership, the objective of 
specific assistance should be to maximise the increase in home ownership for any 
given level of funding.      





Such support can potentially increase home ownership — and thereby the social 
benefits that accrue to the community — in two ways. First, for families that would 
be able in time to purchase their first house without assistance, government support 
can bring that purchase forward. Second, it can bring home ownership within the 
reach of those who might otherwise never be able to purchase a home.  
If most of the assistance supporting first home buyers were to go to those families 
who would otherwise be able to purchase within a relatively short period of time, 
the incremental social benefits to the community of that assistance would clearly be 
limited. Hence, better value from assistance should be obtained if it is targeted at 
lower income households who otherwise may not be able to purchase a home, or 
whose purchase would be considerably delayed.  
Flexibility 
The characteristics, resources and aspirations of households vary. Therefore, a 
desirable attribute of direct assistance measures is flexibility for households to 
choose the standard and type of housing services they wish to purchase. Untied 
grants, for example, enable households to pick the housing that best suits their needs 
and preferences, within their available means. Some households may be prepared to 
sacrifice other spending to live in a larger house or in a particular neighbourhood.  
Obviously, for those struggling to purchase a first home, choices may be very 
limited, in terms of the prices they can afford to pay, or the areas in which they can 
afford to purchase (chapter 2). Nevertheless, even in an environment of constrained 
choice, providing flexibility to recipients as to how they use assistance will still be 
beneficial. 
Administrative costs 
It is important to keep administrative and compliance costs as low as possible, 
consistent with the achievement of program objectives. Indeed, care needs to be 
taken that such costs do not outweigh the benefits of the assistance program from 
promoting greater home ownership. Thus, some tradeoff between administrative 
costs and other program design criteria — especially targeting — may need to be 
made.     




Demand-side or supply-side? 
Measures to assist first home buyers can be broadly grouped into two categories: 
those that seek to boost purchasing power (demand-side approaches) and those that 
seek to increase the supply of affordable land and housing (supply-side approaches).  
Either approach, if well designed, can help aspiring first home buyers. Schemes in 
either category can also have similar flow-on distributional effects in the broader 
housing market: 
•  Measures that increase purchasing power will tend to increase house prices, 
particularly if there is limited capacity to augment supply in response to the 
ensuing increase in demand. This will benefit existing home owners at the 
expense of those seeking to purchase, including first home buyers — though 
recipients of assistance will still be better off overall. In the longer term, this 
price impact may be lessened as higher demand resulting from the increase in 
purchasing power stimulates an increase in the supply of housing.  
•  Similarly, subsidising the provision of housing for particular groups of home 
buyers during a period of supply constraint (of land and builders) may push up 
house prices generally. That is, such subsidies may again add to overall spending 
on housing in an environment where the number and quality of dwellings cannot 
be readily expanded. Thus, while those assisted will be better off, this could 
come at the expense of other home buyers. However, here also, any price raising 
effect will tend to be reduced over the longer term as supply expands in response 
to increased demand.  
As discussed in chapter 6, measures which free up land supply for housing can 
improve affordability for all home purchasers, including first home buyers. But 
these are long-term approaches, and cannot readily address the short-term 
affordability problems currently confronting aspiring first home buyers, especially 
as new dwellings can augment the housing stock only slowly. 
Weighing up 
Especially in the short to medium term, all assistance measures aimed at helping 
first home buyers are likely to have flow-on effects that will dilute the benefits for 
recipients and adversely affect other home buyers. In particular, during periods of 
strong demand for housing and with inelastic supply in the short term, such 
measures will tend to push up house prices across the market. From this viewpoint, 
there may be little to choose between demand-side and supply-side approaches on 
distributional grounds.      





Given this, and in the light of the program-specific evaluation criteria outlined 
above, the choice of measures hinges on the scope to target support at lower income 
households, while preserving flexibility and keeping administrative costs as low as 
possible.  
In the Commission’s view, demand-side measures will generally offer a better 
balance in these respects, especially where the goal is simply to enhance home 
ownership in the broad. 
Supply-side measures may sometimes be preferable in assisting subgroups of 
potential home buyers with very specific needs, especially where those needs are 
not readily accommodated in the market — for example, housing for those with 
disabilities. Indeed, there are several supply-side schemes in place to cater for such 
specific needs, including some mentioned above in section 10.1.  
However, the intrinsically more prescriptive nature of supply-side measures weighs 
against their use in delivering assistance on a larger scale. As discussed later in the 
chapter with reference to some specific proposals, the likelihood of higher 
administrative costs per dollar of support provided, and reduced flexibility for 
assistance recipients, are germane in this regard. Hence, the primary focus in the 
following discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of different assistance 
mechanisms is on demand-side approaches. 
Given the number of different approaches canvassed by participants in this inquiry 
and in other recent reports, and the overlaps between many of these approaches, this 
discussion concentrates on broad outcomes, and abstracts from many of the 
implementation issues that could affect detailed outcomes. 
However, a more extensive treatment of the FHOS is provided, because that is 
currently the major budgetary mechanism providing support to first home buyers, 
and was the focus of much of the commentary from participants. Thus in the 
following discussion, the FHOS, in its current or modified form, is used as a 
benchmark against which to assess other proposals. In keeping with the emphasis in 
the terms of reference, a more extended analysis is also provided for the shared 
equity and housing lifeline arrangements that were discussed during the recent 
Home Ownership Taskforce deliberations.  
10.5  Modifying the First Home Owner Scheme 
As discussed above, in the Commission’s view, it makes more sense to look at the 
case for retaining the FHOS over the longer term, on the basis of its impacts on 
home ownership, rather than in relation to whether ongoing compensation for the     




GST can be justified. Importantly, the FHOS has some basic characteristics that 
would be desirable in any ongoing assistance scheme for first home buyers:  
•  it is relatively simple and cheap to administer; and  
•  because grants are not tied to the type of dwelling or to location, it provides 
flexibility for families to purchase houses that best suit their needs and 
preferences. 
However, a deficiency in the present arrangements is their lack of targeting. The 
bulk of assistance goes to families who might otherwise have purchased a house 
before too long, even without assistance (see box 10.5). In NSW, for example, 
14 per cent of grants go to purchasers of homes priced above $500 000 (see below). 
Together with the small size of the grant relative to house prices, this lack of 
targeting means that, in its current form, the FHOS is unlikely to offer much help to 
low income households. This in turn suggests that if the FHOS is to be retained, 
better targeting would be desirable. 
The Commission notes that, conceptually, stamp duty concessions and the FHOS 
are effectively alternative ways of providing subsidies to first home buyers. From 
this viewpoint, there might well be some administrative savings if one of these two 
measures were discontinued, with assistance provided solely through the other. 
However, in most jurisdictions, the FHOS provides higher funding than required to 
enable the complete removal of stamp duties currently paid by first home buyers. 
Accordingly, the following discussion looks at ways that the FHOS could be better 
targeted on the assumption that a dedicated scheme of this sort is retained.  
Better targeting 
Many inquiry participants supported the view expressed by the Commission in the 
Discussion Draft that higher returns to the community would accrue from the FHOS 
were it targeted more directly to potential first home buyers on lower incomes. As 
an example, the NSW Government stated that it: 
… endorses tightening eligibility for the First Home Owners Scheme (FHOS). This 
would improve the equity of the grant while minimising its impact on overall demand 
and property prices. In addition, the NSW Government supports allocating savings 
from tightening FHOS eligibility to increased targeted relief for first home buyers. 
(sub. DR315, p. 1) 
The targeting options put forward included placing a ceiling on property values 
and/or basing eligibility on income and asset tests. For example, the WA 
Government has already proposed an effective capping to property values of 
$500 000 (sub. DR339, p. 3). The Victorian Government (sub. DR301, p. 1) and the     





AWU (sub. DR290, p. 2) also both proposed a cut-off of $500 000, with the AWU 
further proposing that an annual income cap of $80 000 apply. In addition, there 
were proposals for the amount of the grant to be substantially increased (see box 
10.6), as well as a suggestion from the NSW Government that, alternatively, 
‘savings’ from better targeting could be used to enhance stamp duty concessions for 
first home buyers (sub. DR315, p. 8).  
 
Box 10.5  Views on the ‘pull-forward’ impact of the FHOS 
Participants generally supported the view that the main effect of the FHOS has been to 
pull forward home purchases by those already capable of achieving home ownership in 
the short term, rather than significantly increasing the number of households with a 
realistic prospect of becoming home owners.  
Even so, there were suggestions that this effect could be substantial. For example, 
Professor Ross Guest (sub. 128) submitted the results of simulation analysis, which 
have been interpreted by some as indicating that FHOS assistance will bring forward 
home purchase decisions by as much as five years on average. Thus, in drawing on 
this analysis, the Housing Industry Association submitted: 
On the basis of the estimate that on average FHOG [the grant] brought forward the move 
into home ownership by five years for some 500 000 people, this represents an increase of 
around 2.5 million years of home ownership for Australians. Even if the marginal social 
benefits of home ownership are very small, the total benefits for Australia of all this 
additional time spent as home owners would be staggering. (sub. DR260, p. 32) 
But when viewed in the context of the total number of years that most people will own a 
home over their lifetimes, the social benefits that would accrue from an increment of 
five years assume less significance. 
More importantly, the methodology employed by Professor Guest means that the 
projected pull-forward effect of five years is likely to greatly overstate the actual pull-
forward impact. In effect, the methodology means that the smallest pull-forward 
outcome that can be projected is five years, irrespective of funding levels, grant rates 
etc. 
Indeed, were a grant of just $7000 capable of pulling forward demand by five years on 
average, it suggests that the average home buyer is only saving around $1400 a year 
towards a housing deposit. However, most potential first home buyers evidently save 
much more than this — with savings of just $1400 a year, it would take the average 
household currently renting their accommodation nearly 15 years to accumulate the 
deposit required for a $200 000 home. 
 
 
Especially in light of these responses to the Discussion Draft, the Commission 
considers that, if the FHOS is to continue for any length of time, some form of 
targeting should be implemented. Better targeting offers the potential to free-up 
funds to increase the level of the grant — indeed, to make a real difference to low 
income households, it is likely that a larger grant would be needed (see below). Of     




course, targeting raises some important administrative issues that will be relevant in 
choosing between specific approaches that seek to focus support on lower income 
home buyers. Further, at least in theory, substantially increasing the level of grants 
could reduce the incentive for potential recipients to save for a housing deposit. 
 
Box 10.6  Suggested modifications to the FHOS 
Several modifications to the FHOS were suggested by inquiry participants, including: 
•  Applying a means test, or both means and assets tests — aimed at restricting 
eligibility to households with incomes (and/or assets) below specified thresholds. 
Thresholds could be differentiated to reflect geographical variation in average 
income levels.  
•  Adjusting the value of the grant according to income — similar to means testing, but 
with the value of the grant linked to household income. Households with low 
incomes would receive a higher grant than households with higher incomes.  
•  Placing a cap on the value of the home — designed to limit eligibility to those 
households building or purchasing a home under a specified maximum value. That 
value could be linked to the median house price.  
•  Indexing the value of the grant to median house prices — involving regular 
adjustment of the value of the grant in accordance with movements in median 
house prices. This could be a national, state or regional index.  
 
 
Ceiling on property values 
Evidently, the effect of a price ceiling in better targeting support would depend on 
the level of that ceiling. For example, the NSW  Government indicated that 
restricting eligibility for FHOS support to the purchase of NSW properties worth 
less than $1 million would only have reduced the number of grants by about 
1 per cent annually and saved less than $3 million (sub. DR315, p. 6). But, with 
caps of $700 000 and $500 000, the respective savings would have been $11 million 
(4 per cent) and $39 million (14 per cent).  
Further, the impacts would depend on whether ceilings were locationally 
differentiated in line with regional variations in house prices. Information provided 
by the SA Government, for instance, suggests that, in contrast to NSW, a home 
price cap for that state of around $500 000 would have produced a ‘saving’ of only 
around $1 million over the three years — much less than 1 per cent of total FHOS 
grants to SA home buyers over that period.  
More generally, as the price of the home purchased does not precisely correlate with 
a household’s income levels or assistance needs, a price ceiling approach would be     





a somewhat blunt way of targeting support at those most in need. Nevertheless, it 
could be an administratively cheap option for directing available funds in a way 
which is more likely to enhance home ownership levels than untargeted assistance. 
Income and asset tests 
In principle, providing assistance on the basis of a household’s available income 
and assets would better target support to lower income households. However, 
implementing effective income and/or asset testing would be problematic, a point 
made by the Victorian Government in its response to the Discussion Draft 
(sub. DR301, p. 5). The NSW Government similarly noted that an income test on an 
assistance arrangement it had operated until 2000 was abolished ‘because of 
concerns that an income tax assessment and/or group certificate was not always an 
accurate record of a person’s actual income’ (sub. DR315, p. 7).  
Moreover, to avoid providing assistance to income poor but asset rich households, 
levels of income and assets should ideally both be subject to examination. But 
experience with income and assets tests illustrates the difficulty of assessing income 
and assets in a consistent way across households. Unless the tests are carefully 
designed, they may create incentives for some households to lessen their declared 
income or assets in order to qualify for assistance. The interaction with other 
income-tested benefits available to low income households would also need to be 
considered. And, like a cap on house prices, income and assets test ceilings may 
need to vary regionally, given the variation in house prices. This would raise further 
equity and administrative problems. 
At the very least, subjecting FHOS grants to income and assets tests is likely to be 
administratively expensive, compared with the alternative approach of targeting 
through limiting support to those purchasing homes below a designated price 
ceiling. Indeed, the Tasmanian Government argued that the administrative 
difficulties associated with income and asset tests would be so serious that they 
could negate any benefit from better targeting: 
… attempting to replace the present relatively straightforward, consistent and 
administratively simple scheme with an expensive, convoluted model would offer only 
a dubious improvement in the equity of its outcomes. (sub. DR320, p. 9) 
Increasing the size of the grant 
Leaving administrative difficulties aside, both of the above approaches would better 
target assistance to low income households. However, it is unlikely that either 
would be effective in promoting increased home ownership among such households 
unless the size of grant were increased substantially. Grant assistance will be the     




main monetary resource available to many low income families to pay a housing 
deposit, with the current $7000 grant falling well short of the standard deposit 
required on even very low value properties in most parts of Australia. 
Conclusion 
If the FHOS is to continue for any length of time, the Commission considers that 
the case for targeting support to lower income households is compelling. In its view, 
however, income and assets tests are likely to be administratively expensive and 
cumbersome and possibly an ineffective way of implementing this objective. The 
Commission’s preference would instead be to limit eligibility for FHOS support to 
those purchasing homes priced below regionally differentiated price ceilings. These 
ceilings could be adjusted from time to time in line with changes in house prices 
generally. 
Further, targeting of assistance offers the opportunity to increase the average level 
of grant without increasing overall funding requirements. Indeed, the Commission 
reiterates that grant levels would need to be substantially increased if the FHOS is 
to make a significant difference to home ownership levels among lower income 
households. 
If the First Home Owner Scheme continues: 
•  assistance should be targeted to the housing needs of lower income households 
by restricting eligibility to homes below (regionally differentiated) price 
ceilings; and 
•  there should be a commensurate increase in the average size of the grant.  
The Commission notes that amendment to the current FHOS, which was established 
under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) on Federal–State 
Relations 2000, would require negotiation and agreement between governments. 
The NSW Government was concerned to ensure that any ‘savings’ generated by 
tightening of FHOS eligibility ‘are returned to NSW first home buyers and are not 
retained by the Commonwealth Government’ (sub. DR315, p. 8). The Commission 
therefore suggests that, if the FHOS is to continue, the implementation of price 
ceilings and increase in grant levels be taken up by governments in the context of 
the IGA.  
Those considerations should also have regard to the Commission’s view that the 
case for providing assistance explicitly directed at increasing home ownership 
levels is not strong, and that diverting some or all of that assistance into other 
RECOMMENDATION 10.2     





measures to help low income households may well provide a better return to the 
community. The Commission’s proposed national public review of how best to 
meet the housing needs of low income households — both renters and home buyers 
— could help to inform discussions within the IGA on the future role and 
configuration of the FHOS.  
10.6  Other possible measures to facilitate home 
ownership 
As noted, a variety of other approaches to assist first home buyers were canvassed 
by inquiry participants or have been raised in recent reports looking at housing 
affordability issues. 
Like the FHOS, most of the these arrangements could be targeted to low income 
households. Moreover, some have areas of overlap or commonality with 
mechanisms to increase the access of low income households to affordable rental 
housing and are thus relevant in a wider affordability context. However, the 
following assessments focus on their capacity to increase home ownership.  
Encouraging saving 
While there are many possible ways to encourage saving, one proposal suggested in 
a recent report by the Allen Consulting Group (2003) prepared for the Chifley 
Research Centre, involves the government or other entities matching savings by low 
income households through grant payments. Among the possible uses for the 
accumulated savings would be the payment of housing deposits or mortgage 
repayments. Similarly, the ANZ Bank proposed that the Australian Government 
adopt special savings accounts, like those available in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, which are given concessional tax treatment when accumulated 
savings are used for a home deposit (sub. 193, p. 9). 
However, the international evidence is mixed on whether savings subsidies have 
any appreciable effect on overall savings levels. The impact will partly depend on 
whether households can qualify for a subsidy simply by switching funds from other 
savings. Also, some households might just substitute the government subsidy for 
their own savings. In any case, many low income households have little capacity to 
save. 
These observations suggest that, unless carefully designed and targeted, such 
schemes may have very little impact on home ownership rates. They may merely 
enable those who otherwise could afford to purchase a house to either reduce their     




own savings and increase their consumption of other goods and services, to bring 
forward their time of house purchase to some extent, or to buy a more expensive 
house. 
As previously discussed, such problems also arise under the FHOS. Indeed, 
conceptually, the FHOS can be likened to a savings investment scheme, with the 
subsidy paid at the end of the savings period (at time of house purchase) to add to 
the saving already made by the household for a house deposit, rather than paid 
during the savings period. However, the FHOS appears simpler to administer. For 
example, inflows in and out of savings investment accounts would need to be 
monitored and payments made over a number of years, compared with a once only 
payment under the FHOS. 
Access to own superannuation 
Several participants suggested that potential first home buyers should be able either 
to access loans against, or to make early withdrawals from, ‘equity’ in their 
superannuation funds. 
Such loans or withdrawals would help to offset any reduction, caused by 
superannuation contributions, in the saving otherwise available to a household to 
purchase its first home. However, for households with the capacity to borrow 
sufficient amounts for a housing deposit from the usual commercial sources of 
housing finance, early access to superannuation savings would effectively provide 
an alternative, rather than an additional, source of funds. Further, many of the low 
income households currently unable to borrow to purchase would have little 
superannuation from which to draw. 
Moreover, were such access to be allowed, consideration would need to be given to 
relevant taxation arrangements, including those applying to early withdrawal and 
any subsequent repayment. Early access would effectively turn superannuation 
savings into a special savings account for first home buyers. Under current tax 
arrangements, this could offer more generous ‘assistance’ than the type of 
arrangement discussed in the previous section. 
In addition to tax complications, the arrangement could have consequences for 
social security. It is possible that allowing such access could reduce the amount of 
financial saving available for retirement — depending on whether the funds were 
repaid, and the interest rate charged, and on whether the prospect of early access to 
purchase a home made savings more attractive generally. Were such a scheme 
introduced, saving accumulated at pension age may be more concentrated in the 
main residence, the value of which is currently exempt from the pension assets test.     





However, if the scheme encouraged earlier home ownership, and if earlier home 
ownership in turn encouraged saving generally, then rent assistance and pension 
payments may be thereby reduced. 
Sharing the benefits of public expenditure savings 
A somewhat different ‘savings-type’ mechanism to assist low income households 
achieve home ownership is the ‘home credit fund’ suggested by Professor Gavin 
Wood (sub. 131, p. 6). This scheme is designed to encourage people on long-term 
welfare to move into employment by giving them a share in the resulting public 
expenditure savings. This share would be ‘credited’ to a trust fund that could be 
drawn upon to meet deposit requirements or mortgage repayments. To qualify, 
recipients would need to remain in employment for at least two years. 
However, this would be a rather oblique way of encouraging home ownership. In 
the Commission’s view, if greater home ownership is to be pursued, it is better to do 
so as directly as possible, thus maximising the likelihood of success while 
minimising administrative costs. Viewed in this light, the other ways of encouraging 
savings discussed above are likely to be superior.  
It would also be possible to use the CRA mechanism in a similar way to the home 
credit fund approach. In a sense, CRA already operates to facilitate home ownership 
by increasing the capacity of recipients to save a deposit. This role could be 
extended by, for example, continuing to pay recipients some of the previous subsidy 
after they had purchased a home. However, this would render CRA little different 
from other explicit subsidies to encourage home ownership. In effect, eligibility for 
CRA would simply become the de-facto means test for targeting support. 
Reducing deposit or repayment requirements 
Caplin, Joye proposal for a shared-equity arrangement 
A ‘shared-equity’ arrangement would enable a household to purchase a part-share in 
a dwelling, with the remaining part-owned by an investing partner. In Australia, 
some types of shared-equity schemes are offered by state and territory government 
housing authorities. For example, the WA Government enables public housing 
tenants to purchase between 70 and 100  per  cent equity in their rental property 
under the GoodStart program (sub.  190, p.  51). As well, shared-equity lending 
products are now being canvassed by some private lenders.      




Such shared-equity arrangements are different in nature to other arrangements 
designed to foster home ownership. In particular, by reducing the degree of equity 
achieved on purchase, they ‘automatically’ reduce deposit and repayment 
requirements compared to full ownership, without necessarily calling for 
government subsidy.  
One shared-equity proposal that has received considerable recent attention is the 
model proposed by Caplin, Joye et al., in a report commissioned by the Menzies 
Research Centre for the Home Ownership Taskforce. Under this proposal:  
… housing would be financed with both a mortgage and a passive institutional partner 
who contributes equity capital to the dwelling in exchange for a share of the ultimate 
sale proceeds, with no other monetary payments made between the parties. (2003, 
p. 57) 
The Caplin–Joye proposal would allow the householder to maintain control over the 
management of the property, with the benefit for the financier dependent on the 
nature of the equity arrangement with the occupant. Under a fixed contract, the 
investor would receive a fixed percentage of the final sale proceeds. With a flexible 
arrangement, the investor would receive different percentages depending on 
whether the price of the house had risen or fallen.  
Whether or not such shared-equity arrangements would be attractive to borrowers 
and lenders is as yet uncertain: 
•  Some have suggested that, notwithstanding the lower cost of market entry, many 
potential borrowers would shun an arrangement where they only received a 
proportion of the proceeds when the house was subsequently sold.  
•  As equity investors, lenders would want to purchase homes in areas offering the 
highest returns. In recent years, the highest returns have typically been in more 
expensive suburbs (chapter 2). Conversely, low income home buyers would 
typically be looking to purchase in cheaper suburbs, even if their initial deposit 
and ongoing mortgage repayments were reduced through the shared-equity 
arrangement. 
•  And, although lenders would become an equity partner in the house, that would 
be without the control over the management of the property that an equity share 
usually brings.  
Ultimately, the general ‘test’ of the viability of such arrangements is whether the 
home lending market can develop products which are attractive to both borrowers 
(particularly low income households) and lenders. As noted above, there are 
indications of some developing interest by financiers in shared-equity arrangements.      





However, some have argued that there are regulatory and other impediments to the 
uptake of such schemes. Caplin, Joye et al. (2003, p.  27) noted that, while the 
introduction of shared-equity products can be accommodated within existing legal 
and regulatory frameworks, clarification is needed about whether the investor’s gain 
would be taxed on a cash or accruals basis (that is, periodically or upon realisation 
of the capital gain). And the Australian Bankers’ Association (sub.  164, p.  15) 
stated that a ‘critical factor’ is how the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 
would set capital charges for deposit taking institutions holding shared-equity 
investments on their balance sheets. To the extent that such regulatory uncertainties 
exist, clarification by the relevant authorities would obviously be desirable.  
Also, regulatory uncertainties may not be the only impediment to the continuing 
development of shared-equity products. For example, the Australian Bankers’ 
Association (sub. 164, p. 15) submitted that the viability of shared-equity products 
hinges on the creation of a sufficiently large portfolio of shared-equity investments 
to enable the development of a secondary market for the assets. It suggested that 
government has a role to play in facilitating the development of such a portfolio. It 
is implicit in this view that such arrangements might not be viable without start-up 
money or ongoing support from government. 
The justification for any such government financial support, either start-up or 
ongoing, would need careful analysis drawing on the same evaluation criteria used 
above to assess the merits of other forms of support for first home buyers. It may be 
that some relatively modest funding might be sufficient to ‘kick start’ a reasonably 
wide range of shared-equity lending products. But, in the Commission’s view, were 
more substantial support required, the case for government intervention through this 
instrument rather than through, say, a modified FHOS, would become much more 
questionable. In particular, the complexity of such arrangements could make 
appropriate targeting of government support difficult. And administrative costs per 
dollar of assistance provided could also be high relative to some of the alternative 
approaches discussed above. Hence, the Commission considers that the further 
development of shared-equity products should essentially be determined by their 
attractiveness to borrowers and lenders, subject to clarification of the taxation and 
prudential issues noted above.  
An alternative shared-equity approach was examined in another report for the recent 
Home Ownership Taskforce (Gans and King 2003). It would enable a household to 
purchase a home from a government or private investor who would retain 
ownership of the land on which the dwelling is sited. To a large extent, the issues 
raised by this approach are the same as those arising under the Caplin–Joye scheme. 
However, there would be the additional complexity created by the need to 
separately value the land and the buildings.     




Keystart and similar programs 
A number of existing programs, such as the WA Keystart program and programs 
run through the Housing Societies and Mortgage Managers Association in Victoria, 
offer housing finance to low income households. Finance might be provided with 
lower deposit requirements, at lower interest rates, or without the mortgage 
insurance required in accessing normal commercial finance, with any cost 
underwritten by government. 
To some extent, these schemes may supplant commercial finance, as suggested by 
the fact that the Keystart arrangement accounts for more than 20 per cent of first 
home buyer loan approvals in WA (BCG Residential, sub. DR292, p. 3). But these 
arrangements also assist households that might otherwise be ineligible for finance or 
that, because of poor credit ratings, would only be able to obtain it at higher cost. 
The Housing Societies and Mortgage Managers Association commented: 
We can make loans to these people because we are involved at the ‘coal face’, 
interviewing all loan applicants, continuing to monitor and advise during the course of 
the loan, [with] strict collection procedures relating to any arrears collection. 
(sub. DR266, p. 4) 
Schemes such as these have a role to play in helping low income households into 
home ownership. Indeed, they extend help to households that might otherwise be 
unable to purchase a home, even with the help of other arrangements such as the 
FHOS. However, they can involve greater inherent risk than a straightforward 
subsidy such as FHOS and, partly in consequence, their administrative costs are 
likely to be higher. Thus, the Commission would see such schemes as being of a 
‘specialist’ nature, rather than vehicles for delivering widespread support to first 
home buyers. 
Enhancing housing supply 
As noted, several participants raised concerns about declines in the stock of housing 
affordable for first home buyers in general and low income households in particular. 
To remedy this perceived shortfall, a variety of supply-side schemes were proposed:  
•  Government housing construction schemes — the establishment of government-
owned low-cost housing construction companies. The aim would be to augment 
private construction of low-cost dwellings suitable for first home buyers and 
other target groups. As well as constructing dwellings, these government 
companies would be responsible for selling the homes to target groups.     





•  Public–private partnerships — the provision of land or grants to private 
enterprise or community organisations to construct affordable housing that can 
be sold at low cost to first home buyers.  
•  Subsidising private construction — this would entail providing subsidies to 
developers to include a certain proportion of ‘affordable’ housing in each new 
development.  
•  Requiring developers to fund or construct affordable housing — this approach 
would require developers to contribute to an ‘affordable housing fund’ and/or to 
include an ‘affordable’ housing component in new housing developments. 
•  Group self-build projects — cooperative projects between the government, 
community organisations and future owners to construct houses for purchase by 
the households involved. 
As set out above, notwithstanding its general preference for demand-side 
approaches, the Commission does see a potential role for supply-side schemes 
where very specific housing needs that are unlikely to be met by the private market 
are involved.  
However, the proposals described above are much more general in nature. As such, 
they can provide a useful illustration of some of the deficiencies arising from the 
inherent prescriptiveness of supply-side approaches: 
•  All of these schemes would require the government to determine what type of 
dwellings would be most suited to the needs of recipients. With the best will in 
the world, catering for the diverse needs of even lower income home buyers 
would be very difficult. 
•  The first of these approaches would require government and thereby taxpayers to 
take on the risks of participation in the housing market. And where responsibility 
for the provision of the designated dwellings was passed onto the private sector, 
governments would still be obliged to undertake potentially costly tender and 
monitoring processes. Further, imposing affordable housing requirements on 
developers may have the inequitable and inefficient result of shifting some of the 
costs of meeting the housing needs of low income households from the 
community generally, initially to developers, and thereby to home buyers in the 
developments concerned and/or the owners of housing land. 
Moreover, as under demand-side approaches, rules on which home buyers would be 
eligible to purchase dwellings constructed under these schemes would still be 
required. That is, supply-side schemes do not obviate the need for targeting and its 
associated costs. From this perspective, supply-side schemes simply involve an 
additional layer of bureaucracy.     




Also, to the extent that the current stock of low cost housing is the outcome of 
normal demand and supply forces, increases in supply of such housing occasioned 
by the sort of schemes outlined above, may simply lead to offsetting reductions in 
private supply. Hence, the Commission reiterates that it sees the potential role for 
supply-side schemes to assist first home buyers as being limited to very specific 
situations. 
Overcoming ‘temporary’ difficulty 
The housing ‘lifeline’ proposal, developed by Gans and King (2003), was canvassed 
by the Home Ownership Taskforce. It involves establishing a loan facility which 
could be accessed by families in the event of short-term financial distress. 
Repayment of the loan would be linked to income, in a similar way to the Higher 
Education Contributions Scheme.  
Gans and King (2003) suggested that the proposal could be implemented in a 
number of ways. Key design criteria would include whether to restrict eligibility 
through a means test, the level of the cap on total payments, and the rate of interest 
charged on loans.  
The ‘lifeline’ proposal has the potential to increase home ownership in two ways: 
•  By funding mortgage repayments, it would help families in the event of   
short-term financial stress, reducing the likelihood of households being forced 
into default on their housing loans, with the consequent forced sale of their 
homes. Hence, the risks confronting those at the ‘margin’ of home ownership 
would be reduced. 
•  By providing a form of income ‘insurance’, it could make finance providers 
more willing to lend to higher risk borrowers.  
The number of households that would potentially benefit from a housing lifeline 
scheme would depend crucially on scheme design — whether it was means tested, 
for example. However, there are several reasons why its effects on home ownership 
levels might be quite small: 
•  Because the scheme does not address the capacity of owners to service a 
mortgage over the borrowing period, it does not overcome the major obstacle to 
home ownership for many low income households. And, unlike the FHOS, it 
does nothing to overcome deposit gap problems.  
•  Families use a number of other strategies for guarding against periods of 
short-term financial stress — for example, income insurance, accumulating     





savings that can be drawn down if needed, and building up credit through 
advance payments on their mortgages. 
•  Mechanisms are already available to help owners cope with short-term financial 
stress through, for example, varying repayment terms, refinancing the loan or 
obtaining bridging finance. Indeed, the Housing Industry Association considered 
that ‘the market is already fairly well serviced as banks and other financial 
institutions can frequently accommodate these short-term changes’ (sub.  177, 
p. 69). As well, some households may be eligible for assistance under state and 
territory mortgage assistance schemes. The NSW Government’s Mortgage 
Assistance Scheme, for example, provides interest free loans to households 
facing difficulties in meeting mortgage repayments due to unexpected 
difficulties such as illness or loss of employment (sub. 187, p. 97). At the public 
hearings, ACOSS commented that it would agree with the conclusion that ‘most 
state governments … broadly speaking … meet the same need, so an additional 
federal measure is probably not warranted’ (trans., p. 115). 
Thus, in the Commission’s view, the case for government funding for a new 
lifeline-type scheme is very weak. 
Financing assistance for home ownership 
As discussed earlier, participants put forward for consideration a number of possible 
bond and equity schemes designed to raise finance for the provision of low cost 
rental accommodation. These schemes, which would involve government subsidy, 
could equally be used separately or in tandem to finance support for first home 
buyers, delivered in whatever form governments judged to be most appropriate.  
In this inquiry, the Commission has not sought to evaluate the relative merits of 
these different financing approaches. Rather, its focus has been on what form of 
assistance to promote home ownership is likely to provide the greatest benefit to the 
community, and whether larger benefits might arise were those funds spent in other 
ways. The Commission notes that the Allen Consulting Group Report (see box 
10.3) was ambivalent about which of these financing instruments would be most 
beneficial. 
However, the Commission considers that these instruments, and their potential 
application to financing affordable rental housing initiatives as well as to assisting 
first home buyers, could usefully be subject to further assessment as part of the 
proposed public inquiry into the housing needs of low income households.      
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B  Who are the first home buyers? 
In this appendix, a profile of the demographic and economic circumstances of first home 
buyers is presented, to shed light on the influence of rising housing prices on the demand 
for first homes and to assist with the consideration of housing assistance measures. The 
buyer characteristics examined are: 
•  age; 
•  household composition; 
•  income and employment; 
•  housing costs; 
•  value of home purchased; 
•  location; and  
•  dwelling characteristics. 
The information sources for first home buyer household characteristics were various 
housing surveys (principally the ABS Survey of Income and Housing Costs) conducted 
over the years from 1990 to 2000-01. However, survey data are not yet available for first 
home buyers in the last couple of years when house prices have risen by up to 40 per cent 
in some cities. The main information source for first home prices and locations was data 
collected from the recipients of First Home Owner Scheme (FHOS) grants over the period 
2000-01 to 2002-03. 
B.1 Age 
Between 1990 and 2000-01, the majority of first home buyers were in their late twenties or 
early thirties (see table B.1). Only a small proportion bought their first home when aged 
over 45.     




Table B.1  Age distribution of first home buyers 
Age of household reference persona    1990 1994  1995-96  1997-98 2000-01
  Per cent of recent first home buyersb 
15 to 24  14.9  15.5  12.4  11.0  9.9
25 to 34  54.3  55.6  56.2  56.1  60.6
35 to 44  19.8  21.0  21.9  22.0  18.9
45 to 54  7.6  4.3  4.4  6.4  7.6
55 and over  3.2 3.5 5.2  4.5  3.0
Average age (years)  32.7  32.0  32.9  33.2  33.0
a Typically, one of the partners in a couple household, the parent in a single-parent household or the person in 
a lone-person household. b Households that purchased their first home in the three years preceding the 
survey.  
Sources: ABS (1988 to 1990 First Home Buyers, Australia, Cat. no. 4137.0; Housing Occupancy and Costs, 
Cat. no. 4130.0); unpublished data from ABS 2000-01 Survey of Income and Housing Costs. 
Over the decade to 2000-01, the age distribution of first home buyers has been relatively 
stable (see table B.1). The average age at first home purchase, of around 33, has remained 
virtually unchanged, as has been the proportion of first home buyers aged at 34 or under 
(70 per cent). However, some small compositional changes have occurred within various 
age groups. 
B.2 Household  composition 
Between 1990 and 2000-01, couples were the most common household type purchasing a 
first home (see table B.2). Of this group, approximately half had no children when they 
purchased. The proportion of couples with dependent children (that is, nuclear families) 
has declined slightly since the mid-1990s. 
Table B.2  Household composition of first home buyers 
Selected household type  1990  1994  1995-96  1997-98  2000-01
  Per cent of recent first home buyersa 
Couple only  32.5  34.0  29.8  33.8  32.3
Couple with children  36.4  34.2  32.8  31.2  32.9
  with dependent children only  na  na  29.6  29.3  27.1
Single parent   4.8  3.3  3.3  4.4  4.2
Lone person  12.1  15.7  23.2  17.3  17.5
  aged under 35   na  na  na  na  11.9
a Households that purchased their first home in the three years preceding the survey. na Not available. 
Sources: ABS (1988 to 1990 First Home Buyers, Australia, Cat. no. 4137.0; Housing Occupancy and Costs, 
Cat. no. 4130.0); unpublished data from ABS 2000-01 Survey of Income and Housing Costs.     




While single-parent households account for a small proportion of first home buyers, 
lone-person households have become a more significant purchasing group. 
B.3 Income  and  employment 
First home buyers tend to have higher incomes than other households. In 2000-01, for 
example, recent first home buyers had an average weekly household income of $1200 
before tax — 21 per cent more than the average income of all households. Over 50 per cent 
of them were in the top two income quintiles (see table B.3). 
Table B.3  Income distribution of first home buyer households 
Income quintile  1994  1995-96  1997-98  2000-01
  Per cent of recent first home buyersa 
Lowest 4.9  8.7  8.4  5.8
Second 14.4  11.6  13.2  12.2
Third 25.7  26.9  24.2  27.2
Fourth 31.9  35.1  31.7  29.7
Highest 23.1  17.7  22.5  25.1
a Households that purchased their first home in the three years preceding the survey. 
Sources: ABS (Housing Occupancy and Costs, Cat. no. 4130.0); unpublished data from ABS 2000-01 Survey 
of Income and Housing Costs. 
Moreover, the average household incomes of first home buyers have been rising faster 
(45 per cent) than average household income overall (37 per cent). The share of first home 
buyers in the lowest two household income quintiles fell slightly between 1994 and 
2000-01. 
Excluding those not in the workforce, such as retirees and students, all but 3 per cent of 
households that purchased their first home in the three years to 2000-01 were in full or 
part-time employment. As well as having higher employment than the general workforce, 
the majority of first home buyer households had at least two income earners and the 
proportion has grown since the mid-1990s — helping to explain the more rapid rise in 
weekly income of recent first home buyers than of households generally (see table B.4). 
The growing proportion of first home buyer households with at least two incomes, may in 
turn partly be in response to rising house prices.     




Table B.4  Employment status of first home buyers 
Number of earners  1995-96  1997-98  2000-01
  Per cent of recent first home buyersa 
Two or more  49.2  54.1  54.0
  at least two full-time workers  na  na  40.4
  at least one full-time worker and at 
  least one part-time worker  na  na  14.2
One 42.1  34.9  38.8
None 8.7  11.0  7.2
  at least one person seeking work  na  na  2.9
  no person in the workforce  na  na  4.3
a Households that purchased their first home in the three years preceding the survey. na Not available. 
Sources: ABS (Housing Occupancy and Costs, Cat. no. 4130.0); unpublished data from ABS 2000-01 Survey 
of Income and Housing Costs. 
B.4 Housing  costs 
In 2000-01, about 87 per cent of first home buyer households that purchased their first 
home in the three preceding years had a mortgage (compared with 89 per cent in 1990). On 
average, they spent $264 a week on mortgage repayments and property rates. For recent 
first home buyer households without a mortgage, the other housing costs averaged $54 a 
week. 
Over the decade to 2000-01, weekly housing costs of first home buyer households rose by 
13 per cent on average. This was unlikely to have been affected by a change in the relative 
numbers of buyers with and without mortgages, which remained generally stable over the 
period. Rather, the impact on housing costs of lower interest rates was more than offset by 
a rise in average loans. 
However, because of their strong income growth, housing costs for first home buyer 
households, generally fell as a proportion of household income. First home buyer 
households commonly spent less than 30 per cent of their income on housing costs in 
2000-01 (see table B.5). Housing costs as a proportion of income were considerably higher 
for households in the lowest income quintile. However, the income estimates for these 
households could potentially be unreliable because of a limited sample size and 
underreporting of income. The decline in housing costs as a proportion of income was 
most notable for first home buyers in the second income quintile.      




Table B.5  Housing costs of first home buyers 
Income quintile  1990  1995-96  1997-98  2000-01
  Per cent of pre-tax household income a  
Lowest na  42  58  (b)
Second na  36  27  28
Third   na  26  26  26
Fourth na  21  22  20
Highest   na 19 15  16
All income classes  26  23  21  20
a Ratio of average weekly housing costs (including mortgage payments and property rates) to the average 
weekly income for recent first home buyers in the same income quintile. Households with nil or negative 
income are excluded in this calculation. b Estimate not included because it is potentially unreliable (see text). 
na Not available. 
Sources: ABS (Housing Occupancy and Costs, Cat. no. 4130.0); unpublished data from ABS 2000-01 Survey 
of Income and Housing Costs. 
B.5  Value of home purchased 
Not surprisingly, first home buyers generally purchase cheaper homes than change-over 
buyers. In the second half of the 1990s, the average value of first owned homes was just 
under 80  per cent of the average value of homes bought by change-over buyers (see 
table B.6). 
Table B.6  Median values of first owned homes 
Income quintile  1995-96 1997-98 2000-01
  ($’000) 
Lowest 108 (90) 107 (94) (a)
Second 116 (92) 105 (88) 120 (72)
Third 105 (74) 121 (81) 140 (78)
Fourth 123 (76) 126 (75) 160 (76)
Highest 140 (61) 144 (62) 200 (67)
All income classes 121 (74) 124 (77) 155 (78)
Note. The nominal home value is estimated and reported by the household respondent, so it may differ from 
the purchase price. Figures in parentheses are the ratios (in per cent) of the median value of homes bought by 
recent first home buyers to the median value of homes bought by recent change-over buyers in the same 
household income quintile. a Estimate not included because it is potentially unreliable. na Not available. 
Sources: ABS (Housing Occupancy and Costs, Cat. no. 4130.0); unpublished data from ABS 2000-01 Survey 
of Income and Housing Costs. 
In 2000-01, purchase prices ranged between a national average of $120  000 for lower 
income first home buyers and $200  000 for those at the upper end of the income 
distribution. The variation in first home purchase prices across household income quintiles     




was previously smaller, roughly between $100  000 and $150  000 in both 1995-96 and 
1997-98. 
The relative price difference between first home and change-over purchases also varies 
across income quintiles (see table B.6). It was less for households in the lowest income 
quintile but over 30 per cent lower for those in the highest income quintile. 
Prices paid for first owned homes in metropolitan and regional areas 
Consistent with the national picture, median prices paid by first home buyers in larger 
capital cities were lower than city-wide medians (see table B.7). For example, the median 
prices paid by the recipients of the FHOS grants between 2000-01 and 2002-03 in 
Melbourne, Brisbane and Adelaide were about 10 to 20  per cent below the city-wide 
median prices. In Sydney, the median first home price was nearly 30 per cent below the 
market median. The wider price gap supports the widely held perception that first home 
buyers in Sydney face greater price constraints in choosing an affordable home than first 
home buyers in the other capital cities. 
Table B.7  Home prices paid by FHOS grant recipients in selected capital 
cities 
City Period  Median price of first owned homesa
   $’000   As a percentage of city-wide median 
price 
Sydney 2000-01  218  74 
 2001-02  250 71 
 2002-03  305 72 
Melbourneb  2000-01 to 2002-03  182  80 
Brisbane 2000-01  137  77 
 2001-02  151  88 
 2002-03  185  86 
Adelaide 2000-01  120  84 
 2001-02  135  82 
 2002-03  160  79 
a For Sydney and Melbourne, the median first home price is estimated using detached-house price data. For 
Brisbane and Adelaide, price data for all dwelling types were used. b For Melbourne, the median price is 
estimated for the three-year period as FHOS price data for individual financial years were unavailable to the 
Commission. 
Sources: Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished FHOS data from NSW Office of State 
Revenue, Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance, Queensland Department of Treasury and SA 
Department of Treasury and Finance. 
The gap between the average prices paid by first home buyers and other buyers (including 
investors and change-over buyers) appears to be mainly attributable to them buying 
properties in cheaper suburbs rather than buying cheaper dwellings across cities. In Sydney     




and Melbourne, the median price paid by first home buyers was generally close to the 
suburb median price. However, median prices in the suburbs where most of the first home 
purchases were made were often more than 20 per cent below the city-wide median (see 
figures B.1 and B.2). 
Housing in many regional areas appears to be more affordable for first home buyers than in 
metropolitan areas. For example, first home buyers in many regional centres in NSW and 
Victoria have typically bought homes with values close to market averages (see table B.8). 

















Suburb median First-owned-home median
 
Note. The postcode areas included accounted for 41 per cent of FHOS grant recipients in Sydney. 
Data sources: Unpublished FHOS data from the NSW Office of State Revenue; unpublished suburb price data 
from the NSW Housing Department.  
Sydney median: $422 000    






















Suburb median First-owned-home median
 
Note.  The postcode areas included accounted for 36 per cent of FHOS grant recipients in Melbourne. The 
median prices are estimated for the three-year period as FHOS price data for individual financial years were 
unavailable to the Commission. 
Data sources: Unpublished FHOS data from the Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance; suburb price 
data from the Department of Sustainability and the Environment (2003a). 
 
Table B.8  Home prices paid by FHOS grant recipients in selected regional 
localities 
Localitya  Median price of first owned homes
 $’000   As a percentage of market-wide median price
New South Wales (2002-03)      
 Newcastle  130  81
 Wollongong  160  85
 Albury  110  95
 Wagga  Wagga  116  85
Victoria (2000-01 to 2002-03)b   
 Geelong  147  86
 Ballarat  123  90
 Mildura  128  87
 Bendigo  117  86
 Wodonga  124  86
a The NSW localities included in the analysis accounted for 39 per cent of the number of FHOS grants for 
home purchases outside Sydney in 2002-03. The corresponding coverage of FHOS grant recipients in country 
Victoria was 34 per cent. b The median prices for Victorian localities are estimated for the three-year period as 
FHOS price data for individual financial years were unavailable to the Commission.  
Sources: Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished FHOS data from NSW Office of State 
Revenue and Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance, and locality price data from NSW Department of 
Housing (Rent and Sales Report, various issues) and DSE (2003a). 
Melbourne median: $227 000     





The geographic distribution of first home buyers broadly accords with the distribution of 
population across states and territories (see table B.9). About 70 per cent of recent first 
home buyers live in capital cities, compared with 60 per cent of all resident households. 
Table B.9  Distribution of first home purchases by state and territory 
 1990a 1999a 2000-01a, b 2002-03c
  Per cent of recent first home buyersd  
New South Wales   32  33  27 (21)  30 
Victoria 25  29  29  (21)  23 
Queensland 16  15  19  (10)  22 
Western Australia   11  8  12 (  9)  11 
South Australia   10  9  6 (  5)  8 
Tasmania  4  3  3 (  1)  3 
Northern Territory   1  1  1 
Australian Capital Territory   2  2  3 (na)  2 
a Based on ABS survey data. b Figures in parentheses are for capital cities. c Based on FHOS data covering 
2000-01 to 2002-03. d Households that purchased their first home in the three years preceding the survey and 
data collection. na Not available. 
Sources: ABS (1988 to 1990 First Home Buyers, Australia, Cat. no. 4137.0; Australian Housing Survey, Cat. 
no. 4182.0); unpublished data from ABS 2000-01 Survey of Income and Housing Costs; unpublished FHOS 
data from Australian Government Treasury. 
Intra-city location choices 
According to data obtained from the recipients of FHOS grants in Sydney, Melbourne and 
Adelaide, the location choices of first home buyers in these cities vary considerably.  
In Sydney, recent first home buyers have located mainly in suburbs with cheaper prices 
such as the city’s outer western areas (see figure  B.3). In the three years to 2002-03, 
Sydney’s middle and outer suburbs were the choice of 32 per cent and 35 per cent of first 
home buyers respectively (see figure B.4). Another 15 per cent purchased at the urban 
fringe. And, while less than 20 per cent purchased in Sydney’s inner areas, this share is 
higher than in the past, with increasing numbers of first home buyers purchasing inner-city 
apartments and other high-density dwellings.     




Figure B.3  Geographic distribution of first home purchases in Sydney, 
2000-01 to 2002-03 
under 50 50 to 99 100 to 499 500 or over
20km 40km 60km
 
Note.  Data points refer to postcode areas and are grouped by the average annual number of first home 
purchases over the period 2000-01 to 2002-03. Concentric ovals indicate the distance from the central 
business district. 
Data source: Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished FHOS data from NSW Office of State 
Revenue. 
In Melbourne, many recent first home buyers have purchased in the city’s south–eastern, 
northern and north–western suburbs (see figure B.5). Of all recent first home purchases in 
the city, 15 per cent were in fringe areas, 34 per cent in outer areas, 36 per cent in middle 
areas and 14 per cent in inner areas. In contrast to Sydney, the number of first home buyers 
purchasing a home in Melbourne’s fringe areas has increased over the past decade (see 
figure B.6). 
In Adelaide, there seems to be no distinct geographic concentration of recent first home 
purchases (see figure B.7), though over 70 per cent have been within 20 kilometres of the 
city centre. 
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Inner Middle Outer Fringe
 
Note.  The zones in Sydney are defined as follows: (i) inner zone — less than 10 kilometres from the CBD; 
(ii)  middle zone — between 10 kilometres and 30 kilometres from the CBD; (iii) outer zone — between 
30 kilometres and 50 kilometres from the CBD; and (iv) fringe zone — more than 50 kilometres from the CBD. 
The distribution is based on the number of first home purchases in the three years preceding the survey.  
Data sources: Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished FHOS data from NSW Office of State 
Revenue and unpublished data from the 1991 Housing and Location Choice Survey commissioned by the 
National Housing Strategy Advisory Committee (NHS 1992). 
Figure B.5  Geographic distribution of first home purchases in Melbourne, 
2000-01 to 2002-03 
under 50 50 to 99 100 to 499 500 or over
20km 40km 60km
 
Note.  Data points refer to postcode areas and are grouped by the average annual number of first home 
purchases over the period 2000-01 to 2002-03. Concentric ovals indicate the distance from the CBD. 
Data source: Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished FHOS data from the Victorian 
Department of Treasury and Finance. 
North     


























Inner Middle Outer Fringe
 
Note.  The zones in Melbourne are defined as follows: (i) inner zone — less than 10 kilometres from the CBD; 
(ii)  middle zone — between 10 kilometres and 25 kilometres from the CBD; (iii) outer zone — between 
25 kilometres and 40 kilometres from the CBD; and (iv) fringe zone — more than 40 kilometres from the CBD. 
The distribution is based on the numbers of first home purchases in the three years preceding the survey.  
Data sources: Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished FHOS data from the Victorian 
Department of Treasury and Finance and unpublished data from the 1991 Housing and Location Choice 
Survey commissioned by the National Housing Strategy Advisory Committee (see NHS 1992). 
Figure B.7  Geographic distribution of first home purchases in Adelaide, 
2000-01 to 2002-03  
under 50 50 to 99 100 to 499 500 or over
40km 20km
 
Note.  Data points refer to postcode areas and are grouped by the average annual number of first home 
purchases over the period 2000-01 to 2002-03. Concentric ovals indicate the distance from the CBD. 
Data source: Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished FHOS data from SA Department of 
Treasury and Finance. 
North     




B.7 Dwelling  characteristics 
Detached houses are the most common type of first owned homes in Australia, accounting 
for just under 80 per cent of dwellings occupied by recent first home buyers in 2000-01 
(see table B.10). This compares with 84 percent for change-over buyers. However, higher-
density living has increased among first home buyers, with the proportion of townhouse 
and apartment purchases rising from 12 per cent to 20 per cent over the decade to 2000-01. 
Table B.10  Selected dwelling characteristics 
 1990 1994 1995-96  1997-98  2000-01
  Per cent of recent first home buyersa  
Dwelling structure     
 separate  house  87 82 82  82  79
 semi-detached  townhouse  5 9 8  7  9
 apartment  or  flat  7 9 8  10  11
Dwelling age     
 new  na 26 23  18  20
 established  na 74 77  82  80
  Average number of bedrooms 
Dwelling size  2.8 2.9 2.8  2.9  3.0
a Households that purchased their first home in the three years preceding the survey. na Not available. 
Sources: ABS (Housing Occupancy and Costs, Cat. no. 4130.0); unpublished data from ABS 2000-01 Survey 
of Income and Housing Costs. 
A large and increasing majority of first home buyers purchase established dwellings, with 
the proportion rising from 74 per cent in 1994 to 80 per cent in 2000-01. The pattern was 
similar for change-over buyers, with the proportion who purchased established dwellings 
increasing from 67 to 78 per cent over the same period. 
Over the decade to 2000-01, first home buyers also tended to purchase bigger homes — for 
example, the average number of bedrooms in a first owned home increased from 2.8 in 
1990 to 3.0 in 2000-01. For change-over buyers, the average number of bedrooms in the 
purchased home also increased — from 3.1 to 3.3 over the same period.     
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